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ABSTRACT
COMPELLENCE: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE
Michael G. Dziubinski
Old Dominion University, 2004
Director: Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz

Compellence, the use of a contingent threat of force to get a target state to modify
a behavior, is an understudied area of international relations. An empirical examination of
this area reveals patterns of the frequency o f attempted compellence and successful
compellence that are not explained by current research or broader international relations
theories. In the post-World War II period (1946-2001), the pattern is a rapid drop and
continued suppression of success, but a continuation of compellence attempts at the
historic level. Existing compellence research and international relations theory do not
explain this puzzling disparity of low success and continued attempts at compellence. By
comparing this pattern with a sample of the previous conditions (1914-1945), this study
provides initial findings about the compellence puzzle. Key among them is the effects of
the shift in the international system after World War II, the American policy of
containment, norm formation and promulgation, shifts of compellence from the core to
the periphery, and the domestic effects of compellence on the longevity of leaders.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The rebellion of 1896 on Crete, fomented in part by a Greek nationalist society,
appeared to present Greece with an opportunity to annex the island. The action took place
against a background of growing Greek concern over the treatment of Christians by their
Muslim rulers on Crete, which was under Turkish domination. By the beginning of 1897,
large consignments of arms had been sent to Crete from Greece. On January 21st, the
Greek fleet was mobilized and in early February Greek troops landed on the island.
Union with Greece was proclaimed.
Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Germany, and Austro-Hungary were united in their
opposition to this challenge to the prevailing international order. Acting in concert, they
imposed a blockade upon Greece to prevent assistance being sent from the mainland to
the island. This combination of states wielded over half of the military capability that
existed in the world at that point; Turkey possessed about 2 percent of the total military
capability, and Greece about 2/1 Os of a percent. Thwarted in their attempt to assist their
compatriots in Crete, the Greeks instead sent a force, commanded by Prince Constantine,
to attack the Turks in Thessaly. By the end of April, the Greeks had been overwhelmed
by the Turkish military. The Greeks then yielded to pressure from the European powers,
withdrew their troops from Crete, and accepted an armistice on the mainland. A peace
treaty compelled Greece to pay Turkey an indemnity, to accept an international financial
commission that would control Greek finances, and to yield some territory in Thessaly to

This paper follows the format requirements o f The Chicago Manual o f Style 15th Edition by The
University o f Chicago Press.
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Turkey. Under pressure from the great powers, Turkish troops also left Crete, which
became an international protectorate. There were no battle deaths on the part of the major
powers nor any battle deaths inflicted on Greece and Turkey by the major powers.1
In comparison, the U.S. and the UN had been demanding that the Taliban of
Afghanistan deport Osama bin Laden since 1998. Then, on September 18, 2001, a week
after the suicide attack on the World Trade Center, the UN Security Council,
substantially at the behest of the U.S., demanded that Afghanistan turn over bin Laden
immediately and unconditionally. Taliban leaders rejected the idea that Osama bin Laden
had anything to do with the attack. At this point, the U.S. possessed approximately 15
percent o f all military capability in the world, the Taliban, approximately 1/10 of 1
percent, an overmatch of 150 times. The following day United States ordered 100
military aircraft and the Theodore Roosevelt carrier battle group to the Persian Gulf.
Various Afghan religious leaders threatened jihad if any attacks were conducted on
Afghanistan. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees warned the U.S. that military
actions would exacerbate an already bad refugee problem in Afghanistan. The UN World
Food Program also highlighted the fragile conditions of the Afghan people cautioning
against military action. The Iranian foreign minister and Hamas cautioned against
military actions also. On September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed the U.S.
Congress and issued a demand for Afghanistan to turn over Osama bin Laden and destroy

1 Theodore George Tatsios, The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War o f 1897: The Impact o f
the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1984),
90-137; D. Scott Bennett and Allan C.Stam, "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,". International Interactions
26 (2000): 179-204, http://eugenesoftware.org (accessed 2 April 2004); Faten Ghosn and Glenn Palmer,
"Codebook for the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, Version 3.0,". 2003, Correlates o f War 2 Project,
http://cow2.la.psu.edu (accessed 16 April 2003). Through the course o f this work when numeric facts are
communicated they have been derived from manipulation o f data in the EUGene software program and
associated databases. Details o f that manipulation are found in the Appendix. Where data is from
elsewhere it is so indicated with an appropriate cite.
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terrorist camps in Afghanistan. After fruitless dialogue through various intermediaries,
the U.S. began to conduct military operations on October 7, 2001. After initial strikes, on
October 11, 2001, President Bush offered the Taliban a second chance to turn over
Osama bin Laden. The offer was again rejected.
Despite the overwhelming capabilities of the U.S. and the relative international
isolation of the Taliban, the U.S. ultimately had to use its military force directly in
Afghanistan. A combination of forces under local warlords, U.S. Special Forces, and U.S.
airpower with precision guided munitions destroyed most of the Taliban capability and
structure. The country fell from Taliban control on December 6, 2001. Osama bin Laden
has yet to be captured and managing events in Afghanistan remains a difficult challenge
for the U.S.
The Crete dispute of 1896 is an example of highly successful compellence.
Afghanistan is a compellence failure. In the first, sovereign states, Greece and Turkey,
ceased a behavior and took on other behaviors when threatened by a superior military
force. In the second, a state refused to cease sheltering Osama bin Laden and eventually
ended up in a disastrous, regime replacing war. The Afghanistan example highlights an
important characteristic of compellence. The U.S. achieved a quick military victory over
the Taliban, but the very fact that it had to use overwhelming military force was a result
of the failure o f its compellence threats before the war. This distinction between the
threat of the use of force and the actual use of force points to the need to create a
description from a broader understanding o f the ideas behind compellence.

2 Cable News Network, "Osama Bin Laden," 2002, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/
trade.center/ binladen.section.html (accessed 25 Aug 2004); Cable News Network, "The History o f
Afghanistan," 2002, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/afghanistan.timeline/index.html
(accessed 25 Aug 2004).
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This work will establish a broader understanding of compellence than is available
from current international relations research. By first providing an empirical base, current
compellence research and international relations theory can be challenged and leveraged
to build that understanding. This empirical examination will reveal a counterintuitive
pattern of compellence after World War II. This pattern, with a sudden drop and
continued suppression of success coupled with a continued historic level of attempts is
puzzling, in that it is not easily explained using current theory or logic. By addressing this
puzzle, we will increase our understanding of compellence as a phenomenon and chart a
path for future research.

Defining Compellence
Thomas Schelling’s Arms and Influence is widely recognized as the authoritative
source for the initial formulation of this issue area.3 By contrasting the act of taking
something from someone by force or convincing them to give it to you from fear,
Schelling differentiates between what he calls “brute force” and coercion. Brute force is
an act of controlling or seizing that the adversary has no choice in. The functional view of
coercion is the communication of a threat to cause pain to the other party unless they
comply and the subsequent decision to comply or resist. He further differentiates threats
that deter and threats that compel. Deterrence is characterized by the threat of pain
intended to ensure that an action is not taken. Compellence is characterized by a threat of
pain intended to ensure that action is taken.4 In the case of the Greeks and Turks, the

3

Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

4 Ibid., 3-4, 76.
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threat of pain communicated by the major powers of Europe was sufficiently persuasive
to both parties to take actions that they would otherwise not have taken.
Alexander George and William Simons divided Schelling’s compellence into
offensive and defensive aspects in their landmark book The Limits o f Coercive
Diplomacy.5 They use the term coercive diplomacy to describe a subset of compellence
actions that are defensive in nature and exclude offensive uses. The differentiation is that
in defensive uses the target state of the compellence has already changed the status quo,
thus the compellence is an attempt to reverse that change, whereas offensive compellence
would be to proactively changing the status quo via the threat of pain. Further, their
conceptualization of coercive diplomacy rests on the proportions of diplomacy and force.
This particular formulation is largely diplomatic, force being used only as an exemplar.6
In a later work, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War,
Alexander George shifts the proportions of diplomacy and force even further towards the
diplomatic end, focusing on persuasion vice the use of military capabilities.7
Nevertheless, the activities that some scholars call coercive diplomacy appear to be a type
of compellence that can provide insight to the larger topic.
Other scholars suggest other methods of linking diplomacy and force to
accomplish objectives that is not compellence. In Coercive Inducement and the
Containment o f International Crises, Daniel, Hayes, and de Jonge Oudraat, leaning
heavily on a recent U.N. experiences, suggest a set of actions that is between the U.N.
tradition of impartial peacekeeping based on consent of the parties and simple
5 Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits o f Coercive Diplomacy, 2d ed.
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).
6 Ibid., 8.
7

Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War
(Washington DC: U.S. Institution o f Peace, 1991).
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enforcement action on behalf of the attacked state.8 The primary focus of their
conceptualization is diplomatic, using the change mechanisms of discussion,
blandishments, appeals to emotions or conscience, rewards, threats, or punishments. The
authors treat coercive inducement as a variant of coercive diplomacy. They call for less
emphasis on the use of the military to threaten, instead emphasizing defensive military
actions to hold aggressors’ capabilities harmless, which provides room for suasion to be
effective.9 This use of physical force to set conditions so that other capabilities, such as
diplomatic means, can create change but is not compellence per se, as the writers do not
suggest that the threat of punishment is the primary change mechanism. Since this
approach is closely related to compellence, it may still provide usable insights.
These delineations are not universally accepted across the field of international
relations. Lawrence Freedman, in an edited volume, Strategic Coercion, finds the idea of
coercive diplomacy not to be analytically useful.10 As his title suggests, he forwards what
he contends is an improved conceptualization that encompasses Schelling’s and George’s
constructs. This conceptualization agrees with the general construct of coercion and
includes a close regard for how strategic actors construct reality and how each actor
understands how the other actor constructs reality.11
Capturing ground closer to war, Cimbala in Coercive Military Strategy espouses
the use of a broader range of action across the diplomatic - combat spectrum. He views
this strategy as inclusive of coercive diplomacy, but open ended in terms of readiness to

g

Donald C. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes, and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Coercive Inducement and the
Containment o f International Crises (Washington, DC: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1999).
9 Ibid., 21-24.
10 Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," in Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, ed.
Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 18.
11 Ibid., 36.
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escalate into full-scale warfare.12 He agrees with Pape, in Bombing to Win: Air Power
and Coercion in War, on characterizations of strategies for military coercion. These
include punishment, risk, denial, and decapitation.13 Unlike the previous authors,
Cimbala and Pape paint these strategies as linked to technological advances and modem
times. Although more focused on the military dimension, these coercive military
strategies can inform our understanding of compellence.
As suggested above, it is important to clarify how compellence is different from
war, deterrence, or crisis. In the broadest sense, war-like acts could constitute part of the
communication of the contingent demand or the punishment following non-compliance,
or the environment in which compellence was attempted. For example, the bombing of
Nagasaki and Hiroshima were certainly the ultimate war-like act, but were also a
communication of potential future punishment. After the Taliban resisted the demands of
the U.S., the first week of destruction provided a strong example of punishment before
delivering the final ultimatum. Prior to the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the U.S.
had been conducting a vigorous island hopping campaign across the Pacific, providing
the Japanese with the environment within which the compellence threat was delivered.
Nevertheless, the basic difference between war and compellence is the ability for
the target to be able to decide. In war, control of land, people, and resources is the
objective; a decision by the target is not necessarily required to be successful. Eventually,
the target’s physical capability to effectively resist can be destroyed. The objective in
compellence is to get the target to decide to conduct an action that benefits the sender,

12

Stephen J. Cimbala, Coercive Military Strategy (College Station: Texas A & M University
Press, 1998).
13
Robert Anthony Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell
University Press, 1996).
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even while the target has the means to resist. Therefore, compellence can be an activity
conducted within war, but neither war nor compellence is required to coexist temporally
for the other to achieve its aims.
The difference between compellence and deterrence is small but significant. Both
have a sender and a target, both have a punishment contingent demand, and operate in an
environment, but the nature of the outcome is different. Successful compellence is
marked by a behavior that is initiated, changed, or stopped. Deterrence, on the other hand
is marked by a behavior that is not conducted, an action not taken, a continuation of the
status quo.
Finally, crisis and compellence often seem to be incorrectly conflated. Many are
familiar with the Cuban Missile Crisis, where perhaps the most famous compellence
event occurred, but fewer are familiar with the thousands of other cases of compellence.
Thus, it is understandable that these characterizations of political actions may be
confused. To clarify this relationship it is helpful to review the meaning of the word
“crisis.” The etymologic root is normally rendered in the sense that affairs have
progressed to the point of decision where the outcome could be strongly positive or
strongly negative.14 Compellence can be used to influence the outcome, as was done by
President Kennedy, but a crisis, i.e. a point of decision, existed for the U.S. before he
decided to threaten the blockade and boarding of Soviet ships. Crisis and compellence
can occur together or separately. A crisis can be created or resolved without the use of
compellence, as the Soviet Union created a point of decision (crisis) for the U.S. by

14

"Oxford English Dictionary," in Oxford English Dictionary. Additions Series, ed. John Simpson
and Edmund Weiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
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moving missiles onto the island of Cuba. However, the use of compellence may cause a
crisis for the target state, as the U.S. did for the Soviet Union.
Compellence in the Context o f the Tools o f Statecraft
The previous descriptive discussion implied that there are various types of
statecraft. It may be useful at this point to place compellence in a broader framework of
statecraft to clarify its boundaries. David Baldwin in Economic Statecraft provides a
useful review and categorization of the means of statecraft that has been derived from
multiple other works.15 The initial differentiation is between policy, power, and means.
Policy studies focus on state goals and how those goals are selected. The study of power
focuses on a relational construct, where one actor can influence the actions of another
actor. Means are the tools that allow states to exercise that power to achieve the policy
goals.
Baldwin presents a categorization of those means that includes propaganda,
diplomacy, economic, and military as four types of statecraft. Propaganda is used to
influence primarily based on manipulation of verbal or written symbols. This activity is a
one-way transmission of information that may influence the recipients’ belief structure
and result in changed behavior. Diplomacy, in contrast, is a two-way exchange, a
negotiation. There may be manipulation of verbal or written symbols, but the main
function is to get the other party to agree to an action since he now sees that it is in his
best interests. Part of that two-way negotiation may be to change the conditions of the
proposed agreement to find a mutually beneficial solution. Economic statecraft is the
manipulation of resources that have a market price to achieve policy aims. This

15 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 928.
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manipulation can influence other actors since it creates either advantages or
disadvantages for the target entity within a market. The target entity may be willing to
change some behaviors in exchange for re-establishing or improving favorable market
conditions. The military statecraft category is not as well defined, but is of great interest
to this work. Baldwin only indicates that military statecraft refers to influence attempts
that involve primarily violence, force, or weapons.16 Although these categories were
meant to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, it is likely that states use a mixture of the
four types of means for different situations and targets. Compellence, as outlined by
Schelling and George, appears to have some characteristics of both the diplomatic and the
military versions of statecraft as both the aspect of negotiation and the potential for use of
force are inherent parts.
Individual versus State Perspective on Compellence
Understanding coercion, and specifically compellence, may appear to be easy
since we all share an instinctive understanding of what it is to be threatened with the use
of force. In a dyadic encounter, without the presence of a police authority to enforce rules
of behavior, a person threatens the use of force by communicating by word or gesture that
they have the capability and the willingness to injure you or take your life. Most
commonly, at the individual level, this is linked to a demand to relinquish some material
possession such as money, jewelry, or a car. In these cases, we act as if our internal
calculus tells us that resistance is not worth the chance of injury or loss of life. Part of this
calculus acknowledges loss of life is not a common outcome, but also understands how

16 Ibid., 13-14.
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easily it might be accomplished.17 The result, much to the enrichment of the criminal
element, is that individual level compellence, when attempted, is often successful,
without having to actually resort to violence. At that level, in the U.S. in the year 2000,
•
•
• 18 •
320,000 out of 520,000 robberies were completed without injury to the victim. This
means that over 60 percent of the time, at least for robbery in the U.S., individual level
compellence is successful.
However, this commonsense understanding of compellence and likely lack of
resistance at the individual level misleads when we attempt to explain or apply
compellence at the state level. Given the substantially different outcomes, our
understanding of state level compellence, and the attendant factors that make success
difficult, need to be constructed differently in order to understand this oft used but
seldom successful tool of statecraft.
In comparison to the individual level compellence example, there are a number of
differences in the setting and transaction that may create different outcomes. A key
difference in setting is that individual compellence is often attempted out of the public
view, where the target cannot call on the larger community for assistance in resisting the
sender, whereas in state level compellence demands and threats are often delivered in a
public way with the understanding that other actors will be substantially aware of the
exchange. Another key difference in setting is that the participants in an individual
interaction likely believe that this is a onetime encounter, or that a long-term exchange is
17

Thomas Simon, James Mercy, and Craig Perkins, National Crime Victimization Survey:
Injuries from Violent Crime, 1992-98, Bureau o f Justice Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention no. NCJ 168633 (U.S. Department o f Justice, Office o f Justice Programs & U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 2001).
18
Ann L. Pastore and Kathleen Maguire eds, Sourcebook o f Criminal Justice Statistics 2001.
Department o f Justice, Bureau o f Justice Statistics, http://www.albany.edu/sourcehook/ (accessed 03 May
2003).
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not critical to the sender's goal achievement. State level compellence stands in contrast,
where it is understood that the target and the sender will continue to coexist within the
international system for the foreseeable future. More broadly, other actors in the
international system will have observed the interaction, have the opportunity to intervene,
and themselves will have future contact with both the target and the sender. Unlike the
individual level, at the state level the information content of a previous compellence
attempt is available to impact future attempts. The outcome of state-to-state compellence
attempts is not simply yielding a material object that likely could be replaced. The
outcome, played out in public, has the potential for both informational and materiel
content and subsequent repercussions that could have impacts on the long-term survival
of the state, its leaders and how compellence is viewed.
Finally, the obvious difference is that the actors on either side in state level
compellence are not truly unitary. The fact that there is a political leader and supporters
on either side and that their interaction can be shaped by or may shape the behavior in the
compellence episode makes this case much more complex in interactions. As is outlined
by Jakobsen, George, and Schelling, substantial sender attention is focused on domestic
political interests, decision-making process control along with considerations of the form
and nature of the threatened punishment that might convince the target to be compelled.19
These differences between the state level and individual level compellence
highlight the shortcomings of our instinctual understanding of compellence when we try
to explain outcomes at the state level. Our understanding of the dynamic of individual

19

Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use o f Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge
fo r Theory and Practice (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 36, 41; George, Forceful Persuasion, 33-37;
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 90-91.
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level compellence provides little leverage against the analytic problem of why state level
compellence is difficult and even less leverage on why it has changed.

The Compellence Puzzle
Most know Thucydides’ account of the Melian dialogue, where the Athenians argued
with the leaders of Milos to surrender their city and submit politically to Athens. The
Melians, trusting to allies, gods, and fate, did not comply. After a lengthy siege, the
Athenians took the city, killing the men, enslaving the women and children, and resettling
the island with colonists of their own. As is evidenced by the Melian dialogue,
compellence is not just a modem phenomenon.

20

Figure 1 shows the more recent history of compellence. As we look across that
history, the success and failure of compellence is not randomly distributed. From 1816 to
1907, on average, compellence attempt frequency was 6.9 percent of the number of states
in the international system. Between 1908 and 1930, the rate increased to 12.6 percent,
almost double the previous rate. Between 1931 and 1945, compellence attempt frequency
was 17.2 percent, more than double the initial period and substantially more than the
previous. In the period 1946 to 2001, despite the massive increase the number of states
(68 to 191), compellence attempts fell only to 13.9 percent of the number of states in the
international system. This is still twice the rate of compellence attempts per state than the
initial period, and higher than the years surrounding World War I.
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Figure 1 Ten Year Moving Averages of Frequency of Attempted Compellence per
Number of States and Success Rate as Percent, Superimposed

The change in the rate of successful compellence is even more dramatic. In
looking at the rate of successful compellence, it is first important to note that out of the
1,558 attempts, very few, 105, were successful. Successful compellence is a fairly rare
occurrence. Although the rate for successful compellence across the entire period is 6.7
percent, the pre-World War II rate for successful compellence is 16.8 percent, and postWorld War II only 2.1 percent.
This data reveals a pattern of relatively more successful compellence between
1816 and 1945. The pattern changes after 1945. Looking across the period 1946 - 2001
compellence was attempted at a rate that equaled 17 percent of the number of states in
each year and of those, approximately 2 percent of attempts were successful. In other
words, although the rate of attempt per state increased slightly, the chance of success fell
precipitously. Given the large increase in numbers of states after World War II, (1945-64
states, 1965-125 states, 1985-161 states), the number of compellence attempts increased
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from an average of 5 a year prior to World War II to an average of 23.6 a year after
World War II, while the chances for success became more remote.
In particular, immediately after World War II, the practice of state level
compellence underwent a substantial shift that persists today. Before 1946, state level
compellence was routinely conducted and had a moderate success rate. States could issue
a demarche, or mass troops on a border, or conduct a cross border raid and achieve a
change in behavior on the part of another state. After 1945, state level compellence
attempts became more numerous, but the frequency of successful compellence dropped
precipitously. In the later period states that issued threats, or massed forces, or destroyed
training camps in a desert were unlikely to achieve a change in another states’ behavior,
and often only succeed at increasing tensions.
This is a significant puzzle. Military force has been and remains one of the key
tools for a state to defend its interests and achieve its policy aims in an international
system that consists of co-equal sovereign states. The use of military force has ranged
from full-scale war, with unconditional surrender as its only goal, to verbal
communications about the potential use of military force at some unspecified future date.
Given the financial and human costs, it is not surprising that states would prefer to
achieve their goals by communication of a threat instead of conducting major combat
operations. Given the vast amounts of diplomatic and military energy expended by states
that attempt compellence, it seems to be a low payoff activity. Surprisingly, this fact does
not appear to dissuade potential practitioners.
This work will argue that the post-World War II compellence pattern of a
substantial reduction in the compellence success rate, continued low rates of success, and
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a historic level of compellence attempts was influenced by three factors. The first factor
was a post-World War II shift in the international system, the second, the promulgation of
an anti-compellence norm, and the third is the existence of domestic benefits for leaders
that attempt compellence actions.
The fall in compellence success can be traced to the substantial re-ordering of the
international system that was the result of World War II. States that had been successful
compelling states were no longer in a position to do so. A critical aspect of the new order
was the superpower competition and the U.S.’s containment policy. These resulted in
treaties, organizations, and arrangements that bolstered states’ abilities to resist
compellence, Soviet or otherwise.
The continued repression of compellence success after the immediate post-World
War II conditions had faded requires a different perspective. Compellence does not pit a
significant portion of states’ military forces against one another, but depends on pressures
created by communication of threats. Lacking the finality of major combat operations,
compellence depends substantially on beliefs of the sender and the target. If the sender
does not believe force is an appropriate means for state-to-state discourse, compellence
will not likely be a choice for problem solving. Further, if the target state believes that
resistance, despite the eventual cost, is appropriate, demands are not likely to move them
from their chosen course. The early years of the Cold War may have shaped these types
of norms.
Finally, the persistence of compellence attempts that are not rewarded by success
is more difficult to explain. A possibility is that the act of attempting to compel provides
rewards other than those expected from modifying the behavior of the other state.
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Significance of the Work
Whether successful or unsuccessful across the last 200 years, the practice of
compellence remains popular. On more than 2,000 occasions, it appears that states would
rather attempt to gain benefits through the communication of threats instead of the
application of force. They then have a possibility of achieving their policy aims while
avoiding the risk and the requisite expenditures of monetary and political capital to
militarily removing an adversary’s physical means of effective resistance. Nevertheless,
resisting compellence did not end on Milos, despite the dismal outcome for the Melians.
In fact, since the end of World War II, resistance has become the answer about 99% of
the time.
If successful compellence does not happen often, and there is strong contention
that military force is not an appropriate tool for political change, one may wonder why
one would study compellence.22 There are two main reasons. The first reason is to
address a substantial gap in our knowledge of international relations. The fact that we
have not coherently explained this resource intensive, dangerous, ongoing, and
ubiquitous process points to a substantial gap in our understanding of an aspect of
international relations. The second reason is to address the policy aspects of the
compellence phenomena. Compellence had, at one time, been a cost effective method
that supported the maintenance of the international order. Today, compellence is often
attempted but provides little obvious benefit. Policy makers have yet to adjust their

21 Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 13, 22-23, 25, 358-66.
22

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd Ed (Boston: Scott,
Foresman and Co, 1989), 27-29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21

18
methods to the current realities and either cease attempting it or make it successful in the
current environment.
The Gap in Understanding o f International Relations
Our understanding of the compellence is more immature than deterrence but there
are some similarities in the research that can help us analyze its weaknesses. There is a
general lack of empirical approaches in deterrence, although some authors such as Huth
and Russett have attempted to create a quantitative basis for theorizing.23 In compellence,
no substantive attempts have been made to create a quantitative basis that could assist in
testing or developing theory. The most vigorous attempt at empirical analysis is
Jakobsen’s subdivision of his three cases into 13 sub-cases.24 This lack of quantitative
background leads to a focus on personality and the unique characteristics of each
situation as causal factors of success or failure, instead of providing a framework to
examine re-occurring factors.
In the area of deterrence, Lebow and Stein, in their various criticisms of the field,
highlight the issue that many formulations of deterrence theory depend on rational actor
theory, use exogenous motivations and characterize decision makers as risk tolerant and
gain seeking, but lack a theoretic basis for those characterizations 25 Here compellence
research parallels deterrence research by using similar assumptions without a theoretic
basis. They also highlight deterrence literature’s lack of consideration of potentially
significant factors such as misperception, miscalculation, and precursor determination of

23 Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,"
World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526.
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alternates, vice a singular focus on the decision between the alternatives.26 In this area,
compellence research records a multitude of factors such as these, but provides little in
terms of ordering principles. Before we address these significant items as part of a
research agenda, basic descriptions, such as regional distribution, frequency of the
phenomenon, success rate, and variation in time need to be addressed.
As we examine compellence research, some aspects are obvious by their absence.
Unlike deterrence research, compellence research routinely under-represents the target of
the action. It is most often depicted as a reactor to the sender’s messages, and little said
about the target's interests. The target is occasionally noted as an active player if it tries to
counter-compel the sending state. This shortfall may be a serious flaw. Although this
concern is noted in research, no effort has been focused on the description and analysis of
the actions of a key decision maker-the target.

Further, there does not appear to be any

research that addresses the effects of the international system on compellence attempts
and whether it enables or disables its success. Including system effects may account for
the currently unexplained wide variance in compellence outcomes.
Compellence has received substantially less research attention than deterrence,
most likely because researchers viewed deterrence as a widespread and frequent
phenomenon that underpinned and influenced every day of the Cold War, while,
compellence, with a few major exceptions such as the Cuba Missile Crisis, was not
viewed as a key determinant of the international behavior of the superpowers. An
important difference between the two is that with compellence, it is possible to directly
identify a large number of individual cases of success and failure. With deterrence, it is

26 Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 214-16.
27

Jakobsen, Western Use o f Coercive Diplomacy, 15-16.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20

not possible to know whether the target would have conducted the behavior that the
sender had claimed to have deterred. Although we as analysts may not be able to trace all
the steps in the causal chain, compellence offers the opportunity for clear evidence
whether or not the policy, regime, or territory that was to be modified was actually
modified. This provides the opportunity for clear empirical results. In other words,
despite our current lack of research, the information resources are available to conduct a
rigorous investigation of this phenomenon.
Policy Implications
Policy implications provide another reason to study compellence in the post-Cold
War world. Considerable diplomatic and military resources are being routinely expended
in compellence attempts that usually do not achieve their stated goals. If this phenomenon
was sufficiently understood, these resources could be applied in some other fashion as to
achieve the desired results. This could provide an improve set of options for senior policy
leaders. Alternatively, if compellence is found to be structurally infeasible in the current
international system, those diplomatic and military resources could be redirected to other
tasks were the benefit to the state was higher. A greater understanding of this process
could lead to more effective policies to directly use or defend against compellence. This
may be particularly important if states want to reduce the use of brute force.
Focusing on the broader international system, as Callahan noted in 1998 in his
Unwinnable Wars, nationalistic and ethnic violence has increased in the post-Cold War
era, rather than decreased.

Although great powers may not conduct the compellence

actions that are related to this violence, or even be the target, their interests will likely be
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affected.29 Since states that are not a direct party may have their interests effected, they
need to have an understanding of it so that they may effectively shape policies to address
this threat. For example: Should the U.S. intervene in a compellence attempt against one
of its Asian trading partners? If so, what is the set of methods that could most effectively
diffuse the attempt? Although questions like these are currently answered, it is without
the benefit a scientific understanding of the phenomenon. Informing those policy
decisions with a firm basis of empiricism and theory could improve the workings of the
international system.
Both the lack of rigorous research and fact of experientially based policy making
about compellence provides motivation for its study. As we have seen, the phenomenon
of compellence is a frequently practiced, real world application of diplomacy and the use
of force. Its study provides the opportunity to make empirical and theoretical progress
that would further inform our understanding of both diplomacy and the use of force.

Results in Summary
The pattern of compellence from 1816 to 1945 consisted of a fairly steady level of
attempts per year per state in the international system coupled with a slightly declining
success rate over the period. The pattern of compellence from 1946 to 2001 maintained
historic levels of attempts per year per state, but success dropped almost to zero and
remained very low throughout the period. The initial portion of this puzzle asks why
successful compellence was reduced to almost zero immediately after World War II. The
precipitous fall in the success of compellence was initially created by the new
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geopolitical realities after World War II. Some states that had previously been successful
at compellence were exhausted, others were stalemated in the new bipolar international
system, and others were constrained.
The second part of the compellence puzzle highlights the continued low level of
compellence success, even after the initial Cold War conditions faded. The initial period
of Cold War actions had created the conditions for the continued suppression of
compellence success. U.S. actions to help Europe and contain Soviet expansion
throughout the world were key in creating a set of expectations about armed aggression.
These actions supported the creation, promulgation, and acceptance of an anticompellence norm. Although this norm was accepted and adopted by international
organizations, and re-echoed by Western powers, portions of it were not fully accepted
across the international system.
The third portion of the compellence puzzle highlights that the rate of
compellence attempts, adjusted for the growth in number of states, remains at historic
levels despite the fall in success. Closer examination shows that although the rate
remained the same, there was a geographic shift of attempts from the core to the
periphery. The evidence seems to indicate that, all else being equal, state leaders who
attempt compellence stay in office longer than those who do not. Further, as leaders that
attempt compellence stay in office longer, they have more opportunity to attempt
compellence. Therefore, what looks like the maintenance of a historic level of activity is
actually a complex of interacting trends.
This conundrum of continued motivation to attempt to use compellence and
continued opposition in the world to the use of compellence as an ordinary tool of
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statecraft can resolve in two ways. Either the motivation to use this tool is reduced,
resulting in fewer attempts each year, or the constraining forces that limit the acceptance
of compellence in the international community are loosened leading to an increased
number of successful compellence attempts. Since the level of attempts has remained at
historic levels since World War II, despite low payback, it is more likely for the
opposition to compellence as a valid tool of statecraft to decrease. In this case, an
understanding of the past patterns of compellence would better prepare scholars and
leaders to deal with the new realities of the international system.

Organization
The second chapter focuses on empirical data. It describes the characteristics of
compellence and the behavior of sender and target states from 1816 to 2001. In addition
to general characterization, this chapter provides specific data about the three part postWorld War II compellence puzzle.
The third chapter charts current formulations of compellence from the specialized
literature. By finding common elements within the specialized compellence literature this
chapter finds a simple framework within which to discuss compellence. It also uses the
previously discussed data to correct some misperceptions found in that literature. In
doing so, it refutes three myths about compellence that would otherwise hinder effective
examination of the phenomenon.
The fourth chapter investigates how leveraging aspects of international relations
theory may provide a better conceptualization of compellence. By using the common
elements from the specialized compellence literature and then broadening the perspective
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by taking advantage of the more comprehensive field of international relations theory, the
explanation of compellence is improved.
The next three chapters look for explanations to the compellence puzzle. The fifth
chapter addresses the first element of the compellence puzzle by documenting possible
causes for the initial suppression of successful compellence immediately after World War
II. The sixth chapter discusses the second portion of the compellence puzzle. It suggests
possible causes for the continued suppression of compellence success, even after the
forces that led to the initial suppression have faded. The seventh chapter focuses on the
final portion of the compellence puzzle. It discusses possible causes for the continued
level of attempts at compellence, which rival previous periods.
The eighth chapter provides general conclusions, highlights some policy
implications, and outlines potential for future research in the area of compellence. An
appendix provides details on data sources and methodologies.
At the close of this work, we will have developed a clearer understanding of
compellence, its empirical basis, past and current levels of attempts and success, and
some possible reasons for the current patterns of compellence. Further, scholars will also
be equipped with an outline for future research in compellence. We will now turn to
building the empirical basis that is critical to coherently discuss compellence.
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CHAPTER II
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE

Approach
This chapter will provide the empirical basis to accomplish two significant tasks.
The first task is to provide a general understanding of the data related to compellence.
The second will be to illustrate the main points of the post-World War II compellence
puzzle. To accomplish these tasks, empirical data that describes compellence over a
significant time span is required. This data will provide insight into the elements of the
basic framework of compellence comprised of actors, action, environment, and outcomes.
For the actors, data required includes the states involved, measures of the type of
government in power, capability measures, the leaders of those states, and inclusive dates
of incumbency. To describe attempted compellence actions, the objective, levels of
violence offered by either side, number of states, and inclusive dates of action are
required. To understand the environment, the number of states in the world at the time of
the action, number of great powers, and system concentration of capabilities are needed.
To establish the status of the pattern of compellence, data is needed to describe the
outcome of the combined actions, casualties, and method of settlement. There are no
ready-made, large repositories of data specifically about compellence. However, a
number of extant databases, established for purposes other than the study of compellence,
makes it possible to derive data appropriate for the task of examining compellence.
Incumbent with the use of this data is a sufficient explanation of the sources of data and
how it was interpreted to arrive at conclusions. An abbreviated discussion o f this process
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will be provided in this chapter, with a detailed discussion of the databases and the
manipulation of the data reserved for discussion in the Appendix.
A significant source o f this type of data noted above is provided by the Correlates
of War (COW) Project.1 Focused on the examination of variables associated with the
outbreak of war, this project compiles multiple international relations data sets and relates
them by use of a few common variables. Frequently cited in international relations and
peace research literature the data in the COW data has been refined, analyzed, and
improved repeatedly.2 Many researchers have used this data in testing hypotheses and
models associated with the initiation, escalation, and outcome of conflict.3 Beyond this
robust examination of the path to conflict and its causal factors, this data is also been
used to establish policy pertinent positions for then current problems.4
However, this database does not address all of the data requirements specified
above. A necessary addition to the COW databases, which highlights the interactions
between states, are the Polity databases, which provide information on the internal
characteristics of states.5 This data, appropriately connected to data about external
activities, can provide insight into the often-ignored linkage between domestic conditions

1 Correlates o f War 2 Project, Dept, o f Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University, 1
March 2003. http://cow2.la.psu.edu/ (accessed 1 March 2003).
2
Pat McGowan et al., "International Data as a National Resource," International Interactions 14
(1988): 101-13.
3
J. David Singer and associates, Explaining War: Selected Papers from the Correlates o f War
Project (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979); J. David Singer, ed., The Correlates o f War II:
Testing Some Realpolitik Models (New York: Free Press, 1980); Alan Sabrosky, ed., Polarity and War: The
Changing Structure o f International Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); Charles Gochman and
Alan Sabrosky, eds., Prisoners o f War?: Nation-States in the Modern Era (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1990).
4
J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, eds., To Augur Well: Early Warning Indicators in World
Politics (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979); J. David Singer and Richard Stoll, eds., Quantitative
Indicators in World Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984).
5 Monty G. Marshall, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 18002 0 0 2 .16 December 2003, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm (accessed 23 January 2004).
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and international behavior. These multiple databases are integrated using the EUGene
data management program developed by Bennett and Stam.6 Its primary value in this
study is to provide an automated method to integrate several different sets of data. It does
so by taking various individual databases and creating country year dyads to which data
values are assigned. This dyadic orientation, although necessary for the functioning of the
program, creates another set of data challenges since states act in different ways than pure
dyads would suggest. As noted above, this and other specific data manipulation methods
are addressed in the Appendix.
As comprehensive as it is, the EUGene program and its associated databases does
not contain information on state leaders. For this critical aspect, this work will depend on
the data compiled for The Logic o f Political Survival by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith,
Siverson, and Morrow.7 This dataset provides states’ political leaders names and dates in
office. Through these two sources of data, we now have the wherewithal to describe the
actors, the actions, the environment, and the outcome.

Internal and External Validity
After securing the requisite data, it is necessary to select and organize the various
data elements to create a cogent description of compellence to ensure that resultant
conclusions have internal validity. Further, in order to generate support for useful real
world results, the data must also be representative of a wide range of cases across a
significant span of geography and time to create conclusions with external validity. To

6 Bennett and Stam, "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual."
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address the perennial challenges of internal and external validity, three critical aspects
were considered when selecting data.
The first aspect, specificity, addresses using data from cases that provide clear
indications that compellence was attempted and that a quantifiable result occurred. In
order to generate useful conclusions, specific factors that identify a compellence action
and an outcome were identified in each case. Secondly, in the context of interstate
compellence, external validity requires that the initial data not be limited to a narrow set
of states for the results to be generalizable to all states within the international system.
Thirdly, just as the data cannot be selective in terms of which states are included, the time
frame from which the data is drawn extends from 1816 through 2001 in order to capture a
variety of conditions in the international system. This also allows the analysis to contrast
the outcomes in one era to outcomes in another. Detailed discussion of the methodology
of choosing cases, selecting, and processing the data are provided in the Appendix.

General Characterization
To aid in comprehension of the empirical aspects of this analysis there are some
characterizations of the data that would be useful to understand. Within the previously
discussed data generated by EUGene, the Militarized Interstate Disputes database
provides key information about the actions and outcomes of compellence attempts. To
understand how this analysis has operationalized "compellence", it is helpful to review
the operational definitions that were used within that original database. In Militarized
Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns, Jones,
Bremer, and Singer indicate that the term "militarized interstate dispute" refers to a united
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historical case in which the threat, display, or use of military force short of a war by one
member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives,
official forces, property, or territory of another state.8 This original definition is
particularly important to compellence, as it focuses on actions undertaken by the target
based on the threat, display, or exemplar use of force. This perspective is also important,
as this study will focus on disputes short of war to learn about compellence. As discussed
in the introduction of this work, cases where the participants transition to war will be
viewed as failures of compellence. In these cases, the initial compellence effort did not
accomplish the revision objective. As was noted in the previous chapter, this does not
indicate that compellence cannot happen within a war; only that data is not available to
separate compellence activities and forcible defeat within wars. This analytic bounding
will allow for conclusions specifically about compellence separate from general warfare
and perhaps its usefulness as a political tool short of warfare. Fortunately, there are
thousands of militarized interstate disputes that fall short of war from which to draw
conclusions.
Nature o f Actors
Additionally, the underlying data is focused on the interstate dimension of
interaction, limiting them to diplomatically recognized member states of the global
system and excluding interactions involving non-state actors. Further, this data excludes
routine military training exercises, nation building, foreign internal defense support, or
even intervention on behalf of the recognized government. Other exclusions reduce the
possibility that alleged or dubious actions and incidents could be counted as a dispute.
g

Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, "Militarized Disputes, 1816-1992:
Rationale Coding Rules and Empirical Patterns," Conflict Management and Peace Science 15 (1996): 6.
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Specifically, if either the target state responds, militarily or diplomatically or the action is
verified by an impartial observer an incident can be considered a dispute. Further, the acts
are required to be overt actions taken by official military forces or government
representatives of the state. Covert or non-regular force operations are also excluded
unless the target state responds militarily or diplomatically to the act in question. Further
technical exclusions are discussed in the Appendix. These exclusions provide a
narrowing to ensure the data used in analysis will reflect compellence and not some other
phenomena.
During data selection, there were some key data manipulation choices not
predetermined by the underlying data. One of these, available in EUGene, was that the
cases were generated with an orientation keyed to the revisionist state vice the initiator
state. This means that each dyad in the database has, as its leading member, the state that
was attempting to change the regime, policy, or territory of the second member of the
dyad. This selection was key to ensure generation of cases linked to compellence and not
deterrence or other phenomena. As the cases required an attempt to change some aspect
of a target state instead of maintaining the status quo the possibility of mistakenly
analyzing deterrence cases is reduced.
Type o f Actions
Within the initial data, militarized incidents were grouped in three general
categories, threat of force, display of force, and use of force. The threat of force was
identified by contingent speech or print and usually took on the form of an ultimatum.
The second broad category is a display of force. The Militarized Interstate Dispute
database coded this selection when there was a military demonstration but no combat
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interaction. These nonviolent military acts serve as ways to signal capability and intent to
the target state. It is possible that these signals could be more persuasive than verbal
threats because the state that is attempting to compel has invested materiel and political
resources to communicate this signal.9 The third broad category of the use of military
force almost entirely represents activities that have a direct effect on a target state such as
blockades, clashes, or the occupation of territory. The exceptions to the physical
manifestation in this category are official declarations of war and cases that joined
ongoing wars. The actions within this category are still only state-to-state
communications of capability and intent, although because they are an application of
military force, they can be deadly for those individuals directly engaged in them.
Previously, researchers set the threshold of 1,000 total battle deaths as the dividing line
between militarized interstate disputes and interstate wars.10
Nature o f Actions
Having described the different types of militarized incidents and offered a
classification that ranks them, Jones, Bremer and Singer grouped these incidents into
coherent historical episodes that constitute militarized interstate disputes. It is important
to note that this record of dispute is actually an incomplete and skeletal record of the
interactions between the states. For example, only the highest level of hostility is reported
for each state involved. Repeat exchanges at a given level will not be apparent from the
data, therefore, in this data set, escalation is more valued than persistence. Further, de-

9

James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation o f International Disputes,"
The American Political Science Review, 88, no. 3 (Sept 1994): 585-86.
10 Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures,
Patterns, and Insights," Journal o f Conflict Resolution 28, no. 4 (December 1984): 589.
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escalatory steps are not directly reflected either, although the method by which a dispute
is settled is recorded within the database.
Jones, Bremer and Singer used a set of coding rules to ensure that the facts about
incidents encoded in their database reflected coherent disputes. The complete version of
these coding rules is captured in the Appendix. In summary, these rules include:
1) All incidents must involve the same or an overlapping set of interstate
members.
2) Each incident must involve the same issue or set of issues, and occur
within the same geographic area—unless there was information provided
by diplomatic historians that linked them.
3) The start date of a dispute is defined by the initiation of the first
militarized incident, but the end date is determined in several ways. Based
on the clarity of the condition, the expiration of up to six months with no
incidents marks the end of the dispute. With a clear demarcation such as a
formal resolution, a new action can occur within a month and be
considered a separate dispute.
4) When two states go to war, all other ongoing disputes between these
two states cease. Any dispute that erupts between a war belligerent and a
non-belligerent state is treated as a separate dispute.
5) In cases of militarized interstate disputes within the context of a civil
war, the side that controls the pre-war capital controls the government.
6) Wars and sub-war disputes of independence are included in the data
only if there are interstate system members on both sides of the dispute.11

These start and stop rules provide the boundaries to what may seem to be the
constant ebb and flow of statecraft and military operations. Since we cannot directly
observe the actors’ decision making process, these artificial boundaries serve as objective
markers of where one compellence episode ends and others begin. Particularly important
to describing the compellence puzzle are the outcomes of compellence attempts. In order
to discern the outcome it is necessary to examine how the original data was coded within

11 Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 174-77.
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the Militarized Interstate Dispute database and reinterpret them based on a
conceptualization of compellence. Table 1 provides the operational definition used in the
database.

Table 1. Outcomes within Militarized Interstate Dispute Database
Alteration of the status quo by one state through the use of
Victory
militarized action which imposes defeat upon the opponent
One state capitulates by offering concessions which appease the
demands of another state before the militarized forces of either state
Yield
has secured any substantial tactical gains on the battlefield
Stalemate
Compromise
Released
Unclear

Lack of any decisive changes in the pre-dispute status quo and is
identified when the outcome does not favor either side in the dispute
Each side in the dispute agrees to give up some demands or make
concessions with regard to the status quo
Only for situations in which a seizure of material or personnel
defines the context of the dispute. Seizure of material or personnel
culminates with their release from captivity
Historical sources provided either conflicting interpretations or
ambiguous information about post-dispute status quo

In order to illuminate the complexities of compellence it will be necessary to
recode some of the data, and in some cases, exclude some data. Starting with the most
straightforward set of cases, a "yield" outcome assigned to the target state aligns most
clearly this study's conceptualization of successful compellence. O f course, a "yield" by
the sending state would be the opposite, a failure of compellence. However, the next
category to be examined, "victory", is not as clear. On its face, this definition requires
imposition of military defeat, without specifying the defeat mechanism. However, within
the same database the highest level of action taken by the sending state is recorded. Upon
examination, some of the cases that are coded as victory have reached the revisionist’s
goal without using force. In other words, the highest level of activity is recorded as a
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threat or display followed by the desired change in behavior on the part of the target state
without a military clash. These cases will be considered successful compellence for this
study. Alternatively, those cases coded "victory" that have action levels beyond threat or
demonstration will not be considered successful compellence.
In the bulk of the cases, stalemate is the outcome when the target state decides not
to comply with the sending state demands, and neither side is overcome by direct military
force. Since the sending state did not achieved its goal to get the target state to act in a
particular fashion this outcome constitutes unsuccessful compellence.
To this point, the differentiations between successful and unsuccessful
compellence have been fairly clear. The next outcome, compromise, could be viewed
from either perspective. The sending state achieves some of its desired objective and the
target state does likewise. One could contend that the sending state, acting in a strategic
fashion, could initially demand more than it actually desired and its “compromise"
actually constitutes a successful event. Conversely, one could also contend that the target
state, concerned with the potential for a costly and drawn out dispute, could cede some
unimportant token to allow the sending state to gracefully withdraw. However, there is no
information in the database that would support either explanation. Therefore, in order to
provide an initial stringent test for compellence, compromise will be considered an
unsuccessful effort at compellence. Later in the analysis, this assumption will be relaxed
to gauge its effects on our understanding of compellence.
Another special case, “released,” indicates the release of seized territory, items, or
people. This is only applicable to special cases where the substance of the dispute was the
seizure, for at least twenty-four hours, of material or personnel of official forces from
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another state, or the detention of private citizens operating within contested territory.
Since the cases that constitute this outcome area are, by definition, resolved by reversing
the seizure, these cases lack information to inform compellence. Therefore, these cases
will not be considered in this study.
“Unclear,” indicates that the coders did not have sufficient data to make a
differentiation, therefore this will also be excluded as it does not provide indicative
information. Also fairly obvious, "joins ongoing war", is a failure of compellence as the
dispute has moved past the stage of threats and exemplar use of violence to join with an
ongoing war. The final category, “missing data” does not provide insight into successful
compellence or resistance so will be excluded from the analysis. Table 2 below captures
the coding that will be used to support the study of compellence for this work.

Table 2. Recoded Outcomes from Militarized Interstate Dispute Database
Based on revisionist’s highest level activity, successful or
Victory - Sending State
unsuccessful compellence
Victory - Target State

Unsuccessful compellence

Yield - Sending State

Unsuccessful compellence

Yield - Target State

Successful compellence

Stalemate

Unsuccessful compellence

Compromise

Initially unsuccessful compellence for a strict test of
compellence

Released

Discarded as not indicative of response to compellence

Unclear

Discarded as not indicative of response to compellence

Joins Ongoing War

Unsuccessful compellence

Missing data

Discarded as not indicative of response to compellence

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36
Data Processing and Perspectives
The initial data extracted from EUGene provided 2,945 dyadic cases for
militarized interstate disputes for the years 1816 to 2001, inclusive.12 The first data
manipulation was to remove the cases where a state was identified as “revisionist,” but
not issuing a threat, displaying military forces, or using force. This left 2,814 dyadic
cases. The second manipulation was to remove the cases whose outcome did not inform
compellence. As discussed above, cases with seizure, unclear, and missing data results
were deleted, leaving 2,613 cases. O f these, 1,558 were cases where a single state
attempted to compel a single state. Because the data is presented in a dyadic fashion,
when a sending state attempted compellence and the target state responded in-kind, two
compellence attempts were recorded. This is appropriate as each of the states had similar
decisions to make as a sending state and as a target state. The data that describes the one
state vs. one state cases can be directly manipulated and create meaningful results.
The 1,055 dyadic cases that are subcomponents of larger compellence events
involving multiple states on either side require additional processing before we can draw
conclusions from them. Participation in these cases is not as straight forward as the single
state vs. single state. For example, the 1897 compellence case of Greek and Turkey by
the major powers o f Europe consists of two target states each making independent
decisions based on the combined threat of the major powers. Of the 1,055 dyadic cases
that involve multiple participants some had multiple states involved as sending states,
target states, or both. Simplifying them for the purpose of examining compellence, these
were resolved to 335 cases of attempted compellence by associating the sender and target

12

A copy o f the EUGene input parameters is included in the Appendix.
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data across by MID dispute numbers. After the data from the multiple participants has
been appropriately aggregated and combined with the single state cases, 1,893 episodes
of attempted compellence can inform our understanding of this phenomenon. Initially,
this analysis will use the single state vs. single state data as it provides the simplest
interactions to analyze. Later, the more complex multiple state interactions will be
included to more fully represent the range of compellence activities. Before we turn to
analysis of the compellence puzzle, we need to review the previously highlighted issues
of validity, geographic, and temporal distribution. Examining the data derived from the
categorization developed above, we will first focus on the geographic perspective.
Regional Perspective
To better understand compellence as a global phenomena it is useful to example it
across multiple regions. Further, to support later claims of external validity of results it is
important that the initial data do not exclude a significant portion of states or a specific
region of the world. Using the Correlates of War regional groupings of Europe, Middle
East, Africa, Asia, and North and South America, table 3 provides the number and
percent of MID cases recoded as attempted single state vs. single state compellence cases
by regional representation.
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Table 3. Regional Distribution of Compellence Attempts, 1816-2001
Sending States
Target States
Attempted
Attempted
Compellence
Percent
Compellence
Percent
Occurrences
Occurrences
Europe

425

27.3%

403

25.9%

Middle East

341

21.9%

302

19.4%

Africa

142

9.1%

148

9.5%

Asia

317

20.3%

368

23.6%

North and
South
America

333

21.4%

337

21.6%

Total

1558

100.0%

1558

100.0%

From both the sender’s and target’s perspective, there seems to be a fairly even
distribution of cases across geographic regions, with the exception of Africa. Africa is
underrepresented because this study is about state-to-state compellence and most of the
political units in Africa did not become independent Westphalian states until after World
War II. Since the major focus of this analysis is not about regional causes of
compellence, this data anomaly is not significant to the overall conclusions. Africa
contributes slightly less than 10 percent of both senders and targets, but still provides
more than 142 senders and 148 targets in the sample. For the period after World War II
there are numerous states in Africa, and this data collection anomaly will be even less of
a concern.
Chronologic Perspective
The compellence puzzle suggests that the nature and outcome of compellence are
influenced by the characteristics of the specific time period. Therefore, it is necessary to
examine the data to ensure that this difference is not caused by insufficient data collection
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or faults in the data selection process at a particular point in time. Table 4 provides a
chronologic view of the frequency of attempted compellence.

Table 4. Temporal Distribution of Compellence Target States, 1816-2001
Attempted
Approximate
Compellence
Percent
Attempts
Per Year
Occurrences
1816-1913

238

15.28%

2.4

1914-1945

255

16.37%

7.9

1946-1989

806

51.73%

18.3

1989-2001

259

16.62%

21.6

Total

1558

100.00%

8.4

Although the apparent increase in frequency of compellence attempts is striking,
each of the periods is sufficiently represented in the data for a rich study of single state
vs. single state compellence attempts.

Description of the Phenomena of Compellence
As noted above, initial descriptions of the facts of compellence will be drawn
from the 1,558 cases where a single state attempted to compel a single state. The 335
cases that involve multiple states on either or both of the sides of the interaction will be
included later.
A starting point for understanding compellence is to look at how compellence
attempts distributed in time. Are they focused in times of great uncertainty or across
periods of relative calm? Are they becoming more or less frequent? Figure 2 below
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provides the frequency of compellence attempts by single states against single states for
the time period 1816 - 2001 inclusive.

50
Compellence Attempts

40

5* 30
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Year

Figure 2. Single State vs. Single State Compellence Attempt Frequency by Year

Compellence attempts do not appear to be distributed evenly across time.
Following a somewhat flat distribution from 1816 to about 1907, attempts begin to
increase in the period surrounding World War I. They seemed to peak sharply right
before World War II, rapidly falling off for two years after the War. The number of
attempts then rises rapidly and stays at a level not previously sustained.
These variations may not be meaningful until we consider the number of states
that could conduct compellence events. In figure 3, the same sample of attempted
compellence cases have been divided by the number of states in international system in
each year.
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Figure 3. Compellence Attempts per Number of States in International System

The graph in figure 3 controls for the effects of the growth of the number of states
after World War II. It provides a clearer perspective on the compellence behavior of
states and allows a comparison of historic periods of activity. This figure is expressed as
the number compellence attempts in a specific year as a percent of the total number of
states. This provides a factor that is directly comparable across time periods. From 1816
to 1907, on average, compellence attempt frequency by the number of states was 6.9
percent. Between 1908 and 1930, the rate increased to an average of 12.6 percent, almost
double the previous rate. Between 1931 and 1945, average compellence attempt
frequency was 17.2 percent, more than double the initial period and substantially more
than the previous. In the period from 1946 to 2001 despite the massive increase the
number of states (68 to 191), compellence attempts fell only to 13.9 percent of the
number of states in the international system. This is still twice the rate of compellence
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attempts per state than the initial period (1816-1907) and higher than the years
surrounding World War I (1931-1945). With the control for number of states in place, it
can be observed that not only is the distribution not even, peaking near the two World
Wars, but that attempts continue very strongly even during both the Cold War and Post
Cold War periods.
If compellence attempts remain high, the next logical question focuses on the
results of those attempts. Is success increasing or decreasing? Was success higher in
some particular periods? To address these questions it is first striking to note that out of
the 1,558 attempts, very few, 105, were successful. Totally successful compellence is a
very rare occurrence. However, the reader will recall that compromise as an outcome was
initially held as a failure of compellence to be re-examined later. If we redefine
compromise as partially successful compellence, we would still add only 127 cases. This
is approximately 8 percent of the 1,558 cases of attempted compellence. As shown in
figure 4, the cases that end in compromise follow a similar trend as the more strictly
defined successful compellence cases. The increase in number of cases does not change
the temporal relationship of attempts versus success, but their inclusion could weaken
conclusions about the mechanisms of compellence. In other words, redefining cases of
compromise as successful compellence could increase the number of “successful” cases
but may distract from the clarity of conclusions about compellence. For this reason, the
study will continue using the strict definition of successful compellence.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43

35

Attempts

30

—o— Combined Success & Compromise
•

Successful Compellence

25

20
15

10
5

0
1815

1830 1845

1860 1875

1890 1905

1920 1935 1950

1965

1980 1995

Years

Figure 4. Ten Year Moving Average of Successful Compellence, Compromise Cases, and
Attempted Compellence

Returning to the strict definition of compellence, in table 5, the cases of
successful and unsuccessful compellence attempts are noted across the entire sample
period and within two portions of that sample. Although the rate for successful
compellence across the entire period is 6.7 percent, the pre-World War II rate for
successful compellence is 16.8 percent, and post-World War II only 2.1 percent.
Figure 5 shows that the period 1816 to 1946 had significantly higher rate of
successful compellence attempts (16.8%) when compared to the period 1946 to 2001
(2.1%). Figure 5 graphically represents successful compellence over the entire time
period under study, by providing a ten-year moving average to highlight the trend. It
indicates that the rate of successful compellence decreased over time and that it fell
precipitously after World War II.
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Table 5. Occurrence of Successful and Unsuccessful Single State vs. Single State
Compellence, 1816-2001.____________ ___________________ ____________
1816-1945
Successful
Compellence
Unsuccessful
Compellence
Total Attempts

1946-2001

1816-2001

83

16.8%

22

2.1%

105

6.7%

410

83.2%

1043

97.9%

1453

93.3%

493

100.0%

1065

100.0%

1558

100.0%
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Figure 5. Ten-Year Moving Average Frequency in Percentage of Successful
Compellence

The Puzzle o f Compellence
When the rate of attempted compellence, adjusted for the number of states in the
international system, and the percentage of successful attempts are superimposed as in
Figure 6, an interesting shift in compellence patterns emerge. The attempts at
compellence continue on a generally upward trend throughout the period even when
adjusted for the growth of the number of states in the international system. However, at
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the end of World War II, the number of successful compellence attempts falls
dramatically. This shift in pattern constitutes the main concern in this work.

35%
Success Rate (as percentage of attempts)
30%
—— Compellence Attempts (as percentage of number of states)
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Years

Figure 6. Ten year Moving Averages of Frequency of Attempted Compellence per
Number of States and Success Rate as Percent, Superimposed

Explaining this shift with the understanding of compellence provided in the
current literature will be difficult, because the current understanding of compellence is
not well grounded empirically or theoretically. In order to be able to directly address the
shift in the pattern of compellence, other facts about compellence will need to be
established. The same set of data that has been used to describe the pattern of successful
compellence will be used to correct some of the significant myths about compellence that
are contained in the current literature. After those myths are banished and an empirical
based understanding is established, this study can return to explain the significant shift in
inter-state compellence.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46
The empirical discussion above indicates some stability in the rates of successful
compellence from 1816 through 1945. Although compellence was slightly less
successful, on average, as the Concert of Europe decayed, other than post World War II
there were no other eras when successful compellence was suppressed across the globe
for 50 years. Yet, despite the relative stability in the level of compellence success, there
were substantial changes throughout the international system; Germany underwent
unification, the U.S. became a power to be reckoned with, China shifted from the
imperial system, Russia underwent a revolution and the world become more connected
by technologies that improved communication and movement.. Although there is no
single date in which all of these substantial changes occurred, it is apparent that the
beginning of World War I marked the existence of a changed international system. The
international system continued to evolve, but there are more similarities between the
1914-1945 international system and the system of 1946-2001, than there are
commonalities between the pre-World War I system and the post-World War II system.
To minimize the potential disruptive effects that a large number of system changes may
create, this analysis will use the 1914-1945 period as the baseline against which to
compare the 1946-2001 conditions.

Conclusion
It is unlikely that all the major powers became less effective at compellence and
remained so for more than fifty years from internal or idiosyncratic causes. This
suggested that we look for systemic causes for the reduced effectiveness by examining
the phenomena through a broad set of empirical data. This chapter provided the empirical
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basis to accomplish two tasks in that examination. First, it outlined data that comprises
the post-World War II compellence puzzle. By describing the puzzle in empirical terms,
it makes it more susceptible to analysis. The same data will help to clarify the actual
activities that are going on. In doing so, this chapter has equipped our analysis with data
to test the current literature and has laid the groundwork to address a number of potential
answers to the compellence puzzle outlined earlier.
To improve our understanding of compellence, it will be helpful to provide a
intellectual framework to frame the empirical perspective. This examination now turns to
avail ourselves of conceptualizations used in previous research to explain the
phenomenon of compellence.
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CHAPTER III
INITIAL CONCEPTUALIZATION

Using Literature and Logic to Understand Compellence
To be able to engage in a coherent discussion about a compellence puzzle it is
necessary to establish two things. The first is a clear understanding of the term
‘compellence’ and its implications. The second is an appreciation of the conceptual tools
that can be applied to solve the puzzle posed by the record of compellence patterns
outlined in the previous chapter. This chapter will examine the existing
conceptualizations of compellence, looking specifically for ideas that would help
systematically explain or predict the temporal variations seen in the compellence puzzle.
It will then test some of the common claims by use of the data introduced in the previous
chapter. This examination will start to develop a set of similarities that can be useful in
discussing compellence, despite the differences in various conceptualizations. These
similarities exist in five areas: actors, actions, tools, environment, and outcomes. The
examination will also show that the current conceptualizations can not fully explain the
facts of compellence in the post-World War II era.

Current Formulation of Compellence
Thomas Schelling’s Arms and Influence is widely recognized by most other
compellence scholars to be the authoritative source for the formulation of the issue area.1
By contrasting the act of taking something from someone or forcing them to give it to

1 Schelling, Arms and Influence.
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you from fear, Schelling starts to differentiate between what he calls “brute force” and
coercion. Brute force is the controlling or seizing that the adversary has no choice in.
Schelling's conceptualization of coercion is communication of a threat to cause pain to
the other party unless they comply and the subsequent decision to comply or resist. He
further differentiates threats that deter and threats that compel. Deterrence is
characterized by the threat of pain intended to ensure that an action is not taken.
Compellence is characterized by a threat of pain intended to ensure that action is taken.
Schelling asserts that there are five necessary conditions for successful compellence.
1. The threat conveyed must be sufficiently potent to convince the
adversary that noncompliance is too costly.
2. The threat must be perceived as credible by the adversary, that is, he
must be convinced that the coercer has the will and the capability to
execute it in case of noncompliance.
3. The adversary must be given time to comply with the demand.
4. The coercer must assure the adversary that compliance will not lead to
more demands in the future.
5. The conflict must not be perceived as zero-sum. A degree of common
interest to avoid full-scale war must exist. Each side must be persuaded
that it can gain more by bargaining than by trying unilaterally to take
what it wants by force.2

Given the central place of Schelling’s work in the literature, these five conditions
bear some examination. The first condition: The threat conveyed must be sufficiently
potent to convince the adversary that noncompliance is too costly, introduces three ideas.
The first is the “threat conveyed.” There is a variety of ways to convey a threat, from
verbal communications to display of forces to exemplar use of force. Schelling does not
indicate that one method of conveyance is superior to another, whereas other authors

2 Ibid., 3-4, 76.
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have claimed higher efficacy for some preferred methods. The second idea is potency.
The axiom indicates that the threatened action must be severe enough to cause the
threatened damage. Threatening blockade with a minuscule or inefficient navy would not
meet the test of potency. Schelling does not indicate in this passage how one would
determine the required strength, but it is logical to assume that the threaten use of a
capability that was incapable of causing the threatened damage would cause compellence
to fail. The third idea is to convince the adversary that noncompliance is too costly, i.e.
the damage is too great to bear. This approach focuses the point of effect at the
adversary's mind and makes cost estimation the underlying decision logic. Therefore, if
the adversary does not calculate a large cost relative to the demand, compellence will fail.
The focus of Schelling’s second condition is the target’s perception of the
sender’s credibility, divided in two elements; will and capability. Of these two,
capability, being comprised primarily of physical things, seems to be the most easily
perceived and it credibility most readily judged. However, if the sending state and the
target state have wide variances in capabilities, the target state may not recognize that the
claimed capability exists.
Will is even more difficult for decision makers to correctly perceive. Decision
makers often receive benefits from inaccurately portraying their own will, so their
declarations may be discounted.4 Adding to this difficulty is the possibility that decision
makers, elites, and the public may change their positions over time. Even if the sending

3 Pape, Bombing to Win, 18-20.
Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), 39-40.

4
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state attempts to accurately communicate its will and capability, clarity is not automatic.5
As with the other variables above, failures to perceive either will or capability will result
in failure of compellence.
The third condition is about providing the adversary sufficient time to comply.
This inclusion of time as a factor in compellence appears to be one-sided. That is, it
appears to be counseling patience on the side of the sending state rather than addressing
the use of deadlines as a method of exerting pressure on target state decision makers. This
condition would seem to be particularly apropos if the desired action had a substantial
physical component. One would assume from the statement of this condition that
compellence will likely fail if given insufficient time to work.
The fourth condition deals with the adversary's perception of future behavior on
the part of the sending state. It requires the sending state to provide assurances to the
adversary that compliance will not result in additional demands, reminiscent of a long
term blackmail scheme. There is no mention of the mechanism required for the target
state to believe those assurances nor does it seem likely that the sending state will
foreswear all future compellence based on a single acquiescence. However, logically, the
target state must possess some belief that compliance will not be met with incessant
demands lest it would assume an infinite cost, reject compliance, resulting in a failure of
compellence on every occasion.
The fifth condition is about the perceptions that must be shared commonly by the
participants. Schelling includes three underlying issues in this condition, zero-sum,
common interest, and efficacy of bargaining. The first issue expressed is that the conflict

5 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 219-21.
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must not be perceived as zero-sum. The reference to zero-sum calls on game theory to
communicate the idea that both the sender and the target state need to believe that the
solution will not come wholly at their cost. This idea seems to indicate that compellence
attempts that appear to be focused on relative gains will fail. The second idea of common
interest introduces the basic ingredient for negotiation. It specifies a very basic common
interest: avoidance of massive death and destruction characterized by full-scale war. The
introduction of avoidance of full-scale war as the common interest implies that it is the
ultimate threat that underwrites all compellence. Further, this implies that states that are
in a war cannot be compelled. This may be generally true; however, the example of
Japan’s acquiescence based on the promise of further nuclear destruction in World War II
provides one countervailing example. The final sentence of this condition indicates that
both states must possess the belief that bargaining will provide more value or higher
benefits than the unilateral use of force. Alternatively, it is possible that those benefits are
not direct benefits from negotiation, but instead the benefits may be derived from
upholding a norm of limited use or proportionality of force. However if a belief in the
potential value generated through bargaining does not exist, compellence will fail.
Although Schelling provides a substantial base for theorizing, the five conditions
and the remainder of his work present compellence as set of actors conducting actions,
but with no significant mention of external conditions such as era or geographic location
or outcomes other than success or failure. From this perspective, Schelling provides very
important underpinnings to the body of compellence work but does not directly
contribute to the resolution of the post-World War II puzzle. Before wholly dismissing
the potential contributions of Schelling's work to addressing the compellence puzzle,
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once a larger conceptual and theoretic base is established, we will synthesize elements
from this and other works to more fully explain the compellence puzzle.

The Diplomacy Dimension of Compellence
In another foundational work in conceptualizing compellence, The Limits o f
Coercive Diplomacy, Alexander George and William Simons divide compellence into its
offensive and defensive aspects and identify coercive diplomacy with the defensive
aspects of compellence.6 The differentiation within compellence between offense and
defense is the reason that motivates its use. Generally, if compellence is a method to get a
decision maker to stop, start, or modify an action, offensive compellence would be the
activities to convince a target decision maker to start an action and defensive
compellence would be the activities to convince a target decision maker to stop or modify
an action. These are not absolute categories, but served as an initial guideline.
Offensive compellence then is the case where the sending state desires the target
state to provide some benefit such as surrender of land, favorable trading relations, or
some other thing of value. The sending state could use a threat of force, demonstrations
of force, or a threat of the escalating use of force in the future to get the target state to
comply with their desire. In common parlance, the sending state would be considered the
aggressor, creating the reason for the dispute.
Defensive compellence would hold that the motivating force is that the target state is
engaged in some kind of behavior to which the sending state objects. In response, the
sending state, desiring these acts to be stopped or modified, threatens the use of force,

6 George and Simons, Limits o f Coercive Diplomacy, 7-8.
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conducts demonstrations of force, or threatens an escalating use of force in the future to
get the target state to comply with their desired condition. In this case, the target state
could be considered the aggressor, certainly by the sending state, and possibly by other
actors, as this logic indicates that the target state has created the motivation for the
dispute.
The difference between offensive and defensive compellence appears primarily to be
one of viewpoint. In the case of defensive compellence, the target state may be
conducting activities that are beneficial to that state and considered by its regional
standards to be neutral or even positive forms of behavior. Since the discussion has not
included a universal referent that was held to be violated, one state's defensive
compellence appears as another state's offensive compellence. The characterization of
offensive and defensive may become useful if the motivating behavior for the
compellence is compared to a universal norm such as of abhorrence of genocide, but does
not appear to be intellectually useful in the context of two states or groups of states with
differing standards of behavior.
George and Simons provide a conceptualization of coercive diplomacy but
indicate that operationalizing the concept is difficult and perhaps impossible to achieve.
Deriving a requirement for rationality on the part of the target state and specifying three
key variables, magnitude of the demand, magnitude of the opponent's motivation not to
comply, and a threshold factor of whether the opponent will feel the threatened
punishment is sufficiently credible, the authors indicate that this is, at best, a quasi,
incomplete deductive theory.7

7 Ibid., 13-15.
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After detailed examination of 7 case histories, the authors of The Limits o f Coercive
Diplomacy continue to reflect the attendant uncertainties of compellence in conditional
generalizations akin to those used by Schelling.8 They indicate that if a state decides that
those conditions are met the success of the outcome is largely dependent on “skill in
improvisation” and will not constitute a high confidence strategy in many cases.9
The question, once again, centers on the usefulness of the formulation established by
George and Simons to address the puzzle of variation in compellence patterns in the post
World War II era. Their differentiation of offensive and defensive compellence may be
interesting, but after examination above, it appears to be a subjective difference that does
not help solve the puzzle. This discussion has echoed the previous in terms of actors and
actions, but suggests that the tools for successful compellence are diplomacy instead of
military force. Nevertheless, their emphasis on the quotient of diplomacy to military force
may offer an avenue of investigation. If it could be shown that diplomatic interaction was
highly correlated to success of compellence attempts, we could then look for variations in
that quotient. If a change in the quotient was correlated with the pattern of behavior, these
quotients could be indicators of a causal mechanism. As mentioned earlier, after a larger
conceptual base has been established we will revisit this potential.
Daniel, Hayes, and de Jonge Oudraat, leaning heavily on UN experiences in the
1990s, suggests a set of actions that is between the UN traditional impartial peacekeeping
and simple enforcement action on behalf of the attacked state in Coercive Inducement
and the Containment o f International Crises.10 The primary focus of their

8 Ibid, 268-90.
9 Ibid, 293.
10 Daniel, Hayes and de Jonge Oudraat, Coercive Inducement, 4.
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conceptualization is also diplomatic. Coercive inducement deals explicitly with
improving the quality of consent that United Nations operations need to conduct
peacekeeping. The authors indicate that coercive inducement is a variant of coercive
diplomacy with less emphasis on the use of the military to threaten, but with increased
emphasis on defensive military actions to hold aggressors’ capabilities harmless, which
provides room for the previously mentioned suasion to be effective.11 The idea is that
even compelled action limits inhumane or destabilizing behavior. It assumes that any
consent is provisional at best and the subjects of the peacekeeping operation will test the
limits of the United Nations’ will. Minimum military force is used in order to enable the
diplomatic change mechanisms of discussion, blandishments, appeals to emotions or
conscience, rewards, threats, or punishments.
This discussion depends primarily on the same actors and tools as the previous
but suggests a different application of those tools in action. Although the formulation
specified here may be novel, we come again to the question whether there is some aspect
of this formulation that would help us explain the compellence pattern change
phenomenon noted in the introduction. Although the authors are forwarding this
formulation as a proposal vice recording common practice, this work emphasizes a
similar concern as George and Simons as to the need for pre-eminence of diplomacy in
the area of coercive actions. Although this is not a unique insight, this formulation,
coming from a non-state perspective emphasizes the potential importance of the mix of
diplomacy and to military action as an indicator for successful or non-successful
compellence.

11 Ibid., 21-24.
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A Proposed “IdealPolicy”fo r Compellence
Peter Viggo Jakobsen in Western Use o f Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War:
A Challenge fo r Theory and Practice, although solely focused on the problem of
countering other nations’ military adventurism after the Cold War, provides some
conceptual clarification and logical comparisons of Schelling's and George and Simons’
work.12 A key aspect that Jakobsen mentions but does not develop as a central theme is
the fact that all coercion leaves the decision of whether or not to comply to the target of
the action. Drawing from the previous work, he continues by creating an “ideal policy”
from the U.S. or other Western power perspective for coercive diplomacy success. The
question becomes, is this ideal framework useful in explaining the changes in
compellence patterns?
The ideal policy has four elements: 1) a threat of force, backed by the necessary
capability to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost, 2) a
deadline for compliance, 3) an assurance to the adversary against future demands, and 4)
an offer of "carrots" to replace losses created by the target’s compliance.13
The first element conforms to the previous theorizing by Schelling and George
and Simons but adds the dimension that the threatened operation to inflict damage on the
target state should be of little cost to the sending state. The first elements also adds the
possibility that the threatened military action would be aimed at the target state's
capability to achieve its objectives instead of merely punishing in a general sense. The
second element introduces time as a strong factor necessary for compellence. This agrees
in a general sense with previous formulations. Although a deadline for compliance was
12

Jakobsen, Western Use o f Coercive Diplomacy, 11-24.

13 Ibid., 30.
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not identified as one of the key conditions for compellence, other authors have described
compellence demands linked to an ultimatum or tacit ultimatum as a possible tactic.14
Jakobsen’s third element, assurance of the target state that further demands are not
forthcoming also is consistent with Schelling's formulation, and therefore offers no
unique insight. The fourth element, offering carrots for compliance appears to be an
operationalizing of Schelling's admonition against apparent zero-sum games.
This ideal policy appears to be designed to specify the elements of action that
satisfy the conditions that Schelling and George and Simons require. However, Jakobsen
reports that this ideal policy is designed for use against aggressors only and much like the
previous work constitute a minimum of actions vice all required actions. He indicates that
following the ideal policy will not guarantee success; only that not meeting its minimum
requirements will lead to compellence failure. He specifically notes that the possibility of
misperception or miscalculation on the part of the opponent is not captured in the ideal
policy framework.15
Jakobsen’s approach refers to a set of Western states matched against militarily
adventurist states and emphasizes the amount of military capability difference between
them. We return once again to the question, does this particular construct offer a way to
address the puzzle posed by the change in compellence patterns since World War II? As
is indicated in the above discussion, the ideal policy framework specified by Jakobsen
appears to be a way, with a particular set of target states, to address the requirements for
compellence specified by earlier authors. The one difference this approach seems to pose
is the requirement that the sending state be able to successful conduct its military
14

George and Simons, Limits o f Coercive Diplomacy, 18.

15 Jakobsen, Western Use o f Coercive Diplomacy, 32.
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operations quickly with little cost. This approach requires that the sending state not only
enjoy a significant military superiority, but that he must also be capable of denying the
opponent the ability to retaliate.16 If it can be shown that this significant military
superiority with the ability to deny the possibility of retaliation in the future is an actual
requirement for compellence, this could provide leverage to understand the change in
compellence patterns after World War II.
Alternate Perspectives
These delineations and definitions encapsulated above are not universally
accepted. Lawrence Freedman in an edited volume, Strategic Coercion, argues that the
idea of coercive diplomacy is not analytically useful.17 As his title suggests, he forwards
what he contends is an improved conceptualization that encompasses Schelling’s and
George’s constructs. This conceptualization agrees with the general construct of coercion
but also includes a close regard for how strategic actors construct reality and how each
actor understands how the other actor constructs reality.

18

Inclusion of the echo of

strategic interaction in the base formulation of coercion includes the possibility of making
learning, culture, and norms part of the compellence construct.
Although not intended to explain compellence, Daniel Drezner in The Sanctions
Paradox illustrates a parallel set of ideas in the economic realm.19 This literature reflects
the same logic of a contingent demand in order to get the target state to change some
behavior. A key focus is on strategic behavior. Drezner’s discussion highlights that state
leaders act to maximize the regime’s utility and interest more than achieving specific
16 Ibid., 28-29.
17

Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," 18.

18 Ibid., 36.
19
Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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outcomes. Further, those leaders fashion preferences in reaction to the capabilities and
intentions of other states in the international system.
Combining these two points, the decision makers would be concerned about
concessions that can be used later to threaten their security especially in relation to states
whom they believe may someday pose a threat. In other words, concern for relative gain
is variable depending on the decision makers’ perception of future threat. Given this
concern for future threats, decision makers also prefer to have a reputation for tough
bargaining. The literature highlights a similar caveat that this concern for reputation is
conditioned by expectations of future demands. The desire for a tough reputation is high
when facing states that are judged to have the potential for making future
demands.20Another interesting factor from the economic sanctions literature is a
perspective about the balance of the capabilities. Although states must keep the aggregate
distribution of capabilities in mind, they will be more concerned about the local
correlation of capabilities, since it may not be possible to redirect capabilities towards the
target without excessive cost or time delay.21 This idea of local superiority in the
correlation of capabilities may help explain situations were the aggregate capability
balance would have suggested the opposite outcome. These two alternative perspectives
introduce the idea of a larger context or environment with the inclusion of strategic
interaction and relative gains discussions.

20 Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 28-33.
21 Ibid, 31.
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The Military Dimension of Compellence
In contrast to George and Simons and others who emphasized diplomacy, there is
also a part of the literature that has focused more on the military end of the spectrum. For
example, Cimbala in Coercive Military Strategy espouses the use of a broader range of
action across the diplomatic - combat spectrum. He views this strategy as inclusive of
coercive diplomacy, but open-ended in terms of readiness to escalate into full-scale
warfare.22 Pape, in Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, similarly
characterizes the strategies for military coercion, differentiating them by the type of
target selected.23 However, unlike the previous authors, Cimbala and Pape paint these
strategies as linked to technological advances and modem times. The discussion here
reiterates the same actors, similar actions, but highlights the potential of a set of military
tools as a critical aspect to understand the compellence puzzle. Does an increased
capability to selectively punish difference sectors of a state help us understand the change
in patterns of compellence? The answer does not appear to support their model. As
success in compellence has dropped severely after World War II and the technology to
strike with more precision has increased, there appears to be a negative correlation in the
rise of technology that provides the ability to precisely deliver punishment and the level
of success in compellence. Increasing the accuracy of punishment is not related to
increased compellence success.

22
23

Cimbala, Coercive M ilitary Strategy.
Pape, Bom bing to Win.
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Synthesis
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that there is little agreement as to the
mechanisms of compellence. Most writing on compellence has been focused on
improving its effectiveness for policy makers. This approach has failed to include an
empirical base, find agreement on the causal factors, or to clearly describe the
phenomenon over time. However, it is possible to improve the understanding of
compellence by finding similarities that can be synthesized across the differing accounts.
Similarities can be characterized in five areas: actors, actions, tools, environment, and
outcomes.
Across the writing, it seems to be a consistent understanding of compellence as
having two primary actors: a sender and a target. This orientation does not exclude
multiple participants on either side of the transaction but instead identifies the roles on
either side. The role of the sender is to achieve a desired outcome through use of
communications that informs a target of a desired condition or behavior on the part of the
target and the potential for future punishment should that condition not be attained or
behavior not conducted. The role of the target then is to decide to comply or not with the
demand. The target has the opportunity to perform acts that achieve the outcome
condition that the sender desired and also has the opportunity to not react to the
communication. Further, the target has the opportunity to attempt to become a sender in
its own right, i.e. counter-compellence.
Less unanimity is found regarding the appropriate tools to communicate the
potential for future punishment. Some writers and practitioners prefer to communicate the
potential for future punishment by various practical demonstrations of the same; others
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seem to prefer a minimum amount of physicality, allowing for written or verbal
i
•
communications as the
primary
means. 24

Another commonality is the potential of the environment. The sending and target
states are likely already intermeshed in some relationship as part of the international
environment. This previous relationship may be friendly or adversarial. Existing
adversarial relationships such as being a party to a larger conflict, war, or participation in
a series of communications on the subject could reinforce or mitigate the content of the
communication. Further, as part of that environment, third parties, such as other states or
international organizations could also reinforce or mitigate the content of the
communication without becoming part of the sending or target entity.
The final similarity is the idea of outcomes. For compellence to occur the sending
state has to be able to enunciate a desired outcome or a change in current conditions and
the target state has to be able to perceive and act to create that outcome. Further, both the
sending state and the target state have to be able to agree that the expressed outcome has
been achieved or not. If the sending state cannot express the desired change in conditions,
the chances that the target state will achieve it are nil. If the target state cannot perceive
or act on the required condition the chances of compellence occurring is also nil.
Likewise, although a target state may take action, if both parties cannot perceive that the
outcome has been achieved, either party may conduct itself as if it had not.
To recapitulate - A model of compellence is comprised of a sender, a target, and a
punishment contingent demand. It operates in an environment that can enhance or disable
the transaction. A compellence episode ends with an outcome. The senders intended

24
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outcome is to change an existing condition without having to actually resort to the
threatened use of force to achieve its aims. The target’s preferred outcome is no change in
the status quo.
These are the general outlines of compellence that are available through the
specialized literature. Although the literature is informative on the subject of compellence
and provides a general model within which to further develop explanations, it is apparent
that none of the specialized literature directly addresses the puzzle of the change in
compellence patterns over time.

Three Myths
Discussion of compellence, by and large, has been comprised of policy relevant
studies to inform decision makers of the pitfalls and promises of compellence. In doing
so, the writers of these relevant studies have focused on aspects the decision makers can
affect. Studying a subject such as compellence from within the process or mechanism has
led to a literature that has focused on the internal aspects, with little regard for the
connection of compellence to the broader set of literature. The level of analysis remains
at the individual or state level and does not contain a systemic perspective of why
compellence is attractive or un-attractive to decision makers and states, but attempts to
solve what makes compellence succeed or fail. While focusing on aspects that the
decision makers may control, the writers highlights those factors as controlling within the
mechanism. Another selection effect, created by writing policy relevant literature that
depends on case studies, is the selection for cases with generally positive results and with
characteristics comparable to the target audience for the subject of discourse. Although
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these focusing mechanisms make the literature more comprehendible to the target
audience, they may result in an incomplete and inaccurate portrayal of the efforts in this
field.
This phenomenon has resulted in three myths being perpetrated in the current
compellence literature. One key aspect a decision maker can factor into his compellence
decisions is the balance of the military capabilities between the sending state and the
target state. Further, researchers have developed methods to estimate capabilities across
various states. As researchers could manipulate this variable it became part of the
explanation of compellence. Nevertheless, since a broad empirical base was not
established, a myth has developed about the amount of military capabilities required to
successfully conduct compellence. Another key aspect that a decision maker can affect is
the use of the diplomatic tools of statecraft as part of compellence. Use of case studies of
familiar attempts at compellence and a selection effect by authors more familiar with
diplomatic methodologies highlighted diplomatic action as an important independent
variable in the compellence equation. Like the myth of the primacy of capability, the
opposing myth has developed: diplomacy, with a bare whisper of military force, is the
only effective method to conduct compellence. Logically, both cannot be true, and
empirically, neither is. Finally, since compellence literature is largely case studies written
from a major powers viewpoint, a selection effect for familiar cases has created a
narrowly focused literature. This has led to a myth that compellence is conducted only by
major powers. The existence of these myths penetrate and color writing and thinking
about compellence, impeding a coherent understanding of the phenomenon.
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To recapitulate, the three myths are: vastly superior military capability is required
for successful compellence, the maximum of diplomacy and minimum military is
required for successful compellence, and compellence is a major power only endeavor.
Therefore, it is necessary to disprove these myths before moving to a better
understanding of the factors that animate the post-World War II compellence puzzle.
The Myth o f Military Superiority
A core aspect of current writings on compellence is the communication of the
willingness and ability to use military force in a way that would create unacceptable
damage to the target or its interests unless it conducts a desired action or ceases
conducting actions that are not desired. Within this broad construct a number of
variations are captured in the extant literature. As a portion of compellence is about the
use of military capabilities, some approaches stress the relative amount of capabilities
between the sender and the target. Many writers in the field of compellence stress the
idea that the threat conveyed must be of sufficient potency that the adversary is
convinced that noncompliance is too costly to bear.25 This perspective is probably most
strongly expressed by Peter Viggo Jakobsen in Western Use o f Coercive Diplomacy After
the Cold War. Jakobsen indicates that the state that is attempting to compel must be able
to defeat the adversary rapidly and without much cost to the compeller. He argues that
threats that would require lengthy and costly endeavors do not support compellence. He
indicates that in practice this requires a significant military superiority.26 Further, he
indicates, the compelling state also requires the ability to deny the opponent the ability to
25

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics o f Coercion: American Foreign Policy
and the Limits o f Military Might (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 85-105; Jakobsen,
Western Use o f Coercive Diplomacy, 39-41; Cimbala, Coercive Military Strategy, 81-85; Freedman,
"Strategic Coercion," 21, 28-29.
26 Jakobsen, Western Use o f Coercive Diplomacy, 28-29.
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retaliate. This is a very high standard, which by extension, requires the compelling state
to be able to present a fait accompli currently and for some indeterminate time in the
future. In fairness to Jakobsen, he was attempting to build an ideal policy by which to
conduct compellence, which he proceeds to test against case studies. However, as he tests
that ideal policy, he finds that predicted outcomes of the policy correlates well with
actual outcomes.27 If a more comprehensive sample of compellence attempts negates a
portion of the proposed “ideal policy” the entire policy should be re-examined. This
requirement for overwhelming military capability will be tested with empirical data.
The expectation, if vastly superior military capability is needed to compel, is that
states that are successful in their compellence attempts will have substantially higher
capability scores in the Militarized Interstate Dispute database, as compared to their
targets. If the first expectation is borne out, a second expectation is that the senders’
capabilities scores will remain higher, for at least a few years, than its target of
compellence.
The empirical fact is that successful compellence does not require the sort of
superiority in military capability specified by Jakobsen, and implied by much of the other
compellence literature. Within the 1,558 occurrences of single state versus single state
attempted compellence, 1816 to 2001, approximately 24 percent of the 105 successful
compellence states had composite state capability scores lower than their targets. In other
words, almost one quarter of the successful compellence was achieved by a “weaker”
state. This does not support the requirement for preponderant capability as a precursor to
successful compellence. On the positive side of the capability balance sheet, where the

27 Ibid., 130-33.
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compeller’s military capability was greater than the target’s capability, there were many
cases were the advantage was marginal at best as reflected by the central tendency as
seen in the figure 7.
The capability scores here, extracted from the Correlates of War data, depict
combined scores that take military personnel, military expenditures, energy production,
iron and steel production, urban population and total population into consideration. The
total score of world capability is 1.0. The difference score is calculated by subtracting the
target state’s capability score from the sending state’s capability score. A positive value
indicates that the sending state had more capability than the target state. A preponderant
state, such as the United Kingdom in 1826 may have as high as a .338 military capability,
possessing more than one third of all of the possible capability in the world.
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The common understanding that to be successful the state attempting to conduct
compellence must be substantially more militarily capable that its target is obviously
mistaken. The data show that superior military capability is not a prerequisite for
successful compellence. Although the data indicates a slightly larger number of
successful compellers have some advantage than those operating with a capability deficit,
both states with little advantage and states that have less capability than their target have
been successful. Given that the idea of substantially more military capability as a
necessary condition for successful compellence is not supported by data and the
observation of a wide distribution of capabilities for successful compellers, one could
theorize a dynamic where actual capability is only marginally related to success or failure
of compellence. A number of logical questions immediately present themselves; do those
states that attempt and fail to compel have a like distribution of capabilities? If superior
capability is not required to succeed, what capability is related to failure?
In the case of failures of compellence, the most common case seems to be where
the prospective compeller and its target are closely matched in capabilities. Although a
very substantial number of cases display this characteristic, there remains a number of
cases of compellence failure where the prospective compeller substantially overmatched
his intended victim and those where a large undermatch of capability existed as seen in
figure 8.
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From the chart in figure 8, it can be observed that failures of compellence are
most common when capability is closely matched, with approximately 58 percent of
sending states that failed at compellence possessing a composite capability score higher
than the target state. However, the data does not rule out failure for other configurations,
even attempts with seemly preponderant capabilities. Comparing the successful and the
unsuccessful samples, the distributions do not match exactly, there is a slight advantage
in having more capability than your target, but Jakobsen’s requirement “that the coercer
... needs to enjoy a significant military superiority” as part of minimum requirement for
compellence is certainly not supported.
A possible insight into how the myth came about is provided in figure 9. It
captures the successful cases of compellence when multiple states compelled a single
state, 1816-2001. The capability differential score is strongly positive in all 13 cases. In
28 Ibid, 29.
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11 of the 13 cases, the sending states were European. If there was a selection bias to
examine European states’ activities, which has included many alliances and entente, and
one examined primarily successful compellence attempts; a logical conclusion may be
that preponderant capability was a requirement for successful compellence. However, this
observation is not supported by the data across time for all regions.
Although capability is an integral part of the compellence mechanism, it is
apparent that neither great capability nor weaker capability guarantees success or failure
at compellence, nor does it ensures stout resistance. Therefore, we must example other
tools and aspects of compellence to clarify the relationship.
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The Myth o f Diplomacy
The second understanding that may hamper the effective study of compellence is
one that is offered in counterbalance to the use of strong military force as the key action
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that creates the desired compellence effect. Some authors stress diplomatic actions as the
key tool of compellence almost to the exclusion of military force. In a large portion of the
literature, as illustrated by The Limits o f Coercive Diplomacy, edited by Alexander L.
George and William Simons to Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, edited by
Lawrence Freedman, the bargaining, conferences, consultations, and thoughtful but
exhaustive discussion appears to be a central feature of successful compellence.

9Q

Most

literature portrays this process as give-and-take between two sovereigns and subsequently
structures analytic processes on a move and counter-move basis to mirror that
understanding. From empirical data we will be able to assess the impression we gain
from the literature that successful compellence requires substantive diplomatic activities.
If this perspective is accurate, the expectation is that we should observe that almost all
cases of successful compellence will have diplomatic solutions. The aforementioned
Militarized Interstate Dispute database records the method of resolution for each dispute
and therefore it will be fairly easy to determine if diplomatic actions are actually the sine
quo non of successful compellence.
The method of settlement is assigned one of four categories: negotiated, imposed,
none, and unclear.30 From this data we will be able to examine the impression we gain
from the literature that successful compellence requires substantive diplomatic activities.
Of the four methods of settlement, the first category o f "negotiated" would seem to
support a view of bargaining and the importance of diplomatic interchange as a key factor
in success. The second category of imposed, with its key indicators of unconditional
surrender or adversary’s occupation of territory and failure to withdrawal would not
29
30

George and Simons, Limits o f Coercive Diplomacy, Freedman, "Strategic Coercion."
Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 181.
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indicate lack of negotiations, but suggest a supporting role to the physicalities of the
situation. The third category o f none, still would not indicate that negotiations were not
attempted, just that they were not significant to the outcome. Of course, the fourth
category does not provide any insight into the central significance of negotiation in
compellence. To support the centrality of diplomatic actions in compellence we would
expect "negotiated" to be the predominant method for successful compellence cases.
Comparing the forms of settlement with successful compellence outcomes we
find that negotiations are not the linchpin to the success of compellence as indicated in
table 6. Thirty seven percent of the cases of successful compellence were recorded as
having had “none” as a settlement method. Further, approximately 19 percent of the
successful episodes of compellence were reflected in the “imposed” category where
military capabilities seem to be more useful than diplomacy. About 42 percent of the
cases of successful compellence were marked with “negotiated” as the settlement
method. This indicates that more than 50 percent of successful compellence occurs
without the benefit of leaving a public trace of a negotiated settlement. For comparison,
unsuccessful cases are also listed. Not surprisingly almost eighty percent of unsuccessful
cases had no evidence of a settlement mechanism. Interestingly, 233 cases where
negotiations did occur ended in unsuccessful compellence in comparison to the 44
successful cases that had evidence of negotiation.
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Table 6. Sett ement Methods for Single State Compellence
Successful
Frequency
Negotiate

44

41.9

Frequency
233

Impose

20

None
Unclear

39
2

19.0
37.1

78
1130

1.9

9

77.8
0.6

Missing

0

0.0

3

0.2

105

100.0

1453

100.0

Total

Percent

Unsuccessful
Percent
5.4

16.0

Returning to the MID codebook, examining the coding rules for an outcome of
yield, which is the strictest definition in this study to be considered a successful episode
of compellence, along with the coding rules for the settlement category provides a clearer
perspective. The definition of yield is that “a state offers concessions that alter the status
quo in exchange for not being militarily threatened or to stop further military attacks..
Further, the definition for none as a settlement method includes “none of the conditions
of negotiated settlement are present... denotes the lack of any formal or informal effort
which successfully resolves...” the dispute. Conditions of a negotiated settlement include
a “written agreement”, “joint communique”, “exchange of letters”, “formal acceptance of
cease-fire”, “existence of a verbal or tacit understanding by official representatives.”31 In
other words, the MID researchers found that in more than 50 percent of the cases of
successful compellence, no tangible output of diplomatic negotiation was in evidence. It
would seem then that compellence can and does frequently occur without the specialized
exchange of views that is commonly called diplomacy, and that it can operate at a more
visceral level, where actions provide the essential vocabulary to denote the threat and

31 Ibid.
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acquiescence. Therefore, diplomacy, in the sense of ministerial consultations in the
tradition of Mittemich is not an absolute pre-requisite for successful compellence and is
not even required the majority of the time.32
This approach stands in contrast to the diplomatic and bargaining focus of the
majority of current compellence literature previously mentioned. This mismatch between
expectation and practice indicates a need to conceptualize the process of compellence
differently than current literature obtains. Where literature portrays this process as giveand-take between two sovereigns and subsequently structures analytic processes on a
move and counter-move basis to mirror that understanding, the data suggests that a
number of different ways are used to achieve political aims. Specifically, the interaction
could include a number o f instances of not applying diplomatic means or resolving the
situation via violence, but stand pat on a position and achieving policy aims via
resistance.
The Myth o f Major Powers
Since superiority of military capability is not a necessary condition to succeed at
compellence, and adroit diplomacy may not be necessary, how true might the perception
be that compellence is the province of major powers? When international relations
scholars discuss the use of the threat of force or exemplar use to get a second party to act
in a certain way, many think of “gunboat diplomacy” as practiced by the UK and U.S.
Foundation works such as The Limits o f Coercive Diplomacy by Alexander George and
William Simons and Forceful Persuasion by Alexander George, discuss compellence

32

Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 87-88.
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almost as the sole province of major powers.

Within The Limits o f Coercive Diplomacy

all seven case studies focus on the U.S. as the compeller, with various target nations
throughout the world. Forceful Persuasion follows the same pattern. In a more recent
work, Western Use o f Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, as
implied in his title, derives cases from compellence actions by the U.S. and other Western
nations, which includes the majority of major powers in the world.34 This sample of
literature would seem to indicate that attempted compellence actions are conducted
predominantly by major powers, and that a study of these actions provides a firm
foundation for the understanding of this global phenomenon. If true, the expectation is
that compellence attempts by major powers should be a high proportion of all
compellence attempts. If the actual ratio of major power attempts to minor power
attempts in the literature matches the major to minor power attempts ratio in the historical
record, this will indicate that the literature has correctly depicted compellence as a major
power activity. As the Militarized Interstate Dispute database captures the major power
status for each state involved in each compellence attempt, this expectation will be easily
tested.
However, the data, as captured in table 7, indicates that the major powers
compellence attempts comprise a little more than one quarter of all single state vs. single
state compellence attempts. In the period 1816 to 2001, the major powers, as a group,
conducted 429 compellence attempts of the total of 1558.

33
34

George and Simons, Limits o f C oercive D iplom acy, George, Forceful Persuasion.

Jakobsen, Western Use o f Coercive Diplomacy.
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Table 7. Major Power Participation in Single State Compellence Attempts
Frequency
Percent
Minor Power

1129

72.5

Major Power

429

27.5

1558

100.0

Total

It does appear that major powers, which have never totaled more than nine,
participate in more attempts than their sheer numbers would tend to indicate, but almost
three-quarters of single state vs. single state compellence attempts are conducted by
minor powers. However, as implied earlier, major powers may focus on compellence
attempts that include allies or partners. When the 76 cases of multiple states attempting
compellence against a single state are examined, almost 80 percent of those involved at
least one major power. Further, when the cases of multiple states attempting to compel
multiple states are examined, more than 60 percent of the 23 cases involve major powers
as sending states.
To review, table 8 below captures all cases, both single and multiple state activity,
where outcomes that could be readily identified as compellence or failure of
compellence. As was previously noted, less than 10 percent of the attempts were
successful.
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Table 8 . Single anc Multiple State Compellence Rates, 1816-2001
Success
Success
Failure
Total
Percent
Single State

110

1527

1637

6.71

Multiple States

24

232

256

9.35

Totals

134

1759

1893

7.07

To understand how that small percentage is distributed in regard to major power
status we will need to examine the various combinations of major power and minor
powers that where involved in compellence or as a target. Table 9 provides a summary of
successful compellence by sender and target.
Immediately obvious is that minor powers are responsible for the greater number
of compellence attempts and fewer numbers of successes. However, given nine major
powers, in their various incarnations, have conducted about 600 attempts at compellence,
and the minor powers, growing from just under twenty to approximately 180 states
conducted about 1300, major powers are, on an attempts per state basis, much more
active than the minor powers. In addition, the major powers have a much higher success
rate than minor powers.
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Table 9. Success Rates of Major and Minor Powers with Number o Attempts
Target States
Major
Power
<z>
0)
ed
-*->
00
b/)

.s
*3
a
C/5

Minor
Power

Total

Major
Power

10.23%
n=176

16.95%
n=419

595

Minor
Power

4.29%
n = 210

3.31%
n=1088

1298

Total

n=386

n=1507

1893

Although the myth that only major powers attempt compellence is shown not to
be true, the examination of this myth leads us to an interesting observation about the
major power vs. minor power proportion of successful compellence. Major powers are
generally more successful than minor powers when viewed across the entire period under
examination. However, the compellence puzzle is inherently about changes over time. To
illuminate possible differences over time, all cases were coded as either before and during
World War II or after World War II. Table 10 highlights the changes in success from one
period to the next.

Sending States

Table 10. Success Rates in Two Time Periods with Number of Attempt s

Major Power
Minor Power
Total

1816-1945

1946-2001

23.42%
n=333
9.93%
n=292

4.38%
n=262
1.62%
n=1006

625

1268
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Total
595
1298
1893
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The change over time perspective illustrates a significant set of information in
relation to the compellence puzzle. As previously implied, the substantive increase in
numbers of attempts is related to the growth in the number of minor powers. After we
control for that growth, compellence attempts levels continue at nominally historic levels.
Interestingly, the major powers have more of a drop in the rate of compellence success
(23.42% to 4.38 %) than minor powers (9.93% to 1.6%). To better understand these
reductions, similar data can be examined from a regional perspective. To ensure clearer
regional specification, we must momentarily return to data that reflects single state
against single state compellence attempts. Although there may be some slight variation
from preceding figures, the trends remain clear.

Table 11. Detail of Success by Type of Power and Region, Single State in Percent
1816-1945

1946-2001

2 2 .00 %

1.19%

Middle East

N/A

N/A

Africa

N/A

N/A

Asia
Americas

25.00%

0 .0 %

40.00%

8.33%

Europe

11 . 11 %

1.19%

Middle East

0 .0 0 %

1.56%

Africa

0 .0 0 %

2.84%

26.32%

1.89%

9.49%

0.84%

Europe

C/5
<D

Major
Power

od

xn
00

a
a<D

00

Minor
Power

Asia
Americas

As seen in table 11, major powers in all regions, but slightly less so in the Americas,
became ineffective compellers, as did the once successful minor powers in Asia. Minor
powers in the Middle East and Africa became slightly more effective but remained
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largely ineffective. Although these interesting variations exists across regions they are not
quite sufficient to explain the causes of the patterns we see in the compellence puzzle.
We will return to that portion of the puzzle for discussion in a later chapter. The point
here is that compellence is not just a major power activity, but instead an activity pursued
by majors and minor powers alike.

Summary
This chapter discussed compellence from the perspective of the
conceptualizations available in the specialized compellence research for two purposes.
The first was to improve our understanding of the term ‘compellence’ and its
implications. The second was to achieve an appreciation of the conceptual tools available
to address the compellence puzzle posed in the previous chapter. Through this
examination, it was possible to detect some commonalities in the actors, actions, tools,
environment, and possible outcomes of compellence. This examination also led to
rejection of some of the commonly held myths about compellence. However, modem
science prefers that critiques of existing explanations be followed by an alternate
explanation that more fully explains the facts at hand .35 By finding some commonalities
in the conceptualizations of compellence in the specialized literature and discarding other
explanations, this chapter has formed a starting point to broaden the discussion of
compellence. In the next chapter, we will avail ourselves of some selected portions of
international relations theory to establish a more coherent understanding.

35 Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth o f Knowledge (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970).
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CHAPTER IV
IMPROVED CONCEPTUALIZATION

Contributions of IR Theory
The previous chapter presented conceptualizations based on the specialized
compellence literature and addressed three common myths. The framework derived from
the compellence literature and addressing these three myths is still insufficient to fully
understand how compellence has changed over time. To move closer to solving this
puzzle, we must avail ourselves of the broader international relations literature. In this
next section, some of the predominant international relations theories will be examined to
determine if and how they illuminate compellence and more specifically, increase our
understanding of the puzzle of changed compellence patterns. After review of applicable
theory creation of a synthesis framed by the previously discussed similarities actors,
actions, tools, environment, and outcomes will provide the ingredients to create a useful
description of compellence.
Realism
Hans Morgenthau encapsulate the realistic approach in his argument that the
central motivation for action between states is their pursuit of interest expressed as
power. He provides a rich vision, enumerating multiple factors that may indicate a state's
potential to influence others to exercise or gain more power.1 Morgenthau highlights the
threat of military force as a method to impress upon other states the demonstrator’s
military preparedness and capabilities. Beyond demonstrations of capability, he notes the

1 Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations; The Struggle fo r
Power and Peace, 6th ed. ( New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985).
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partial or total mobilization provides a strong tool to communicate strength and resolve to
other states. However, as these demonstrations serve to impress potential adversaries and
keep the allegiance of current allies, the highest use being to give a state such a reputation
for power as to enable it to forgo the actual employment of the capabilities. This idea
comports directly with compellence.2 Nevertheless, Morgenthau cautions that even with
these demonstrations it is very difficult to correctly assess, through power calculations
that include allies, opponents and various possible alliances, the balance of power and
states’ likely actions.3 The central thoughts of communication, uncertainty, and
calculation remains critical in compellence, however noting them is not sufficient, by
itself, to explain when and where it has been and is likely to be unsuccessful. The aspect
of realism that provides the threat of force as a potential tool appears to agree more with
the version of compellence as envisioned by Schelling than by Alexander George.
However, realism provides little traction to understand specific variations over time.
Understanding the alternatives to traditional realism may inform the variations of
compellence we see in the puzzle.
Kenneth Waltz parsimoniously and pragmatically envisions a system that is
comprised of states, operating in a condition of anarchy, with no superior entity,
differentiated only by the level of capabilities, operating in a self help fashion. He argues
that these system dynamics give rise to automatic balancing where states will join to
counter a more powerful state that threatens them and the system .4 His framework
acknowledges the use of force between states, but provides little direct leverage to the

2

Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 93-97.
3 Ibid., 224-26.
4

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84
practitioner or student of compellence. One could view attempted compellence and
resistance to it as an expression of the anarchic and survival focused nature of the system,
but this level of formulation provides little insight into the facts of many compellence
attempts and few successes in the post-World War II era.
In Waltz’s neorealism balancing is the essential activity that maintains the system.
Applying this aspect of neorealism, we would expect that states would frequently come to
the aid of a state that was a target of a compellence attempt. However, the data does not
bear out that expectation. Only about 16 percent of the militarized interstate disputes
between 1816 and 2001 were characterized by having another state join the dispute after
its initiation. Therefore, overt balancing does not provide leverage to explain the variation
seen in the compellence puzzle.
However, some balancing may not be as overt as movement of troops or
launching of ships. Since the action of the sender is to transmit a punishment contingent
demand, appropriate balancing actions may be to issue contingent assurances of future
support to the target in such a way that they are known to the sender. Announcing a
future delivery o f military hardware to a target state as a sign of support may allow the
target state to more confidently resist the demands of the sending state. This idea of
balancing via the communication of interest or intent, enabled by the ability to rapidly
move combat forces throughout the globe may take place of overt declarations of support
or physical deployment of military forces. No longer tied to the techniques of railroad
and road marches seen in the preparations to World War I, the ability to rapidly deploy
and redeploy forces across the globe provides a built-in presence without generating the
types of evidence that would be captured from troop movements. Thus, balancing may
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have evolved from physically aligning the military forces of many against the strongest,
to a new form. This form consists of a combination of the expression interest or intent
and a rapidly responding global force presence. Unlike the initial form of balancing of the
many versus the strong, this form of balancing requires a state with global reach
capabilities, such as the U.S. to strike a balance.
Constructivism
Other theorists address changing perspectives of the impact of communication of
ideas or intent. For example, Alexander Wendt, like Waltz, highlights the importance of
the system, but identifies social interaction as the force that constructs both the system
and the actors.5 His discussion allows for states to be constructed in three general types,
Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. These cultures become self fulfilling prophesies that
perpetuate themselves.6 A constructivist could venture that Hobbesian states attempt
compellence as a cultural expression of appropriate state-to-state intercourse, and
resistance as a proper Hobbesian response. Further, Lockean states may attempt
compellence, and resist, applying the logic of competition, but would avoid escalation to
the point that would destroy the other competitor state. Kantian states would not attempt
to use compellence, but would resist and join with others in their resistance.7 Wendt
suggests that evolution of states in the Kantian direction is a possibility although not
ft

•

•

•

predicted. Logically, if such an evolution occurred it would result in decreased
compellence attempts over time, as Kantian states would have no use for compellence.
However, the data show that attempts at compellence range across democracies and
5 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
6 Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics, 308-9.
7 Ibid., 257-58.
8 Ibid., 311-12.
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autocracies, in all geographic regions, and across all religious groupings, and that
compellence is practiced increasingly often, and commensurately resisted. Therefore,
Wendt’s overall formulation may not be the appropriate answer to the puzzle. However,
other aspects of constructivism that reinforce the idea that social structures, that is, shared
ideas, acquired logics, and tendencies that persists through time may prove useful.
Although the logic of anarchy may generally hold, a system change may create the
conditions for a modification and internalization of a new logic, resulting in a different
pattern of compellence. The caesura that was the end of World War II, with the
immediate competition between the U.S. and the USSR, but also with the transformation
of what was normal international discourse, could be such a shock.
Complex Interdependence
Other writers such as Keohane and Nye provide intricate interactive visions of
complex interdependence, with webs of vulnerability and susceptibility and multiple
channels, multiple issues, and reduced utility of military force.9 Although this theory was
developed in opposition to the realist school, the ideas of interconnectedness and the
possibility that multiple channels and multiple issues may influence state action are
aligned with the compellence authors’ description of the environment in which
compellence operates.10 However, a central idea within the complex interdependence is
the minor and diminishing role of military force. The authors allow for the threat of force
to deter attacks, and allow for a desire for military protection to support issue linkage

9

Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd Ed.

10 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd Ed, 1-27; George, Forceful Persuasion.
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bargaining, but suggest that the use of force has costly effects on non-security goals and
domestic policy support that constrains the use of military force.11
Domestic Influences
The idea of international and domestic costs of using force can provide some
insight into the low success rate of compellence. If the sending state's decision makers
did not initially understand the possible international and domestic costs of their
compellence attempt, target state actions that communicate those costs to the sender’s
elite and to their domestic audience may be helpful in resisting compellence. Beyond
merely communicating what those costs might be, the target state also has the option to
generate some of those costs for the sending state through linkage strategies. Complex
interdependence also highlights the role of international organizations as an outgrowth of
multiple channels and lack of hierarchy between issues. These international organizations
allow small and weak states to pursue those linkage strategies. The existence of these
international organizations and their ability to enhance the practice of linkage allows for
different political patterns than one might expect in a strict balance of power or cost
benefit analysis model.12 Complex interdependence also indicates the multiple channels
that create connections among societies blur the distinction between domestic and
international politics. It suggests that attitudes and policy stands of domestic groups are
likely to be affected by a communications, organized or not, between them and their
counterparts abroad and that this influence will not be limited to nongovernmental actors.
These multiple channels and the communications across them may make it difficult to

Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd Ed, 24-29.
12

Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd Ed, 35-37.
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coherently define a state’s interests.13 The rapid advances since World War II in
telecommunications technologies have allowed a more rapid flow of information to and
from more locations than previously thought possible. It is not surprising that information
can form the basis of decisions or can influence others within the network. Although the
reduced utility of military force under conditions of complex interdependence does not
explain the continued high level of threats to use force, it comports with the low success
rate of those threats since World War II.
As Putnam illustrates in his discussion of two-level games, states’ negotiators
have a vested interest in influencing the opposing sides’ domestic constituency .14
Although Putnam's example focused on expanding the opposing negotiators win set, and
notes the difficulty of truly understanding another state’s domestic politics, it
communicates the ideas of "suasive reverberation," where communications at the
international level can have substantial positive or negative effects at the domestic
level.15 This work offers the idea to compellence that targets or third parties can directly
interact with senders domestic constituencies and can create effects within the senders
polity. This may explain part of the causal mechanism that led to the dramatic decrease of
success in compellence.
Implication o f Hegemony
Still other works highlight the issue of hegemonic power, current and past, the
establishment of converging expectations for state behavior, the value and capability of

13 Ibid., 33-34.
14

Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic o f Two-Level Games,"
International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 451.
15 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic o f Two-Level Games," 456.
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institutions.16 These connective discussions indicate that institutions and organizations
that are operating today are at least partly a result of the U.S. operating as a hegemonic
power. The rise of a norm that held that the use of force to compel is illegitimate and the
growth of a set of institutions to nurture norm growth and enable its spread may have
been created, or at least enabled, unwittingly, by U.S. hegemony. Even if the U.S. may
attempt to use compellence, the norms and institutions continue to operate, without
hegemonic backing. These norms and institutions may have become key to the post
World War II trend of successful resistance.
Individual Leaders ’ Contributions
Finally, there is an extensive literature that focuses on the personality and
accomplishments of individual statesmen, limning them as the motive force for states’
behavior.17 This perspective provides a potential for understanding the reasons to comply
or resist in a particular case study, however in its pure form, runs in contradiction to the
previous systemic perspectives. In order to comprehend the results of thousands of
compellence attempts, the actions of many more thousands of political leaders would
have to be studied and put into a framework or system. As Kenneth Waltz states about
the insights of behavioral scientists, “.. .the insights of the behavioral scientists are like a
number of pearls, or glass beads, lying around loose. Their value may be great, but their
use is slight unless they can either be placed in a setting or put on a string."18 A work by

16 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and D iscord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "Promises,
Promises: Can Institutions Deliver?" International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 39-51.
17

Seyom Brown, The Faces o f Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy
from Truman to Clinton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); George Perkovich, India's Nuclear
Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkley: University o f California Press, 1999).
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), 78.
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Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrrow, The Logic o f Political Survival, may
be sufficient to fulfill Waltz’s intent. Their construct holds that political leaders shape
their policies and allocation of benefits in such a way as to reward and thereby influence
the particular constituency they need to stay in office. Politicians’ policy choices are
selected because they are compatible with maintenance of office .19 Although their study
highlights leaders’ choices in the broader areas of taxing, spending, policy choices and
war behavior, the logic should remain valid for the narrower subject of compellence.
Therefore, politicians’ policy choices about compellence should be affected by their
desire to maintain office. If domestic forces are to be accepted as part of the explanation
of the compellence puzzle, we should see a relationship between the level of compellence
activity and leaders’ longevity in office. In fact, a strong relationship exists between
leaders that attempt compellence and increased longevity in office, ceteris paribus.

Synthesis of Theories
From this brief review, it is obvious that many of the international relations
theories have aspects that can improve our understanding of compellence and specifically
of the puzzle of post World War II patterns. The discussion to this point provides us with
three major areas. The first is the general structure of compellence harvested from the
earlier discussion of the specialized compellence research. This structure consists of a
sending state, the target state, a punishment contingent demand, and an outcome. The
second major area comes from review of extant international relations theories, which
then helped explain the behavior within the above structure. The final area is elements of

19

Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic o f Political Survival, 7-9.
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the compellence literature that appear to be represented as at least partial causal factors.
To have a coherent explanation of the patterns we see in post World War II compellence
we will have to relate the first two, structure and theory, and account for the previously
offered causal factors.
Realism provides the underpinning idea of compellence that demonstrations of
capability or varying levels of mobilization are a robust tool to communicate strength and
resolve. It characterizes the highest use of this activity being that the state can achieve its
goals without the actual employment of the capabilities. Neorealism and constructivism
provide the first tools to counteract the demonstrations or mobilization suggested by
realism. Conditioned, educated, and informed by the calamity of World War II and the
behaviors shortly before and after, states to deal with compellence within the bipolar
system. Complex interdependence provides the ideas of interconnectedness and multiple
channels over which individuals and international organizations can bring attention and
pressure to bear. Both complex interdependence and other works on the international and
domestic overlap highlight a possible change mechanism to deflect the pressure of
threatened military actions. Robert Keohane in After Hegemony provides for the
possibility that the structures initially grown with U.S. assistance can survive system
changes and lack of subsequent support from the hegemon.20 In the case of compellence,
those structures to support resistance could continue to exist and may even be used in
reaction to the hegemon’s efforts at a later date. These theories all provide building
blocks to help understand why compellence is almost always successfully resisted in the
post World War II era. However, they do not appear to inform our understanding of why

20

Keohane, After Hegemony, 49-51.
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compellence then would continue to be attempted at historic rates. Borrowing from
Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow the reason could be related to the fact
that these attempts, successful or not, are compatible with the maintenance of office by
political leaders.
However, this amalgamation cannot be accomplished by merely alluding to the
building blocks of theory, they must be ordered. An ordering that begins to illuminate the
observed patterns is that leaders conduct activities that tend to be compatible with their
maintenance in political office. One of those behaviors is threatening the use of force
from a realist paradigm to defend and promote state interests. However, in a highly
connected and interdependent environment, those actions are actually constrained by the
environment. The activity of other states, their domestic constituents, and international
organizations, whose beliefs have been constructed by a World War II and post World
War II experiences, intercede regularly. These intercessions, directed at either the sending
state or the target state, may be sufficient to allow the target state to successfully resist
the demands of the sending state. This pattern and structure, constructed early in the Cold
War, has been included and maintained as part of the international operational code by
international organizations such as the U.N., global media, and encoded in the domestic
law of some states. This inclusion allows the phenomenon to continue although the
original conditions for its construction no longer exist.

Elaboration
A brief elaboration of this potential compellence framework of actors, actions,
environment, and outcomes, motivated and given shape by the applicable portions of
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international relations theory can provide some important insights that may be helpful
later in coming to a conclusion about its usefulness. The first area for elaboration is the
actors. The actors are the leaders of the opposing states. Their function is to make policy
decisions, which are then carried out by the state mechanisms. Although it is recognized
that the state mechanisms; military, diplomatic, economic, and information, can introduce
variations in the process of carrying out the policy decisions, their effect over time and
across the multiple states is nominal for the purposes of this study. Given that there are at
least two state leaders in the model it is appropriate to examine both perspectives.
Initially, before the sending state leader is aware that he needs to attempt to change a
behavior, the target state’s leader has made a decision to take an action that, as Bueno de
Mesquista et al argues, is calculated to optimize maintenance of political office.21 The
leader likely believes that this action creates some benefit for himself or an important
constituency.22 In other words, the target state leader chooses to embark on a course of
action that will result in more power or a more secure position for themselves, better
access to natural resources for the industries owned by the selectorate, reduction of some
perceived threat to the state, or some combination of the above.
The leader of the sending state decides that this action is somehow detrimental to
his political well-being or is in violation of his state’s interests. This provides the
motivation to send a demand that the target state stop, start, or modify its actions.
Depending on the environment, if the sending state's leader determines that a request not
linked to potential use of force, or some other form of suasion cannot motivate the change
in activity by the target state, he or she may then decide to issue a punishment contingent
21

Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic o f Political Survival, 7-9.

22

Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention
Decisions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 49.
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demand. As outlined in Pape, the threatened punishment could be aimed at a number of
different types of targets .23
For example, in Haiti, October 1993, armed mobs and gunboats manned by police
confronted the U.S. amphibious ship Harlan County, which was there to disembark initial
U.S. troops under the UN brokered Governor’s Island accord. This activity caused
President Clinton to withdraw the USS Harlan County and not put forces ashore in Haiti
at that time .24 The Haitian leaders had decided that to allow the U.S. forces, even few as
they were, into Haiti was not compatible with continued maintenance of their political
power.
The USS Harlan County situation caused U.S. domestic repercussions. Attacked
by both liberals and conservatives within the U.S. Congress and in liberal society for his
lack of resolve, President Clinton’s eventual action was to issue a demand for the Cedras
regime to step down or to suffer an airborne invasion and forcible removal from office.
This threat was linked to vigorous on-scene diplomatic activity.25 The Haitian regime was
isolated from any form of support in the broader international environment by a U.S.
enforced UN blockade and abhorred by the region’s leaders. The outcome, in this case,
was that regime leaders complied with demands to step down and to direct their military
and paramilitary not to forcibly resist U.S. forces when they landed.
This example appeals to the realist tradition where the threat of force is a viable
tool to exercise power. However, the constructivist and neo-realist perspectives are also
informative. Given the illegitimate and brutal nature of the Haitian regime, any states that

23 Pape, Bombing to Win, 18-19.
24

Mark Peceny, Democracy at the Point o f Bayonets (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1999), 164.
5 Peceny, Democracy at the Point o f Bayonets, 165-68.
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would have attempted to intercede and provide support in opposition to U.S. demands
would have done so at the risk of appearing to support the barbaric methods used by
Cedras’ supporters. International organizations such as the UN supported removal of
Cedras’ regime. In this environment, no intercession occurred against the U.S. threat of
the use of military force.
The features lacking in this example can be illustrated by review of an additional
example. Since the signing of the Dayton agreement, Slobodan Milosevic attempted,
through various seizures of territory to convince the Croat leadership to cede further
territory. This exemplar use of force was “balanced” by President Clinton meeting with
President Mesic and Prime Minister Racan .26 This meeting yielded an announcement of
$21 million in developmental aid, $4 million for foreign military financing, from the
U.S., reiteration of Croatian membership in the NATO Partnership For Peace program,
and $4.5 million contribution to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to help
returning refugees and internally displaced persons in Croatia.
The environment that Milosevic was operating in had been developed during the
various episodes of violence and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. At this point, Milosovic
had no external international partners and was about to lose an election inside Serbia. The
Croat leadership conducted a show of force and negotiated a return of the seized areas.
The outcome was a failure of compellence on the part of Milosevic.
The realist will recognize Milosevic’s threat via exemplar use of force as a
method to increase Serbia’s power, and the constructivist will note that the recent Balkan
conflicts left lasting impressions that helped create Milosevic’s isolation. With all states,
26 U.S. Department o f State. "Transcript: Clinton Meets Croatian President, Prime Minister." In
International Information Programs. 9 August 2000. http://usinfo.org/usia/usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/
refugees/ archive/00081004.htm (accessed 17 Oct 2004)
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even including Serbia’s traditional ally Russia, unwilling to support Milosevic’s
continued use of military force to acquire territory, and the U.S. and the international
community, represented by the resettlement NGOs, actively supporting the target of
compellence, the Croats could more easily resist, resulting in a failure of compellence.

Summary
This chapter provides a possible explanation of how compellence may operate. In
this conceptualization, action is motivated by the leader’s desire to conduct activities that
are compatible with maintenance of political office. A second leader, also motivated by
maintenance of political office, decides the best way to get the target state leader to
change the offending behavior is to issue a demand with a linked threat of the use of
military force. The political environment, which includes international organizations,
norms about use of force, and political allies, is likely to mitigate the sender’s threats,
especially in the post World War II era. Unlike previous conceptualizations that stress
calculations of levels of pain, the central deciding factor in this conceptualization is the
leader’s perspective of how the actions will affect his or her political longevity. Since
World War II the most common outcome of this process is a stalemate, where the target
state continues to execute the actions that started the sequence and the sending state does
not carry out its threats.
By linking commonalities in the conceptualizations of compellence in the
specialized literature and the broader international relations theoretic base this chapter
has synthesized an explanation of the mechanisms of compellence. This possible
explanation may be useful to address the post-World War II compellence patterns.
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CHAPTER V
EXPLAINING POST-WORLD WAR II FALL IN COMPELLENCE SUCCESS

Previous chapters have clarified compellence from an empirical perspective,
outlined the existence of the compellence puzzle, provided a conceptualization of
compellence, and dispelled some common compellence myths. Equipped with both
empirical and conceptual tools, we now turn, in the three succeeding chapters, to examine
and attempt to address the three aspects of the compellence puzzle. The first portion of
the puzzle to be examined is the precipitous drop in compellence success immediately
after World War II.
In a well-understood science, a researcher could state the basic laws of a
phenomenon and then proceed to discuss the modifications or special factors that pertain
to a particular situation. However, in compellence the difficulties are manifold. As
previously revealed in the discussion of theory, basic laws and causal factors for success
and failure o f compellence are unclear. Schelling indicates that there are five necessary
conditions for successful compellence.1 George and Simons identify five contextual
variables; global strategic environment, type of provocation, image of war, unilateral or
coalition coercive diplomacy, and the isolation of the adversary—to ascertain whether
coercive diplomacy is a viable strategy in a given crisis. After a decision is taken to use
coercive diplomacy, the authors highlight nine conditions that favor success for coercive
diplomacy.2 Others highlight variants with less emphasis on the use of the military to
threaten, but with increased emphasis on defensive military actions to hold aggressors’

1 Schelling, Arms an d Influence, 3-4, 76.
2

George and Simons, Limits o f Coercive Diplomacy, 8, 211-15, 279-88.
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capabilities harmless so that suasion can be effective.3 Still others highlight strategic
actors and a constructivist approach.4 In short, the existing compellence literature does
not provide a clear guide to understanding the variation seen in compellence success and
failure. Nevertheless, to move forward, it might not be necessary to understanding the
entire cluster of compellence related behaviors but only to identify the factors that
reduced the success rate at a particular time. By assuming that each of the theoretical
observations illuminates some portion of compellence, but does not characterize the
whole, we can simplify our task by focusing on the changes that are associated with the
end of World War II. This way progress can be made on understanding the variations and
the underlying principles at the same time.

Narrowing the Examination
Our previous empirical discussion indicted that to minimize the potential
disruptive effects that a large number of system changes may create, this analysis will use
the 1914-1945 period as the baseline against which to compare the 1946-2001 conditions.
In addition to focusing the investigation on eras that are as much alike as possible, it is
important to examine the change in compellence outcomes from two perspectives. The
first perspective is a direct examination to determine the possible causes of the sharp drop
in compellence success. The second perspective is need to illuminate the fact that
compellence success remained suppressed for a more than 50 years from that drop. As
the continuation of a low success rate is unusual within the historic record, it is possible
that factors other than those that created the initial suppression are responsible. This
3
4

Daniel, Hayes, and de Jonge Oudraat, Coercive Inducement, 21-24.
George and Simons, Limits o f Coercive Diplomacy, 36.
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chapter will focus on the first perspective, the immediate drop, the following chapter the
issue of continuing low success.
A change previously highlighted in the post-World War II timeframe was the
region of the sending states that were attempting to conduct compellence. In the period
1914-1945, Europe had the largest number of compellence attempts, as seen in figure 10.

Americas - 55 -

Asia - 30
154 - Europe
Africa- 1
Middle East - 15

Figure 10. Compellence Attempts, 1914-1945, by Region

As the number of states grew in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia they took on a
larger percentage share of compellence attempts, while the previous main contributors,
Europe and the Americas, continued to attempt compellence, but had reduced proportions
of the total compellence effort as depicted in figure 11 .
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Americas - 155

320 - Middle East

141 - Africa

Figure 11. Compellence Attempts, 1946-2001, by Region

As the regional proportions shifted, so did the nature of the states that were
attempting to compel. The states that came into being after 1945 were not major powers,
but minor powers. The major powers, long established, had just fought an exhaustive,
bloody world war. In table 12, attempts and the success for single state vs. single state for
major and minor powers can be seen for both periods.

Table 12. Major and Minor Power Comparison, 1914-1945 and 1946-2001
Total
Attempts
Succeed
Fail
per Year
Attempts
Major Power
147
25
122
4.6
1914-1945
103
3.4
Minor Power
108
5
3.4
Major Power
7
182
189
1946-2001
15.6
Minor Power
876
15
861

Percent
Success
17.0
4.6
3.7
1.7

To narrow the field of possible sources of the reduced success at compellence,
one can test to determine if there is continuity in the performance of these two groups. In
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terms of continuity, there are four possible outcomes. One outcome is that both major
powers and minor powers perform after World War II much like they did in the previous
era. By looking at the reduction in the overall rate of compellence success, we know that
this cannot be true, so this option is discarded. Another outcome would be that both types
of powers suffer a reduction in success. The other two outcomes are that either the minor
powers or the major powers suffer the reduction in success. Using the record of single
state vs. single state compellence for the period 1914 through 1945 and the period 1946
through 2001 success means were examined to see if their success distribution remained
the same between the two periods. An independent samples t-test, equal variance not
assumed indicated that the means differences are statistically significant for the major
powers.5 The difference in the means indicates that it is statistically improbable that the
reduction in means for major power success rates was random. A second independent
samples t-test, equal variance not assumed indicated that the means differences are
statistically insignificant for the minor powers.6 The difference in the means indicates
that it is within statistically probability that the reduction in means in minor power
success rates was random. From a statistical perspective, the fall in compellence success
after World War II is related to a change in major powers’ performance, and cannot be
attributed to minor powers’ performance. Therefore, the first element of explaining the
suppression of successful compellence will examine major power attempts in the post-

5 Major powers’ success means from 1914-1945 and 1946-2001 were subject to an independent
samples t-test, equal variance not assumed. It indicated that the means differences are statistically
significant, t (202.856) = 3.912, g_=.000. The pre-1946 era (M= 17, SD_=.377) was substantially higher
than the 1946 and after era (M_=.04, SD = 1891.
6 Minor powers’ success means from 1914-1945 and 1946-2001 were subject to independent
samples t-test, equal variance not assumed. It indicated that the means differences are statistically
insignificant, t (117.176) = 1.404, g_=,163. The pre-1946 era (M=.05, SD_=.211) was slightly higher than
the 1946 and after era (M =.02. SD = 1301.
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World War II environment and why they failed so much more often than in the past.
Although the change in performance of minor powers was not found to be statistically
significant, these cases will be reviewed later to gain additional insight.

Changes in Time
In order to focus on major power attempts, we will first review the performance
changes from one period to the next to further identify where the change occurred.
Selecting states that were major powers in both periods provides a continuity of
comparison. Table 13 shows states that were major powers in either time frame.7 We will
drop Austria-Hungary from this part of the analysis since it did not conduct any single
state compellence attempts in the first period and did not exist as a state for most of the
first and all of the second period.

Table 13. Major Powers and Status Changes
1914-1945
Continuous
United States
Continuous
United Kingdom
1914-1940, 1945
France
1914-1918, 1925-1945
Germany
Austria-Hungary
1914-1918
1914-1943
Italy
1914-1917, 1922-1945
Russia / USSR
Minor Power
China
Japan
1914-1945

1946-2001
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
1991-2001
Dissolved
Minor Power
Continuous
1950-2001
1991-2001

Table 14 shows the major powers and their compellence performance in the two
time periods under discussion. A visual examination reveals substantially varying
7

Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982).
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performance for each state. The U.S., although not prolific, was fairly successful in the
first period, whereas in the second period its success rate dropped severely. The United
Kingdom’s rate of success increased substantially in the 2nd period, but it attempted
single state compellence only four times, negating the significance of that increase.

Table 14. Major Powers’ Single State Compellence Performance, 1914-1945
1914-1945
1946-2001
Attempts

Success

Percent

Attempts

Success

Percent

U.S.

10

4

40.0

36

3

8.3

UK

14

1

7.1

4

1

25.0

3

0

0.0

14

0

0.0

Germany

46

5

10.8

0

0

0.0

Italy

20

1

5.0

1

0

0.0

Russia/USSR

38

9

23.7

69

3

4.3

China

6

1

16.6

64

0

0.0

Japan

20

5

25.0

3

0

0.0

Totals

157

26

16.5

191

7

3.6

France

France was more prolific in attempts, moving from 3 to 14, but was completely
unsuccessful in each era. Germany had been a solid performer at 46 attempts with about a
10 percent success rate in the first time frame, but after World War II, Germany did not
make any solo attempts at compelling other states. Italy has a similar pattern with 20
early attempts and a five percent success rate, but only 1 attempt since World War II with
no successes. Russia, in its various incarnations, increased its attempts a great deal, but its
successes dropped even more substantially. China had not been an aggressive attempter
of compellence and had little success in the first period. In the second period, China
increased its attempts dramatically, was never successful. Japan, in the first period was a
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solid user of compellence, with 20 attempts and five successes. After World War II, it
attempted compellence only three times and was not successful. To make use of these
data elements it will be helpful to put them into the context o f the political environment.
Before World War II, the international system was relatively stable, but both
fascism and communism were nascent threats to that order. Britain, France and other
European countries continued to play the great power game, much as they did during the
Concert of Europe. In the Pacific, the U.S. along with the Dutch, French, and British
controlled islands, much of Indochina, and India, Burma, Hong Kong, and Malaya. Japan
was aggressive, but lacked critical natural resources and was engaged with China. Russia
was relatively weak and not expansive at this time. In the Middle East and Africa,
European colonialism dominated and in the Western Hemisphere, American economic
actions guaranteed cheap raw materials and dependable markets.8
At the end of World War II, the United States was the preponderant power on the
planet. It had gone to the ends of the earth to defeat the evil that was Nazism, and the
Japanese empire. The American nuclear monopoly offered the opportunity to destroy any
enemy within days. The U.S., with the atomic bomb, the requisite delivery devices, and
required infrastructure, was in a different category when it came to measuring capability.
With the totalitarian powers destroyed, America had begun to bring her boys home,
demobilize them and reconvert its economy and society back to a peacetime footing.
Nevertheless, all was not well. The USSR with its large land mass, substantial armies,
and its demonstrated will to sacrifice millions of men in defense was also in a different
league than most states. The Soviet Union, an erstwhile member of the Alliance,
g

Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy
Since 1938 (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 1.
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continued to occupy and consolidate territory. Areas that they did not occupy were
subject to having their institutions undermined by various Soviet agents. While the U.S.
atomic capability could obliterate thousands of people at a time, the Soviet capability was
immediately applicable to seizing and controlling people, land, and resources. The
distribution of relative capabilities had now changed. Many of the European state’s
capabilities had dropped substantially, as did Japan’s. Alternatively, the U.S. and the
Soviets both had risen dramatically,
The post-World War II era was marked by a new international system. As Waltz
highlights, a system is comprised of a set of interacting units at one level and a structure
at another.9 In the international system, the ordering principle is generally anarchic and
the units are normally considered states. These states are substantially undifferentiated,
insofar as they execute the same functions. Waltz argues that they are distinguishable by
distribution o f capabilities across units.10 Through the process of World War II
substantial capability was destroyed and created. The destruction, noted in figure 12,
although perhaps not as horrific as the battlefield slaughter of World War I, was
considerable.

9

Waltz, Theory o f International P olitics, 48.

10 Ibid., 100.
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Figure 12. Major Power Capabilities, 1935-1955

For example, as the Soviet Union’s population dropped from 196,659,000 in 1941
to 177,300,000 in 1945, while iron and steel production dropped from 15,584 to 12,252
tons for the same period, its warmaking capability dropped from about 18 percent of the
world’s capacity in 1935 to near 12 percent in 1945. At the same time, the United States
moved from about 19 percent in 1935 to almost 40 percent of the world’s warmaking
capability .11 However, capability is not just based on raw materials. Capability is also
based on the ability to organize, train, and equip elements of the state to accomplish the
various required functions such as military and security functions. As the principle of
entropy indicates, energy is needed to create that organization. For states, energy is often
expressed in terms of money. As we examine the drop in post World War II expenditures,
in table 15, we can get a feeling of the loss of post war capability from an organizational

11 J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and
Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Peace, War and Numbers, ed. Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage,
1972).
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perspective and note with interest that the Soviet Union and China do not decline by this
measure.

Table 15. Military Expenditures (Thousands of Constant Dollars)
1945
90,000,000
United States
17,002,048
United Kingdom
1,230,509
France
10,648,000
Germany
305,412
Italy
8,589,076
USSR
228,612
China
4,002,481
Japan
* = Occupation ends in Germany in 1949, Japan Self Defense Force

1949
13,503,000
3,137,333
1,246,614
*
523,478
13,964,622
2,030,000
*
established in 1954

This systems and capabilities perspective provides two insights that are important
to the reduction of success part of the puzzle. The data in table 15 provides a perspective
on the condition of the states that would have attempted compellence after World War II.
There no longer appears to be a set of major powers, but at least three types of states at
this point, conquered states, exhausted states, and artifacts of a bipolar international
system. The conquered state portion is fairly straightforward, Germany and Japan were
occupied, their affairs of state and military under the control of foreign powers, they did
not have the political capability nor perhaps the will to threaten other states. Italy, did not
suffer a like occupation, but dropped from major power status and was constrained
nonetheless from military adventurism. Great Britain clearly falls in the category of
exhausted state, with severely reduced military expenditures and rapidly dwindling
imperial holdings, realizing their situation, they impose constraints on themselves. France
had an analogous position to England, although it took some more time for it to lose its
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colonial holdings. China had been mauled by Japan and was occupied with a civil war but
was eventually able to recover.
This post World War II major powers configuration leaves just the two
superpowers able to attempt compellence. Although they both attempted compellence on
a regular basis, they were consistently unsuccessful. Between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, they account for slightly over 50 percent of the great power compellence attempts.
Before we turn to the particulars of the compellence attempts and the mechanics of how
they were frustrated, a brief review of a few precipitating events will help establish the
logical underpinnings of the failures of superpower compellence. In the next chapter, as
the exhausted states regain their strength and the occupied powers regain their
sovereignty, we will examine why compellence success remains low throughout the Cold
War and beyond. But for now, this examination will focus on the superpowers.

Soviet Expansionism
With relatively greater capability than the conquered or exhausted powers, the
Soviets started to act on the principle that territory is a necessary ingredient to security.
This approach was not new, the Soviet Union acted on this principle from the beginning
of World War II. Poland had stood alone through days of blitzkrieg and ruthless air
bombardment by overwhelming German forces. On the 17 day, 1 September 1939, she
was informed by the Soviet government that the Red Army was crossing her eastern
frontier to ostensibly protect the population of Western Ukraine and Western White
Ruthenia. Warsaw surrendered to the Germans on 27 September. The eastern part of
Poland was under Russian occupation for twenty-one months and was violently
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Sovietized. On 22 October 1939, after mass arrests and executions, elections under the
Soviet system were held. The delegates to the local Soviets were forced to apply for
incorporation into the Soviet Union, and parts of Poland were annexed by the Ukrainian
and the Byelorussian Soviet Republic. Mass deportations to distant parts of the U.S.S.R.
followed and continued throughout the occupation period. Toward the end of the war, the
Soviet Union's actions against Poland provided more indicators of their intent. Ensuring
the massacre of Warsaw through inaction, murdering 15,000 Polish officers, annexing
Eastern Polish territory, creating their own provisional government, the Soviet Union
inexorably continue its advance to secure territory across Eastern Europe.12 The Soviet
actions in Poland illustrates Schelling's idea of brute force and the lengths that the Soviets
were willing to go to increase its security. Brute force was not the only method that the
Soviets understood, they also used compellence as a tool in pursuit of their security goals.
Even while applying brute force in Poland, the Soviets were practicing
compellence against the Baltic States. Immediately after the signature of the RibbentropMolotov agreement, the Soviet government influenced Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to
sign “mutual assistance pacts” that included granting the Soviets military, naval, and air
bases on their territories. Red Army forces moved into the territories of the three small
countries. Despite their submission, under the pretext that the three small countries had
made a secret military alliance directed against the U.S.S.R., the Soviets issued ultimata
requiring the formation of new governments friendly to the Soviets and the admission of
an unlimited number of Red Army forces. The three Baltic states conducted questionable

12

Oscar Halecki. "Borderlands o f Western Civilization: History o f East Central Europe."
Historical Text Archive Europe (1952).
http://historicaltextarchive.com/books.php?op=viewbook&bookid=l&cid=23 (accessed 25 Aug 2004).
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elections and were then named the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth Soviet Republics.13
Unlike the Polish experience, the Soviets were able to expand their control with
contingent threats of force and did not have to conduct the type of behavior that was used
in Poland; invasion, annexation, massacre, and deportation. This type of action is more
representative of the post World War II compellence attempts of the Soviets.
Nearer to the end o f World War II, Romania was rapidly converted to a satellite
state after its "liberation" by Soviet soldiers. The Romanian Communist Party at first
attracted little popular support, and its rolls listed fewer than 1,000 members at the war's
end. Recruitment campaigns soon began netting large numbers of workers, intellectuals,
and others disillusioned by the breakdown of the country's democratic experiment and
hungry for radical reforms. King Michael, a figurehead monarch, was offered an
ultimatum by the Soviets-either to appoint a Communist sympathizer to run the
government or lose Romania's continued existence as an independent nation. Red Army
tanks surrounded the king’s palace, and Soviet soldiers disarmed some Romanian troops
and occupied telephone and broadcasting centers. The king, lacking outside support,
yielded. Communists were named to head the army and the ministries of interior, justice,
propaganda, and economic affairs. In May 1945, the Soviet Union took control of
Romania's major sources of income, including the oil and uranium industries. When the
U.S. and UK protested after the fact, the regime ignored their objections and protested
against outside "meddling" in Romania's internal affairs.14 Romania was not the last
victim of Soviet expansion. The Soviets, supported by a belief in history, were prepared
to apply the lessons of Romania and the Baltic. Their potential targets were any state,
13 Halecki, "Borderlands o f Western Civilization: History o f East Central Europe," 423-24.
14
Library o f Congress. "Romania - A Country Study." In Library o f Congress Country Studies
Series. 10 October 2000. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/intoc.html (accessed 25 August 2003).
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starting at an expanding periphery. The Romanian experience made it clear to the U.S.
that the Soviets were not yet satisfied and that more vigorous measures were necessary to
resist the Soviet’s course of compellence

Beginnings of Resistance
During World War II, the United Kingdom, the U.S., and the Soviet Union sent
forces to Iran to protect vital oil supplies.15 Traditionally, Iran had been within the United
Kingdom's sphere of influence; however, the Soviet Union indicated that it was ready to
impinge on that traditional influence. Instead of withdrawing troops on a timely basis
from Iran after the war, the Soviet Union prepared to continue their occupation..16 Iran,
dissatisfied with the Soviet occupation, complained to the United Nations. The Soviet
Union blocked Iran's appeal in the Security Council. U.S. and United Kingdom had
withdrawn their forces on schedule and so fell back on diplomatic measures to pressure
the Soviet Union to withdraw. Iran complained again to United Nations about the Soviet
occupation. Finally, after a month of occupation the Soviets announced that they would
withdraw their forces within six weeks, while extracting an agreement for establishment
of the Soviet Iranian oil company and creating a Communist movement in northern
Iran .17 The Iran experience showed that the Soviet Union could be influenced to shift a
course of compellence once begun and prepared the U.S. administration for the next
challenge.

15 William E. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer & Cold Warrior (Boston: Twayne
Publishers, 1989), 87.
16 Fraser Harbutt, "American Challenge, Soviet Response: The Beginning o f the Cold War,
February-May, 1946," P olitical Science Quarterly 96, no. 4 (Winter 1981-2): 638.
17 Harbutt, "American Challenge, Soviet Response," 638.
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Soviet expansionist policy had perhaps the most potential for impact on
Americans’ security concerns in Turkey. As early as 1944, the Soviets started to demand
control over portions of the Black Sea straits and eastern provinces of Turkey that
bordered on the Soviet republics of Georgia and Armenia. They urged establishment of a
new system of joint Soviet-Turkish control of the Dardanelles and threatened Turkey
with the termination of existing friendship treaties between the countries. The Soviets
moved 25 divisions of ground forces into position in nearby territories. Although the
United Kingdom and U.S. were willing to discuss internationalization of the straits, the
Soviets rejected the concept. The Turkish government resisted all the demands from the
Soviet Union. The U.S. showed its support by ordering a naval task force to Istanbul to
join the U.S. battleship that was there returning the body of the recently deceased Turkish
ambassador. Both the U.S. and the United Kingdom followed this military maneuver with
diplomatic notes indicating that the Dardanelles were of international interest and threats
to the straits would be handled by the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, the
U.S. decided to maintain a permanent naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.
Eventually, the Soviets ceased their demands and efforts to destabilize Turkey.

18

This

was another successfully resisted compellence threat. Like earlier attempts, the Soviets
used the traditional tools of politics, military and diplomatic capabilities. The U.S. was
able to provide countervailing support by employing the same tools.
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The Challenge
In Greece, the pattern was different. Here it was neither Soviet infantry divisions,
nor Soviet tanks as the force of choice; it was partisans conducting cross-border guerrilla
warfare combined with political actions within Greece, which threatened to bring it into
the Soviet fold. Greece's monarchist government had been restored after German forces
left in 1944. It encountered difficulty in establishing its authority due to both chaotic
conditions and the efforts of Greek Communist groups to gain power .19 Fighting soon
broke out between the monarchist and Communist elements. The Communists began to
use Albania and Yugoslavia as staging areas for guerrilla attacks. The scale of the
fighting increased and reached the proportions of a civil war. As the United Kingdom's
traditional capability to support military operations in Greece had dwindled, it requested
that the U.S. take full charge, politically, economically, and militarily of the Greek
situation.20 The Prime Minister of Greece and his Minister of Foreign Affairs specified in
a letter to the President of the United States their perception of the situation and their
needs. Citing the systematic devastation of Greece in the war, the letter appealed to the
Government of the United States and through it the American people for financial,
economic, and expert assistance. The appeal outlined four categories of assistance; aid for
sustenance, aid for security measures, aid for capital investment, and technical personnel
to advise and train in administration and economics. The Prime Minister's letter did not
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specifically ask for U.S. military forces to be involved on Greek soil, nor did it identify
the Soviet Union, or any particular dissident group as the cause of Greek difficulties.

21

U.S. policy was not primed for this request. As recently as 6 January 1947, in his
State of the Union address, President Truman indicated that the U.S. would rely
substantially on negotiation in its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. His speech
outlined the importance of a rapid return to peace in which all peoples could return to
productivity and reconstruction. He highlighted the importance of collective security and
upholding the principles underlying the United Nations. In budget discussions with the
military and Congress, President Truman was determined to decrease government
expenditures in general and military expenditures specifically, while making the Armed
Forces more effective.22

What Was Learned
Because of wartime needs, the executive branch of the U.S. government had
developed substantial intelligence and analysis capabilities. The Central Intelligence
Group concluded in September 1946 that the Soviets would probably refrain from
outright military actions in the near future. They also reported that the Soviets sought
worldwide Communist revolution by means other than war. Strikes, sabotage, and other
means were to be used to discredit capitalist governments.

91

In February of 1946, George

Kennan wrote his now famous Long Telegram. Viewed as the seminal encapsulation of
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the underlying principles of U.S.—Soviet conflict, Kennan stresses the basic Russian
national security tendencies and repressive governance, which required the image of a
hostile international environment as the root cause. This was a shift in understanding, as
previous efforts assumed that the tools of democracy, quid pro quo and compromise,
would be effective to deal with the Soviets.24
White House and congressional delegation discussions on providing aid to Greece
provide insight into the perception of Soviet action as coercion. Dean Acheson is noted
reviewing the Soviet aggression in Turkey, Iran, Greece, Hungary, Italy, France, and
Austria. His analysis used the analogy of Athens and Sparta and Rome and Carthage to
describe the extreme polarization of power, directly linking the situation in Eastern
Europe with the security of the U.S. From a military perspective, General Hap Arnold
provided an assessment that without military aid Greece would fall, then Turkey. With
this change, he posited that the eastern Mediterranean with its oil supplies would become
untenable to U.S. and its allies.25 A background memorandum developed to support the
drafting of a speech on aid to Greece, placed blame for the Greek difficulties squarely on
Communists supported by the Soviet Union. This memorandum indicates that their
activities are part of a "master plan to separate Macedonia from Greece and to make
untenable any Greek government not subservient to Soviet aims."26
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As the situation in Greece was brought to a head by the United Kingdom's
cutbacks in economic and military support, various committees to study U.S. assistance
to Greece in Turkey were formed. One result of the analysis of these committees was that
assistance would eventually be required in numerous countries, not just Greece and
Turkey. The logical corollary of that thought was that the U.S. needed a global approach
that addressed psychological, political, economic, and military factors.27 One of the
concerns was that people might misperceive the U.S. response as regionally focused and
overly aggressive. The President's cabinet recommended that intervention be presented as
vital to American interest to counteract Communist subversion.28 Given American
domestic conditions caused by demobilization and reconversion it would be difficult to
justify expenditure of $400 million and reverse the drawdown of involvement on the
continent of Europe. Therefore, the President and his key advisers met with congressional
leaders of both political parties. The congressional delegation was eventually impressed
with the analysis and promised to support whatever measures should be necessary, on the
condition that the President should explain his reasoning fully to Congress and the people
of the U.S. Their rationale was that they could support such a program only if the public
were fully informed. The President agreed to this approach.29
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The Truman Doctrine
On 12 March 1947, President Truman delivered an address before a joint session
of Congress. The address was titled "Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and
Turkey,” and broadcast via radio to the nation. He opened this address by indicating that
there was a broad, serious situation that confronts the world today. He stated that he
wanted to present one aspect of the present situation for their consideration and decision.
He continued by outlining the urgent appeal from the Greek government for financial and
economic assistance. He indicated that Greece must have assistance if it is to become a
self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. He said, "I believe that it must be the
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." He discussed the geopolitical
aspects of Greece and Turkey vis-a-vis the Middle East, and its potential impacts
throughout the world. As he closed his delivery he stated, "The free peoples of the world
look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we
may endanger the peace of the world-and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our
own Nation ."30
These actions and the other provision of assistance that followed in its wake
created that the world's largest anti-compellence program in history. Not only was U.S.
political might on call to support beleaguered states, the U.S. provided capabilities
worldwide. The most powerful state became a potential partner for any other state that

30 Joseph M. Jones, "Document 16 - Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey
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vol. 8, Documentary History o f the Truman Presidency, ed. Dennis Merrill, ([Bethesda, MD]:University
Publications o f America, 1996).
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could claim Communist aggression. The challenge of Soviet expansion became a reason
for resistance across the globe.
As highlighted in table 16, the Soviets mostly shifted to attempting compellence
to influence the policies of other states instead of regime change, as was the case for the
Baltic countries and Romania. Still, two attempts were related to regime change rather
than policy. Its initial compellence foray after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine
occurred in 1949, with an attack on Changshan Island as an exemplar use of force to put
pressure on Nationalist China. This attack had no discemable effect on the Nationalist
regime. The other regime related compellence attempt also was failure. The initial effort
against Hungary in 1956 turned out to be a prelude to use of brute force and subsequent
invasion, ergo a failed compellence attempt.

Table 16. Soviet Initial Compellence Attempts After Truman Doctrine

State
Taiwan
United Kingdom
Japan
Japan
Sweden
Hungary
Poland
Japan
United States
Denmark
Iran
Japan

Year
1949
1950
1953
1955
1955
1956
1956
1958
1958
1959
1959
1959

Revision Type
Sought
Regime
Policy
Policy
Policy
Policy
Regime
Policy
Policy
Policy
Policy
Policy
Policy

Outcome
Stalemate
Stalemate
Stalemate
Stalemate
Stalemate
Victory
Victory
Stalemate
Stalemate
Stalemate
Stalemate
Stalemate

The Truman Doctrine was not the only modality that made the U.S. a source of
capability to counter Soviet actions. The most popular topic for militarized threats by the
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USSR the next ten years was Japan’s policy on the Sakhalin and the Kurile islands. Even
after signing a Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration in 1956, the Soviets continued to
threaten the use of force in an attempt to get Japan to relinquish its claims to some of the
islands. For most of this period Japan did not have a military force, it therefore would
have been impossible to resist this attempted compellence based on a bilateral calculation
of a favorable military outcome. But, the U.S. had a military force in the area that could
serve as a counter. Further, the U.S. was obligated to do so, as the U.S. had demilitarized
Japan by demobilizing its Army and deactivating its Navy. The U.S., as an occupying
power and as the drafter of a constitution that denied the Japanese recourse to force,
•

assumed the burden of guaranteeing its sovereignty.

^1

It is logical to conclude that

Japanese decision makers believed that the US would resist Soviet attempts to conduct
military operations against the main islands over a disagreement about outlying islands.
The remaining attempts that were not focused on maintaining order within its own
empire were aimed at the UK, Sweden, the U.S., Denmark, and Iran. Those efforts all
included employment of Soviet forces. The decision makers in the target states, based on
the earlier Polish, Baltic, and Romania examples, had every reason to believe the Soviets
were serious in their threats. Each, with the exception of the Poles and Hungarians, ended
in stalemate. That is, the Soviets made demands, deployed forces, and the opposing side
did not respond with military capabilities but also did not accede to the Soviet demands.
The situation did not escalate and after a minimum of six months, no further demands or
threats were issued.
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By 1950, NSC 68 had been written and reinforced by the outbreak of the Korean
War. Although the U.S. felt limited in the amount of capabilities they could field, they
were committed to containment of the Soviet Union. Although U.S. forces did not deploy
in response to each Soviet action, each of the target states were aware of the U.S. policy.
This provided a powerful political edge when resisting Soviet actions.
An overt example was the American response to Soviet compellence attempts in
the Middle East. Through the formation of the Middle East Treaty Organization, the
United States linked with Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran. The governments of these
states benefited from the enunciation of the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957, which indicated
that the United States would employ American forces to protect the independence and
integrity of any nation in the Middle East requesting such aid against overt armed
aggression from any nation controlled by communism.

This organization transformed

itself into the Central Treaty Organization with the departure of Iraq. The new
organization increased the depth and breadth of the U.S. commitment to maintain their
collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect. In pursuit of the principles
enunciated in the treaty organization charter, the United States negotiated a bilateral
agreement with Iran to provide increased military and economic aid. After meeting with
Prime Minister Eqbal of Iran, President Eisenhower reaffirmed United States support for
the collective efforts of Iran and other free nations to maintain their independence. He
stressed the gravity with which the United States viewed the threat to the territorial
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integrity and political independence of Iran, recalling the then recently signed Bilateral
Agreement o f Cooperation with Iran.33 Soviet border violations ceased shortly thereafter.
The Central Treaty Organization was not a unique tool in the conduct of
containment. NATO, SEATO, and ANZUS all included similar purposes, although some
were broader in membership and purpose. Despite their differences, they all served to
provide support to states that were subject to Soviet compellence attempts.34 Even
minimal success at building these support structures gave target state decision makers
sufficient confidence that U.S. capability could be brought to bear to counter the Soviet
pressure. Perhaps more importantly from the recipient states perspective, structures built
to support the U.S. policy of containment also serve the partners purposes to resist
compellence, no matter the source. These structures had varying levels of durability,
witness NATO’s longevity and METO’s volatility, but they communicated in concrete
terms that the U.S. was willing to support resistance to Soviet pressures throughout the
globe.

China and Compellence
Although China was not a frequent practitioner of compellence between 1914 and
1945, in the period 1946 to 2001, China attempted compellence 66 times, just a few times
less than the Soviet Union. These two states attempted compellence accounts for almost
70 percent o f all great power compellence attempts in this period. In China’s case, all
attempts met with failure.
33
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As we specifically examine the drop in the success rate immediately after World
War II, China's unsuccessful attempts provide a substantial number of events that are part
of the low rate of performance. While other major powers that had been somewhat
successful in the pre-World War II era no longer provided the bulk of the major power
compellence attempts, China’s large number of unsuccessful attempts drove the success
rate down.
Its first attempt after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and establishment of
the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949 was in 1950, against India, which
remained a favored target over the next ten years with four more attempts at compellence.
Territory change was the reason that motivated these five cases of attempted compellence
against India in the early years of the Cold War. Another favorite target was Nepal,
targeted three times for changes to policy. A final favorite was Japan, targeted twice for
changes to policy. O f the 11 attempts in the first 10 years of new statehood, 1949 to 1958,
China achieved a stalemate in 10 attempts and a compromise in the remaining attempt.
Some attribute China’s political approach to a culture perspective that takes a long view
of international relations, so what may be viewed as compellence failure in this study
may be intended as astute political maneuvering by the Chinese decision maker at that
time .35
Although the new revolutionary state attempted compellence more often than its
pre-World War II incarnation, China’s failures to compel in this period were not
surprising, as they conformed to China’s previous practices. While China was not
exhausted like some states in Europe, nor was it occupied like the former Axis powers,
35
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nor was it actively contained like the Soviet Union, it was in the midst of consolidating
its power and grasp on an enormous population and landmass. Given China’s previous
poor record of success and the challenge of consolidating a new state, it is not surprising
that success in compellence was hard to find. To address the precipitous fall in the
success rate of compellence immediately after World War II, China’s multiple
unsuccessful efforts to compel drove down the compellence success rate, while the more
competent compellers were either exhausted, occupied, or contained.

The U.S. Attempts to Compel
Other than the Soviet Union and China, the U.S. was the next substantial
contributor to the low levels of successful compellence immediately after World War II.
Across the period 1946 to 2001, the U.S. participated in 38 single state vs. single state
compellence attempts, with an 8.3 percent success rate. The U.S. did not start as early as
the Soviet Union in this type o f attempt after World War II, its first recorded single state
to single state compellence attempt was against Chile in 1957. Concerned about the rise
of Communist forces in Chile and a set of political alliances called the Popular Action
Front, the U.S. communicated a threat of what might happen if the Communists came to
power. Chile was not swayed. The U.S. was more successful in the Dominican Republic
in 1961. During the Trujillo succession crisis, the U.S. managed to force out the former
dictator’s relatives and temporarily calmed the situation by a show of naval force and a
very small presence ashore.36 Although there were a substantial number of interventions
and other military activity by the U.S. in Latin America, these do not fall within the strict
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definition of compellence used here, but instead would be characterized as brute force,
from Schelling’s perspective.
For the next ten years, U.S. compellence attempts were focused on the Soviet
Union and China. The Soviet Union was the target three times during this period and
China four times. None of these attempts was successful. All attempts involved at least a
show of force and many of them included exemplar uses of force. Many of the efforts
were attempts to reduce the support of China and the Soviet Union for North Vietnam.
Each of these attempts failed, possibly because of U.S. concern with the potential of
China’s entry into the Vietnam War, a la Korea or the possibility of escalation with the
Soviets.37 The U.S. contribution to the drop in successful compellence shortly after
World War II then was largely tied to superpower caution and unwillingness to risk
escalation via attempted compellence.

Minor Powers
Although the change in performance for the minor powers did not appear to be
statistically significant when comparing success in 1914 to 1945 and success in 1946 to
2001, there may be some insights to be gained from examining this data. One interesting
aspect of the data is that in single state vs. single state compellence attempts in the 19141945 period about 66 percent of the 108 compellence attempts were part of a pattern of
repeated dyads. In the 1946-2001 period, this rose to about 80 percent of 876 attempts.
Examining these repeating patterns, where a sending state attempts to compel the same
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target state more than once over time, reveals that the most active 10 percent of
compellence pairs conducted about 48 percent of the 105 attempts in the 1914-1945
period and the most active 10 percent conducted about 62 percent of the 876 compellence
attempts in the 1946-2001 time period.
Given the large numeric impact of a small percentage of minor power compellers,
that specific 10 percent from 1946 to 2001 merit further examination. Within this group
minor power compellence pairs can be divided in two different categories, those directly
affected by the new international system in both compellence and resistance, and those
who were less directly affected by the superpowers. Pairs such as Argentina and Chile,
Turkey and Greece, Somalia and Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Sudan were less affected by the
bipolar structure. Their compellence interactions were not predicated on superpower
interaction, and most had long-standing historic disputes that were merely continued
during the Cold War. Since their compellence relationship was not affected by the change
in the international system, we did not observe a significant change in their level of
compellence success.
Other states that could be more directly affected by the change in the international
environment had at least one member’s compellence capabilities enhanced by a
superpower. Example dyads include Pakistan and India, Syria and Israel, Jordan and
Israel, Egypt and Israel, Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Taiwan and China. For
Pakistan and India, although the underlying source of tension, Kashmir, cannot be traced
to either the U.S. or the Soviet Union, the U.S. provided military capabilities to Pakistan
based on its strategic location vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. India, although the head of the
nonaligned movement, received assistance from the Soviet Union. More so for Pakistan
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than India, the military assistance provided capabilities that would not otherwise have
been attainable by that state.38
Israel has been the target of compellence attempts more than any other state in
this category with 55 attempts recorded. Syria accounted for 27 of these attempts. The
robust support that the United States has provided to Israel, done in part to counteract the
support that the Soviet Union provided to Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, has been key in
•

•

•

allowing Israel to continue to resist despite the hostility of its neighbors.

"50

,

,

Similar to

Israel, but from a different religious persuasion, the United States has provided support to
Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan by some method during the Cold War.40
The Taiwan-China pairing provides an example of a minor power being enabled
by the sponsorship of a superpower. Although Taiwan attempted to compel mainland
China 13 times in the post war period, the U.S. aid did not provide the level or type of
capability required to conduct successful offensive operations. Instead, the U.S. support
improved capabilities to resist Chinese compellence attempts.
Although the change in minor power performance did not appear to be
statistically significant, the change to a bipolar system appeared to be an important force
that shaped minor powers’ capabilities to resist. The emphasis on resistance instead of a
widespread effort to enable minor powers to conquer their peers may have also
contributed to the initial post-World War II low level of compellence success.
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Summary
In this chapter, we addressed one part of the compellence puzzle, the rapid drop in
compellence performance shortly after World War II. In the statistical analysis, it appears
that minor powers performed poorly at compellence in the period from 1914 to 1945, and
continued to perform poorly in the period 1946 to 2001. The increasing number of
sovereign states was associated with the increased number of unsuccessful compellence
attempts while the major powers performed differently. The major powers appear to have
suffered a statistically significant reduction in the rate of success from 17 percent
between 1914 and 1945 to 3.7 percent between 1946 and 2001. Examining states that
were either a great power during the first period or during the second period, it became
apparent that some states that had had relative success at compellence were now in no
position as conquered powers to attempt compellence. It was also obvious that some
powers, such as England, were too exhausted after World War II to attempt compellence.
Other states such as France and China had previously been unsuccessful at compellence
and continued to be unsuccessful, although more frequently. American compellence
effectiveness was reduced in the early part of the post World War II time frame as it
shifted its efforts toward countering the Soviet Union and China instead of its previous
focus on small Latin American states. Finally, the Soviet Union’s success rate dropped
from about 24 percent to about 4 percent because of the effectiveness of American
containment. Containment provided materiel and political support to states that may have
otherwise succumbed to the pressure like those trapped behind the Iron Curtain. The
same containment efforts had an effect on some minor powers that were involved in
multiple compellence attempts. The containment policy provided some states better
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capabilities to resist and gave others the confidence to continue to attempt compellence
even when outmatched in military capability.
Occupation, exhaustion, containment, and superpower competition coupled with a
new distribution of capabilities and perennially ineffective minor powers are the key
elements that explain the rapid fall of compellence success.
While the immediate effects of World War II go far in explaining the drop in
success, the explanation for the continued suppression of success rates through the post
World War II era is lacking. Since the effects of World War II fade over time, the
elements that created the initial depression in compellence success rates do not stay
constant through the entire Cold War and post-Cold War period. The next chapter will
look to different explanations to that may explain the continued low level of compellence
success through 2 0 0 1 .
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CHAPTER VI
NORMS - THE REASON FOR RESISTANCE

To understand the compellence puzzle, this paper has examined data about
compellence and provided a conceptualization of compellence. This was followed by a
search for the causes of the precipitous fall in the success rate of compellence after World
War II. When closely examined, the precipitous fall appears to be caused by the postWorld War II geo-political realities and the shift to a bipolar international system with the
resultant U.S. policy of containment. Since neither of those geopolitical realities nor the
bipolar international system continued unchanged through the next 50 years these factors
cannot explain the continued low rate of successful compellence. Not only had the U.S.
given up occupying Germany and Japan soon after the war, the U.S. approach to
containment varied substantially over time. From an initial strategy of the maintenance of
political regimes in areas that were at least favorable to the continued power and
independence of United States, to the denial of Soviet expansion at every possible turn to
maintain the perception of U.S. supremacy, to a refocusing on vital interests, increasing
flexibility, moving to detente, mixing with human rights, moving back to confrontation,
and finally watchful waiting as the Soviet Union came apart, this strategy was highly
variable.1 Much like containment, bipolarity progressed through an evolutionary process,
•

•
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ending m a unipolar moment. Despite the variations m containment and evolution of
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Vietnam War: The Search fo r Consensus From Nixon to Clinton, 3rd ed. (Armonk, N Y : M.E. Sharpe,
2000 ).
2 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990/1991).
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bipolarity, compellence success did not vary in a similar fashion. It remained at a very
low overall success rate, despite continued compellence attempts.
Since the success rate maintains a steady level of performance, other factors
recorded in the Correlates of War database were examined to see if a correlation existed.
There seems to be no regular pattern of compellence success that can be related to region,
government type, capability, or any of the many factors that describe states and their
interactions.3 Although the data describing the new environment after World War II was
helpful in understanding the initial low success rate, it has not helped to understand the
maintenance of that rate. Further, expected utility approaches such as those used by
Bueno de Mesquista and Lalman and Drezner where applied against the cases from 1945
to 2001 but they did not illuminate why compellence success would be suppressed over
the time period .4
A more promising explanation is suggested by Robert Keohane in After
Hegemony. He proposes a model of system learning and behavior after World War II that
may provide analytic leverage for this part of the puzzle. In short, Keohane explains the
growth of hegemony, which can create cooperation, and how cooperation continues to
survive after the decline of the hegemonic condition. Enabled by the hegemonic capacity,
patterns of asymmetric cooperation were built and cooperation institutionalized. These
patterns were institutionalized in formal international regimes that helped regulate

3 A binary logistic function was applied to the variables resident in the Correlates o f War database.
After coding for compellence success and failure as noted in the empirical chapter, numerous variables
such as capability o f each party, capability difference between parties, region, level o f violence, method o f
settlement, nature o f political system, and other descriptors o f the internals o f each state were tested. No
single variable or combination o f variables provided a sufficient model to differentiate cases o f
compellence success. Cox and Snell psuedo-R2 s were in the .004 range.
4
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International
Imperatives (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox.
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monetary relations and trade in manufactured goods. Although the hegemony faded,
cooperation did not do so in equal measure. International regimes adapted and
cooperation persisted in the areas of money and trade .5 The reaction to compellence
attempts may have undergone an analogous process.
Ann Florini, in The Evolution o f International Norms, suggests a mechanism for
how this condition could have been created. Using a biological analogy, she indicates that
norms are a subset of information called memes, ideas that provide instruction on
appropriate behavior which compete within an environment for survival. Norms that are
accepted and further espoused survive and those that are not accepted, perish. She
highlights the vertical and horizontal reproduction of norms, key to their survival in a
competitive belief environment. Vertical reproduction is accepting norms from political
predecessors, whereas horizontal reproduction is receiving and accepting norms from
political contemporaries.6 A norm that relates to the appropriate reaction to compellence
attempts would have used both the horizontal and the vertical modality.
It appears then that norms can be created and promulgated, but is their effect
limited to market and economic sectors? Various scholars have indicated that norms can
have a controlling effect over the use or threat of force.7 In Christopher Gelpi’s construct,
where norms were found to constrain and enable state actions, it appeared that the norm,
as expressed in a post-conflict agreement, had substantial effect on the behaviors of two
contending states. By examining state behaviors after the violation of a norm, described
5 Keohane, After Hegemony, 182-83.
6 Ann Florini, "The Evolution o f International Norms," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 3
(September 1996): 372, 378.

7

Christopher Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment: The Role o f Norms in Crisis Bargaining," The
American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 339-60; Herbert K. Tillema and John R. Van
Wingen, "Law and Power in Military Intervention: Major States After World War II," International Studies
Quarterly 26, no. 2 (June 1982): 220-50.
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in an legitimate agreement signed by each of the states, Gelpi was able to capture, based
on probit and logit analysis, the likely state reactions while controlling for potential
epiphenomenal effects of capability balance, possession of the nuclear weapons, interests
at stake, concurrent involvement in other disputes, history and behavior in previous
conflicts, and change in balance of conventional military capability. Gelpi does not
discard the importance of the realist body of theory, but suggests a modification to
include the contribution of norms.8
Kegley and Raymond provide insight to how this may work in When Trust Breaks
Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics. They argue that norms exert influence
because they enter the diplomatic discourse and become part of the thought process and
vocabulary o f decision makers. The norms are embedded in those decision makers’
understanding of appropriate behavior within international society. Kegley and Raymond
subsequently provide statistical proof that norms about states’ behavior to uphold or
violate alliances have a strong positive correlation with the number of serious militarized
disputes, major power involvement, and level of destruction.9
Since states act as if durable learning, including norms, can take place under
hegemonic conditions, as Keohane and Florini argue, and norms can shape state behavior
in regard to the use of force, as Gilpi and Kegley and Raymond argue, then the norms
formed during the post-World War II hegemony of the United States may be a causal
factor for the reaction to compellence attempts well after that hegemony has faded. To
satisfy the conditions of this proposition, it must be shown that the U.S. acted as a

8 Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment," 348-49, 355.

9

Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Gregory A. Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and
World Politics, Studies in International Relations, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr and Donald J. Puchala
(Columbia: University o f South Carolina, 1990), 19-20, 195-202.
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hegemon, that it attempted to create and promulgate norms about appropriate responses
to compellence, and that the observed behavior aligns with the espoused norm.

Did the United States Act as a Hegemon?
There is common agreement that the U.S. acted as a hegemon after World War
II .10 Keohane and Nye’s definition is useful to outline the characteristics of a hegemon:
“ ... when one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate
relations, and willing to do so.” They also specify the prerogatives of the hegemon, "...
such a state can abrogate existing rules, prevent the adoption of rules that it opposes, or
play the dominant role in constructing new rules.” 11 American willingness to act as a
hegemon was demonstrated in a number of ways, some of which have already been
alluded to. One example was the American move to bring economic order to Europe. The
Marshall Plan set the rules by which Europe, home to what had been the most powerful
states in the world a few years earlier, rebuilt and reconstituted itself. Another
demonstration of willingness was its creation of the Bretton Woods system, which
eventually resulted in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This initiative created the institutions and
procedures for global trade and monetary exchange.12 Despite its limited support to the
French in Vietnam, America’s emphasis on decolonization created another set of rules for

10 Terry Boswell and Mike Sweat, "Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series
Analysis o f Systemic Dynamics, 1496-1967," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 137;
Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case o f Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?"
International Organization 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 210-11; Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth o f Lost
Hegemony," International Organization, 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987): 565-71.
Keohane and N ye, P ow er an d Interdependence, 2n d Ed, 44.

12 Gaddis, We Now Know, 192-94.
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the global body politic .13 The U.S. was certainly willing to exert itself to make and
maintain the essential rules of a new international system. Not only did the U.S. create
these rules, it also established a worldwide military network with unmatched capabilities
to create a secure environment within which to operate.14
In terms of capabilities the U.S. certainly qualifies for hegemon status for the
early part of the post World War II era, as seen in figure 13. The combined capabilities
score is from the Militarized Interstate Dispute database. It is an index with the maximum
value o f 1.0 for all capability in the world. Each state gets a fraction of that total. The
index includes total population, urban population, iron and steel production, military
expenditures, men under arms, and energy production. The U.S. ended World War II with
almost 40 percent of the total world capability. Ten years later, it still controlled more
that 30 percent. Its nearest competitor, the Soviet Union had increased to around 18
percent by 1955. Apparently, the U.S. was powerful enough, but was it willing to act as a
hegemon?

13

Robert A. Pastor, "Looking Back and Forward: The Trajectories o f Great Powers," in A
Century's Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World, ed. Robert A. Pastor (New York: Basic
Books, 1999), 342-43.
14

Ambrose and Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, 178.
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Figure 13. Capability Score for Major Powers, 1945-1965

Did the United States Promulgate Norms About Compellence?
The question then becomes: did this hegemon lead the creation and promulgation
an anti-compellence norm? To see if the U.S. meets this test we will review the
mechanisms by which norms are created and promulgated to determine if the U.S.
conducted these actions. It will be helpful to first capture a statement of the norm in
question.
The anti-compellence norm is the idea that the appropriate reaction to the threat or
use of military force to compel is resistance. This norm goes beyond putting up a face
saving struggle and beyond tactical actions to create opportunities for negotiations off the
battlefield. This norm encapsulates the idea that aggression should not be rewarded by
acquiesce. It can be viewed as a shared belief in the analogy of “no more Munichs,”
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enhanced by the lessons of early post-World War II Soviet expansions.15 Further, it
indicates that it is appropriate for target states to ask other entities for assistance against
the threat. It encourages those other states and international institutions to provide moral,
political, and military support to the target state to negate the sending states’ efforts.
Interesting, this norm does not deny the threat of use of force for other purposes, such as
self-defense. It is not a general prohibition on the use of force, but outlines the
appropriate reactions to what may be viewed as the aggressive use of force.
The acceptance and further promulgation of this norm by some states does not
guarantee equal acceptance by all states. Western states and other states that benefited
from the U.S. leadership likely absorbed the norm more rapidly than states that were not
directly affected by it. Since the U.S. was an adversary to the Soviet Union and China for
substantial parts of post World War II era, these states were not necessarily influenced
through hegemonic actions and therefore may not have fully accepted all aspects of the
norm. Where Western Europe may have fully absorbed this norm, Eastern Europe, Asia,
the Middle East, and Africa may have adopted specific aspects of the norm, especially
where it reinforced existing predilections.
This norm is different from declarations of the declining utility of the use of
military force outlined in complex interdependence approaches and counter-argued by
others.16 This norm is a narrower idea relating to the reaction to a particular use of the
threat of military force and does not speak to the use of force for other purposes, such as
humanitarian intervention or the ejection of an invader. Although it is possible that the
narrow application would be affected by a broader declination in the perception of the
15 Khong, Analogies at War, 175, 184, 189.
16 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd Ed, 27-29; Freedman, "Strategic
Coercion," 33-34, are two representative samples in the debate o f the utility o f military force.
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utility of force, this norm does not depend on it as a precondition. In essence, since the
method by which compellence works, if at all, is through creating fear of future pain via
threat, the anti-compellence norm elevates the importance of resisting aggression above
the potential of pain as a political instrument. In essence, it indicates that it is better to
suffer the threatened pain than to negotiate with an adversary that is likely to be
insatiable. At the same time, this norm does not speak to the broader issues of the
appropriateness of physically controlling or destroying an adversary’s capabilities.
Norm Formation
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change introduce a useful framework to explain the formation and spread of
norms.17 This framework takes a systemic perspective to explain a three-stage process of
norm creation and promulgation process. The first stage is “norm emergence,” the second
stage involves broad norm acceptance, which they term a “norm cascade,” and the third
stage involves internalization of the norm. A threshold or “tipping” point divides the first
two stages, at which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm. The authors
cite independent discovery of this pattern in work on social norms in U.S. legal theory,
quantitative research by sociology’s institutionalists or “world polity” theorists, and
various scholars of norms in international relations.18 The authors indicate that the pattern
is important as norm formation and spread leverage different social processes and logics
of action at different stages in a norm’s “life cycle.” Thus, this pattern may serve as a
useful tool to examine development and spread of an anti-compellence norm.

17

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,"
International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887-917.
18

Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 896.
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Norm Emergence. Within Finnemore and Sikkink’s work, they offer a method of
norm origin or emergence. Two elements are necessary, norm entrepreneurs and
organizational platforms from which they act. Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm
emergence because they call attention to issues or even create issues by using language
that names, interprets, and dramatizes them. As the entrepreneur frames the issues, they
create a logical or emotional structure that resonates with broader public understandings.
These new structures are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding these
issues. In constructing their frames, norm entrepreneurs face firmly embedded alternative
norms and frames that create other perceptions of both appropriateness and interest.
In other words, new norms do not enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge
in a contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and
perceptions of interest. This normative contestation has important implications for those
who would act as norm entrepreneurs. To frame an issue and achieve acceptance of the
new perspective over the old one is to participate in a normative struggle. Thus, at this
emergent stage of a norm’s life, norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively
built by agents that have strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in the
international community and are willing to participate in the struggle.
Given the potential costs of the normative struggle, Finnemore and Sikkink
enquire into possible motivations for norm entrepreneurs. Their explanation highlights
empathy and empathetic interdependence, where actors “are interested in the welfare of
others for its own sake, even if this has no effect on their own material well-being or
security.” 19 They also recognize altruism —“action designed to benefit another even at

19 Ibid., 895-905.
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the risk of significant harm to the actor’s own well being” —as a motivation. Further,
they include ideational commitment as the main motivation when entrepreneurs promote
norms or ideas because they believe in the ideals and values embodied in the norms.20
They appear to overlook the possibility that a norm entrepreneur promotes a
specific norm because they believe in the ideals and values and as importantly, it benefits
them directly when other entities also believe in those ideals and values. In other words,
there may be a non-altruistic ideational commitment that provides the motivation for
expenditure of resources to pursue a normative struggle.
Since the Soviet Union used the threat and application of force to achieve political
re-alignments during and at the end of World War II and was seen as likely to continue to
use these methods, creation and acceptance of a norm that limited the effectiveness of
this tactic supported the U.S. policy of containment. The U.S., while attempting to blunt
the Cold War tools of Soviet expansion, was, in actuality, supporting the creation of a
much larger, anti-compellence norm. U.S. actions, motivated by political competition,
promulgated a norm initially intended as an anti-Soviet norm, but was accepted as a norm
that spoke to the appropriate reaction to any state’s compellence attempt. Therefore, it is
possible that the norm was not created for purely altruistic purposes as is suggested in the
Finnemore and Sikkink scenarios. The creation and promulgation of a norm that could
reduce the Soviet’s chance for unchallenged expansion was beneficial to the U.S. policy
of containment. Altruism or moral judgments about the use of force were not necessary to
motivate the creation of this norm.

20 Ibid., 898.
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Finnemore and Sikkink also highlight the need for some kind of organizational
platform from and through which to promote norms at the international level. Sometimes
these platforms are constructed specifically for the purpose of promoting the norm, as are
many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Greenpeace, the Red Cross, and
Transafrica and the larger transnational advocacy networks of which these NGOs become
a part. Transnational advocacy networks conduct activities such as promoting human
rights, environmental norms, a ban on land mines or earlier, the end of apartheid in South
Africa. They note that entrepreneurs also work from standing international organizations
that have purposes and agendas other than simply promoting one specific norm. Those
other agendas may significantly shape the content of norms promoted by the
organization.21 Of course, the U.S. after World War II had a significant platform for
promotion of its ideas as a democratic world power. Dixon in Democracy and the
Peaceful Settlement o f International Conflict argues that democracies have an internal
norm of bounded competition. Further, that this norm discourages the use of force within
the political process, so long as contingent consent, the agreement that the process is fair
and that the losers in the competition continue to have access to the process is in force.
Dixon further indicates that democracies have applied this internal norm to external
situations, especially dealing with other democracies.

99

•

Therefore, as Finnemore and

Sikkink suggest is likely, the anti-compellence norm was shaped by the democratic
nature of the U.S., where elections and compromise are the appropriate proactive change
mechanisms and threats of force would be resisted.

21 Ibid., 899.
22

William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement o f International Conflict," The
American Political Science Review 88, no. 1 (March 1994): 14-32.
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Finranore and Sikkink imply that powerful states and their leaders are not norm
promoters but are more often targets of norm promoters.

'j 'i

,

,

Still, their advice to non-state

norm promoters is also pertinent for great powers. The key aspect that they highlight is
that the promoter must take what is seen as natural or appropriate and convert it into
something perceived as wrong or inappropriate. This process is not necessarily or entirely
in the realm of reason, though facts and information may be marshaled to support claims.
Affect, empathy, and principled or moral beliefs may also be deeply involved, since the
ultimate goal is not to challenge the “truth” of something, but to challenge whether it is
good, appropriate, and deserving of praise. In these cases, what the organizational
platform provides is information and access to important audiences for that information,
especially media and decision makers.24
To more closely examine this process, borrowing again from Ikenberry and
Kupchan’s Socialization and Hegemonic Power, socialization can occur through three
mechanisms: normative persuasion, external inducement, and internal reconstruction .25
Normative persuasion. Normative persuasion is based on elite contact via
diplomatic channels, cultural exchanges, and foreign study. These contacts provide the
venue for ideological persuasion and transnational learning either as part of an overt
program or as an inherent part of the dialogue. The elites then internalize these norms and
move to adopt new state policies, which are compatible. In this approach, socialization
occurs prior to changes in policy. That is, policy changes because underlying beliefs have
changed. When the socialization of norms occurs through normative persuasion, shifts in

23

Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 900.

24 Ibid.
25

G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power,"
International Organization, 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 283-315.
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the values and norms held by elites occur and those elite choose to enact commensurate
policies by their free will. The cost of this approach is low, as material sanctions or
inducements do not play a role in the exchange.26
It does not appear that this was the primary change mechanism for an anticompellence norm in the post-World War II era. Although some ideological persuasion
may have occurred, it is not apparent that elites decided to enact new policies because of
earlier socialization and internalization of a new norm. The activities that preceded the
adoption of the norm were not a debate about the appropriateness of the use of
compellence, instead it was the attempt on the part of many states to use combinations of
brute force and compellence to achieve political ends. It appears that policies of noncompellence were borne on the exigency and survival needs predominant at the end of
World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. Norm acceptance was preceded by
establishing the new set of facts on the ground, not the reverse that would be required by
normative persuasion.
External inducement. When socialization occurs through external inducement, a
state initially uses economic and military incentives to induce smaller states to change
their policies. This manipulation of the preferences of elites is materially based. It is only
after those elites have adjusted their policies to accord with those of the other state’s that
the normative principles underlying the new policies come to be embraced as rightful by
the elites. Belief in the normative underpinnings of the system emerges gradually as elites
seek to bring their policies and value orientations into line. Material influence can lead to
socialization for three main reasons.

26

Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," 290.
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First, elites may embrace and espouse the norms articulated by the providing state
for instrumental reasons, either to minimize the potential domestic costs or to take
advantage o f elite restructuring to gain domestic support. Second, elites in recipient states
may feel some degree of cognitive dissonance because the policies they implement do not
correspond fully with their beliefs. This dissonance can be reduced if the norms that
guide the policies come to correspond more closely with those policies. Third, a form of
normative inducement may take place within the web of interactions created by the
provision of material assistance, through a gradual process of learning and adjustment.27
President Woodrow Wilson’s efforts after World War I could be considered an
example of an attempt at external inducement. The material engagement of the U.S. in
World War I created a standing with European powers that provided it some leverage for
the acceptance of norms suggested by Wilson’s 14 points. Although not specified in any
single point, an underpinning idea is that the use or threat of force to resolve political,
territorial, and ethnic tensions should be resisted. During his address to Congress on the
8 th of January 1918, he characterize the rejection of the aggressive use of military force,

"the day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by,” and then later, "What we demand
in this war, ... is that the world to be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it
be made safe for every peace-loving nation.” Although he did not overtly state that he
was ready to return to war to secure this, he did indicate that the people of the United
States were “ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything they possess” to
vindicate this principle.

President Wilson was attempting to establish the "rightness" of

27 Ibid.
28
Woodrow Wilson, "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points." In Avalon Project. 8
January 1918. Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilsonl4.htm (accessed 25 August
2004).
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using any possible resource to resist the threat of force or aggression. We know he was
not wholly successful, which provided a later president, Harry S. Truman, an opportunity
to promote similar ideas during his enunciation of what became known as the Truman
doctrine. At the end o f World War II, the U.S. had developed more standing with Europe
and other states throughout the world. During his articulation of the need for support to
Greece and Turkey on the 12th of March 1947, President Tmman is overt in his
description of the desired normative state. "One of the primary objectives of the foreign
policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations
will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion.” He highlights the formation of
the United Nations as a means to "ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from
coercion”29 Although neither one of these attempts were wholly successful by themselves
to create a norm that guaranteed resistance to compellence, each of these efforts of
external influence added to the effort to build such norm.
Internal reconstruction. Socialization and the acceptance of norms can also occur
through internal reconstruction. In this formulation, a state directly intervenes in the
recipient state and transforms its domestic political institutions. Such extensive
intervention can occur only in the aftermath of war or as a result of the existence of a
“formal” empire. It occurs when the victorious state occupies the defeated state and
assumes responsibility for its reconstruction or when an imperial power colonizes a
peripheral state. In either case, the victor imports normative principles about domestic
and international political order, often embodying these principles in institutional
structures and in constitutions or other written proclamations. The process of

29

Joseph M. Jones, "Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey (Truman Doctrine).
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socialization takes place as elites in the secondary state become accustomed to these
institutions and gradually come to accept them as their own.

-5 A

There are no obvious examples of internal reconstruction that resulted in the
adoption of the specific anti-compellence norm previously discussed. The closest
examples of internal reconstruction related to an anti-compellence norm are grounded in
the U.S. and Allied occupation of Germany and Japan. Wanting to forestall a recurrence
of World War II the U.S. wrote and negotiated a new constitution for Japan. Article Nine
of this constitution stated:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of
settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.31
Although there is some debate about how involved the Japanese were in creating
the wording of their constitution, it is unlikely that any state would have taken on the idea
of renouncing the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes, had
it not been occupied by a foreign power. Although the Federal Republic of Germany’s
Basic Law was written, debated, and voted on by German Laender representatives on
May 8 , 1949, their efforts started at the direction of the Occupying Powers, via the
Frankfurt Documents. This initial direction was reinforced by regular consultation with
the three military governors of the occupying powers about the contents and

Ikenberry and Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, 292.
31

"Text o f the Constitution and Other Important Documents." In Birth o f the Constitution o f
Japan. 3 May 1947. http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed 25 August 2004).
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interpretation of the Basic Law .32 The result, in reference to a norm about compellence,
was reflected in Article 24 and 26. Article 24, International organizations, indicates in
part, “For the settlement of disputes between nations, the Federation shall accede to
agreements providing for general, comprehensive and obligatory international
arbitration.” Although not as strict a renunciation of the threat or use of military force as
the Japanese, Article 26 provides a further distancing from the use of force. “Activities
tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb peaceful relations between nations,
especially to prepare for a war of aggression, are unconstitutional. They shall be made a
punishable offense.”33 Much like the Japanese example of internal reconstruction, the
idea that a sovereign power would renounce the “intent to disturb peaceful relations
between nations...” would have been unthinkable prior to the defeat of World War II and
occupation.
Again, these examples depict internal reconstruction, but not of the specific norm
under discussion. These are offered to indicate that the U.S. was actively promulgating
norms across the international environment. It seems unlikely that a norm to resist could
be promulgated through internal reconstruction, as the technique requires the norm
activist to have seized control of the target state.
Ikenberry and Kupchan’s three socialization mechanisms offer a number of ways
that the elites can be convinced of a particular norm. As was seen, there are a number of
likely ways that the socialization of key elites could have taken place. However, for

32

Library o f Congress. "Germany - A Country Study." In Library o f Congress Country Studies
Series. Eric Solsten, ed. ffds@loc.gov. August 1995. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/detoc.html (accessed 25
August 2004).
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norms to be accepted as a possible reason o f continued suppression of compellence
success, it will be helpful to look beyond those elites.
The importance o f institutions fo r an anti-compellence norm. In most cases, for an
emergent norm to reach a threshold and move toward the second stage, it must become
institutionalized in specific sets of international rules and organization. Finnemore and
Sikkink indicate that since 1948 emergent norms have increasingly been institutionalized
in international law, in the rules of multilateral organizations, and in bilateral foreign
policies.34 Such institutionalization contributes strongly to the possibility for a norm
cascade, both by clarifying what, exactly, the norm is and what constitutes proper
exercise of the norm. Further, it often takes material forces to develop and communicate
ideas. As Kathryn Sikkink indicates in Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in
Brazil and Argentina, even ideas that are held by state policymakers fare better if they
have been adopted or incorporated into governmental structures.

In a case where broad

based societal consensus was required to carry out an idea, the leaders needed to root
them in state institutions where they find support mechanisms and a constituency that
have the capacity to carry out policies built on those ideas and therefore affect the
-J ZT

physical world.
President Wilson’s enunciation of his 14 Points, the Atlantic Charter that
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill’s signed at Placentia Bay on August 9,
1941, and the United Nations creation in 1945 were all instances of norms being encoded
in institutions. The ill-fated League of Nations, the partnership that became NATO, and

34

Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 900.

35

Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
36

Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 199.
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the UN all absorbed and re-transmitted the anti-compellence norm. As recorded in Article
2 of the UN Charter, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state...” and reserves the right in Article 39 to “determine the existence of threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” And finally in Article 42 the Security
Council “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
3 7

or restore international peace and security” This sequence codifies the norm to resist the
threat of the use of force, and in this case makes it the job of the most powerful states in
the world to participate in the resistance. Despite having the vast majority of the then
existing states join the UN and avow the aforementioned principles, the tipping point for
the anti-compellence norm had not occurred.
Norm Cascade
Finnemore and Sikkink capture the idea of a norm cascade, after a critical mass of
states have adopted new norms, where the norm reaches a threshold or tipping point.
They cite quantitative empirical support for the idea of a norm tipping point and norm
cascades and provide two hypotheses about what constitutes a “critical mass” and when
and where to expect norm tipping. Noting that it is not possible to predict exactly how
many states must accept a norm to “tip” the process, they note that because states are not
equal when it comes to normative weight, empirical studies suggest that norm tipping
rarely occurs before one-third of the total states in the system adopt the norm. They also
note that it matters which states adopt the norm. Some states are critical to a norm’s
adoption; others are less so. What constitutes a “critical state” will vary from issue to

37

United Nations. Charter o f the United Nations. 26 June 1945.
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (accessed 3 October 2004).
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issue, but one criterion is that critical states are those without which the achievement of
the substantive norm goal is compromised.38
Up to the tipping point, Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that domestic concerns
are the primary motivating factor for norm adoption. After the tipping point has been
reached, they suggest a different dynamic exists. More states begin to adopt new norms
more rapidly even without domestic pressure for such change. Empirical studies suggest
that, at this point, often an international or regional demonstration effect or “contagion”
occurs in which international and transnational norm influences become more important
than domestic politics for effecting norm change. They argue that the primary mechanism
for promoting norm cascades is an active process of international socialization intended
to induce norm breakers to become norm followers. In the context of international
politics, this promotion involves diplomatic praise or censure, either bilateral or
multilateral, which may be reinforced by material sanctions and incentives.39
What happens at the tipping point is that enough states and enough critical states
endorse the new norm to redefine appropriate behavior. In the case of resistance to
compellence, adoption of the norm by numerous entities may not have been the critical
step to cause the cascade. Given that this norm marked an increased level of resistance to
compellence and not an entirely new behavior, many states were already pre-disposed to
resistance. What was lacking in this case was the leadership of a critical state, the U.S.
Set in the context of President Truman’s March 1947 broadcast that encapsulated what
became to be known as the Truman Doctrine, the American show of naval force in
support of Turkey, and its substantial investment in stabilizing Greece were key triggers
38
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39 Ibid., 902.
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in strengthening the anti-compellence norm. The overt commitment of U.S. resources and
political capital to an international policy of non-compellence set the conditions for states
across the world to accept and act on this norm. Although the adoption of the norm across
the world was not instantaneous, the effect was significant. From 1816 through 1945,
Greece and Turkey were successfully compelled 10 times out of 32 single state attempts.
After the U.S. reinforcement of Turkey and Greece, these states resisted all 36 single
state compellence attempts that occurred in the post-World War II era. The U.S.
continued to preach the gospel of resistance to the use or threat of force through word and
deed. Although not a compellence event by this work’s definition, the Korean War served
to reinforce the norm by highlighting American willingness to provide support even in a
very costly situations.
The U.S. actions were designed to create an expectation of resistance to Soviet
domination. But, when an expectation of resistance became the rule, the political
character o f the sending state mattered little. Finnemore and Sikkink capture the spread
and reinforcement of ideas like this. As states resist compellence, even if with the support
of the U.S., elites in other states are motivated by the forces of conformity and esteem to
do no less than their peers. These elites need to maintain the respect of other states and of
their own fellow citizens in order to maintain their position and ability to operate in
government. This leads to generalization of the norm .40 What started as a containment
measure against the Soviets expands and reinforces a more general norm to resist any
state’s threat or exemplar use of military force as a political change mechanism.

40 Ibid., 902-3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151
Internalization
Finnemore and Sikkink note that at the extreme of a norm cascade, norms may
become so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a “taken-forgranted” quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic. For this
reason, internalized norms can be both extremely powerful (because behavior according
to the norm is not questioned) and hard to discern (because actors do not seriously
consider or discuss whether to conform). Since they are not controversial, these norms
are often not the centerpiece of political debate and tend to be ignored in debate and
research. A related mechanism may be iterated behavior and habit. More than 50 years of
resistance will likely create certain levels of expectation. Broadly, this idea suggests that
internalization of normative change is indirect and evolutionary.41 These types of changes
leave little in the way of documentary evidence. Some indirect evidence such as the
previously noted change in Greece and Turkey’s resistance behavior from acquiescing to
compellence 10 out of 32 times in 1816 through 1945, to resistance in all 36 single state
compellence attempts that occurred in the post-World War II era, does exist. Since it is
not possible to directly measure the presence of internalization, nor necessarily establish
a logical link from norm promulgation to possible internalization it is difficult to
demonstrate that internalization occurred with the anti-compellence norm. It is useful to
further research to understand that norms may be encoded deeply within states
operational codes and affecting policy decisions on a daily basis.

41 Ibid., 905.
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Counter Arguments
Despite the discussion above, normative explanations are not readily accepted by
all scholars. One particular example is Andrew Moravcsik in The Choice fo r Europe:
Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. His logic poses a
particularly strong test for normative explanations as he rejects a normative explanation
as the cause of the integration of Europe. This is a strong test in that the normative
explanation had been widely accepted within the community of those that study European
integration.42 He does so in favor of an explanation that highlights commercial interests,
relative bargaining power of important governments, and incentives to enhance the
credibility of interstate agreements.43 By rejecting normative explanations, he rejects the
influence of ideals to explain converging economic policies in favor of the causal power
of a commercial environment in which this convergence makes economic sense. Further,
he rejects the explanation of the outcomes of interstate bargaining that hinges on the
centrality of supranational entrepreneurs in favor of an explanation of outcomes
underpinned by a notion of state-centric asymmetric interdependence. Finally, he
dismisses ideological commitment or the desire to reduce transaction costs to accept the
efforts to constrain and control other governments as the explanation for a tendency for
governments to delegate and pool sovereignty in international organizations.44 In short,
where norms-focused scholars had seen ideals, ideology, and the actions of entrepreneurs
at work to create an integration of states into an ever-perfecting union, other scholars saw
interstate competition in an alternative setting. The three elements of Moravcsik’s
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Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice fo r Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to
Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 4.
43
Moravcsik, The Choice fo r Europe, 3.
44 Ibid., 5-9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

153
explanation, economics, bargaining power based on asymmetric interdependence, and
efforts to constrain other states, are not unique to the question of Europe, but could be
applied to many issue areas.
This highlights an important consideration: why would not some portion of the
three element economic-realist style explanation that Moravcsik uses to explain European
integration apply to this part of the compellence puzzle? If a widely accepted normative
explanation of a phenomenon as significant as European integration can be challenged by
return to realism, interdependence, and economic realities, is it possible that a reaction to
force-centric activity like compellence is better explained by these same factors?
Before we give up on a normative explanation for low compellence rates, we
should examine Moravcsik’s counter-norm construct. There are a number of factors to be
considered as we examine it. Firstly, the integration of Europe and the continued low
level of success rate of compellence efforts are substantially different types of
phenomena. For example, the continued low level of success rate of compellence is a
global phenomenon of resistance, where a somewhat successful behavior, compellence,
was first diverted from its historic frequency range by the realities of World War II and
now maintains a new low level of frequency despite changing conditions. Conversely, the
integration of Europe is a continuing series of cooperative events that occur aperiodically
within a regional framework. These cooperative events are the opposite of behaviors
required to exercise resistance against a compeller. Secondly, none of Moravcsik’s threepart explanation appears to be strongly related to compellence success or failure. As we
examine the economic reasoning, it indicates that the potential for positive economic
outcomes may be the motivation for European integration behavior. If a behavior would
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appear to a decision maker to increase their or their state’s commercial wellbeing, it
would be logical to conduct that behavior. In contrast, logically, resistance to demands
reinforced by threat of force does not directly result in commercial gains and might result
in immediate losses. A related method, expected utility, as applied by Bueno de Mesquita
in War and Reason, which includes various international and domestic cost factors of
using or having force used on a state, was examined .45 The examination indicated that
expected utility did not provide good explanatory power for when resistance to
compellence would occur. If expected utility is not a good indicator of resistance to
compellence, a logic based on the possibility of economic gains as a reward for resisting
compellence seems unlikely.
The second cause of integration cited by Moravcsik was bargaining power created
by asymmetric interdependence.46 Here states were able to influence other states since
they were able to leverage asymmetries. If asymmetrical interdependence exists between
states that are in a compellence situation, it could be used to resist compellence as well as
supporting compellence. But, naming interdependence as a cause of suppressed
compellence is incorrectly conflating motivation and means. Leveraging an
interdependence may be a means of resistance, but provides no inherent motivation to
resist in the first place. The sense of appropriate behavior provides the cause to resist,
various means or methods, to include those offered by asymmetric interdependence can
be used to resist.
45

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason. Equilibria from the War and Reason model
and equations were established with EUGene software and compared to the actual outcomes o f
compellence attempts. The model predicted more than half o f the cases would result in a negotiated
settlement as that would maximize utility. Instead slightly less than 10 percent were. Stalemate was most
often the real world result, at approximately 65 percent. A fuller discussion o f this expected utility
approach is offered in Chapter VII.
46 Moravcsik, The Choice fo r Europe, 3.
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The third cause highlighted by Moravcsik, efforts to constrain other nations, is
argued as a competitive reason to explain cooperative behavior. For example, state “A”
would cooperate with state “B” in order to limit the opportunity for state “C” to compete
with state “A.” In the case of this part of the compellence puzzle, the behavior we are
trying to understand, resistance, is the opposite of cooperative behavior. Similar to the
interdependence discussion, to privilege this argument as causal misidentifies means and
motives. More narrowly, this work has suggested that the U.S. has pursued opportunities
to cooperate with target states against sending states. From this perspective, Moravcsik’s
contention about cooperation to constrain other states may be technically accurate.
However, this cooperation is a tactic or method used to achieve a desired level of
resistance, not the cause of resistance.
In short, Moravcsik’s rejection of normative explanations for European
integration may be correct, but his rationale for rejection do not as readily apply to the
elements of the compellence puzzle. Therefore, his particular objections to European
integration normative answers do not disable a normative exploration of part of the
compellence puzzle. Conversely, although Moravcsik’s particular arguments may not be
more helpful than the normative approach, the short exposition above does not dismiss
many other possible causes of the continued low level of compellence success.

Summary
This chapter has argued that the norm formation and acceptance was the tool that
made the suppressed levels of successful compellence last for more than 50 years.
Borrowing from hegemonic regime theory and normative theory, this chapter contends
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that the conditions of the early post World War II era and U.S. actions in support of
containment resulted in norms of almost total resistance to compellence. These norms,
once adopted, became more powerful than any single state’s influence, lasting throughout
and beyond the end of the Cold War. Proving the existence and efficacy of a norm, a
form of an idea, is difficult. Arguments that highlight results quickly become
tautological. Nevertheless, given President Wilson’s, Roosevelt’s, and Truman’s
enunciated positions, the preponderance of American power, the American expenditure
of blood and treasure in support of other states, and strong initial support for the U.N. it is
reasonable to claim that the U.S. executed adequate actions to create and promulgate a
norm of anti-compellence. Further, given the record of post-World War II state activity
captured in the Militarized Interstate Dispute database, it is also fair to say that states act
as if there is a general agreement to resist compellence attempts. Since the precipitous fall
in compellence success occurred shortly after the U.S. rise to superpower status and its
efforts to contain the Soviet Union the time order is appropriate for causality. Yet it is too
early to claim a full understanding of this part of the compellence puzzle. Since norms
cannot be directly observed, further specialized research and analysis in the area of an
anti-compellence norm needs to be accomplished to secure a greater level of assurance
prior to a declaration of causality. Recommendations for further research will be
discussed in the final chapter.
The third aspect of the compellence puzzle also provides a challenge to our
understanding of how international relations work. If the anti-compellence norm drives
down the frequency of successful compellence, logically, sending states should have
reduced the number of attempts they made, as they saw that compellence did not provide
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positive results at a low cost. To explain the actual results we have to shift the
examination to a different level of analysis and focus on compellence attempts.
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CHAPTER VII
WHY ATTEMPT COMPELLENCE?

This chapter will examine the third aspect of the compellence puzzle: states
continue to attempt compellence at about the same frequency after World War II as they
did before World War II, despite the dramatic fall in the success rate of compellence. As
we saw in chapter 2 , this conundrum remains even when we adjust the attempted
compellence rate for the number of states in the international system. This chapter will
examine three approaches in a search for answers to the level of continued compellence
attempts.
The first approach, borrowed from the Correlates of War project, is to look for
factors that correlate with the maintenance of the compellence rate .1 This is a useful
approach in that correlation can be a pre-cursor to causation. If correlation can be
established, the causal influences may be deduced or observed. The second approach,
borrowed from the game theoretic community in international relations, will be an
attempt to apply Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman’s International Interaction
Game to see if the expected utility and move structure it provides will inform the reason
to attempt compellence. This approach, using a game theoretical perspective, has
provided insight to other security topics that were not amenable to correlation analysis
and may likewise be useful with this puzzle .3 The third approach, borrowing from Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita et al. in The Logic o f Political Survival will be to see if the pattern of

1 Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes"; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability
Distribution."
2

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason.

3

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy o f Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).
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compellence attempts can be explained as the resultant of a set of individual decisions
based on the desire to maintain public office.4 The third approach is a somewhat novel
explanation of foreign policy behavior suggested by work on emergent behavior in
international relations.5 This three-part examination will accomplish two things. First, it
will provide an increased understanding of the specific elements of this part of the
compellence puzzle. Secondly, it will provide a set of possible explanations for this final
element of the compellence puzzle.

The Maintenance of Compellence Attempts
Why is compellence attempted at historic levels even though success of those
attempts is dramatically reduced? To be able to answer this question we must first more
closely examine some of the elements of compellence, both before and after the apparent
change in pattern. Looking at the basic pattern of compellence attempts and success, we
can see in figure 14 the continuation of the level of compellence attempts, controlling for
the number of states in the international system. Although there is some variation in the
level of attempted compellence within the time period 1946-2001, the rate for this period
is generally the same or higher than the period of 1914-1946. The average attempted
compellence rate for both 1914-1945 and 1946-2001was approximately 17 percent of the
number of states in the international system.

4

Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic o f Political Survival.
5 Robert M Axelrod, The Complexity o f Cooperation: Agent-Based Models o f Competition and
Collaboration (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1997); Lars-Erik Cederman, Emergent Actors in
World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press,
1997); Stephen Wolfram, A New Kind o f Science (Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media, 2002).
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Figure 14. Ten Year Moving Averages of Frequency of Attempted Compellence per
Number of States and Success Rate as Percent, Superimposed

For clarity, figure 15 provides a simplified perspective of both the attempt and
success rates. The rate of attempts prior to 1914 is slightly lower, 1870-1913,
approximately 12 percent, and before that, 1816-1869, about 7 percent. When one
examines the hundreds of compellence attempts juxtaposed with a success rate of
approximately 2 percent since 1946, it is counterintuitive that states continued to invest
time, prestige, and effort into what was likely to be an unsuccessful endeavor.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

161

25%
01 Average Attempt Rate
56852822^^0290294284
B Average Success Rate

20%

15%
| 10%
<u
05%
0%

1816-1869

1870-1913

1914-1945

1946-2001

Years

Figure 15. Attempted Compellence and Success Rates

State Factors that may Correlate with Attempts
There are a number of factors that might help explain the seemingly anomalous
pursuit of compellence despite its apparent futility in the post War era. Some authors
suggest that specific states or regions may be predisposed to use military force as a tool.6
Another possibility is that hegemonic states may use the threat of force to maintain their
position in the system .7 Still another possibility is that some states that have built a
reputation for intervening in humanitarian situations may need to threaten the use of force
regularly as part of that intervention.8 States that have an aggressive policy o f worldwide

6 Callahan, Unwinnable Wars', Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff.
1 Boswell and Sweat, "Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Analysis of
Systemic Dynamics, 1496-1967."
g
Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms o f Humanitarian Intervention," in The Culture o f
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York; Columbia
University Press, 1996), 153-54.
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engagement, such as the U.S. did during the Cold War, may have a continuing level of
military operations that could appear as a large number of compellence attempts.9
In order to test these possible explanations for the continued level of attempted
compellence, it will be helpful to divide the compellence attempts into the two time
periods and determine their geographic distribution. If the attempts at compellence appear
to emanate from a set of regions or a single region over time it may indicate that
geographic explanations require further investigation. The expectation is that if any of the
conditions noted above are true, we should immediately detect a geographic trend. If no
geographic nexus is found, none of the motivations above can be true.
Regional Examination
By regional examination, it becomes apparent that the simple continuation of
compellence attempts levels is not simple. As shown in figure 16, there were wide
variations in regional compellence efforts between the first and second half of the 20 th
Century.

g

Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment, 92.
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Figure 16. Attempted Compellence by Region as a Percentage of Global Attempts

Europe was the source of a significantly reduced portion of compellence attempts
whereas the Middle East, Africa, and Asia all experienced substantial increases in
proportion .10 The Americas show a small reduction in percentage as the source of
attempted compellence. Since what appears like continuity on the surface is actually a
shift of compellence attempt frequency from the center to the periphery, the previously
proffered explanations are not supported. The idea that a single region or hegemonic
power, or state dedicated to humanitarian intervention or even one that used compellence
to support a policy of worldwide engagement as the cause of a continuation of the level
of attempted compellence do not assist our understanding in this area .11

10 Gochman and Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," 604. It is important to note
that the Militarized Interstate Dispute database includes Russia, when it existed, the Soviet Union, and
Eastern European states as a part o f “Europe.”
Callahan, Unwinnable Wars; Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff; Boswell and Sweat, "Hegemony,
Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Analysis o f Systemic Dynamics, 1496-1967," 131;
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The fact that the continued high frequency of compellence attempts is actually a
shift from the center to the periphery requires a further examination of the phenomenon at
the regional level to clarify the subordinate activities. First, we will examine the evolving
situation in Europe, to understand the substantial drop in proportion of compellence
attempts. Secondly, we will examine the trend in the other regions that experienced an
upsurge in the proportion of compellence attempts.
Immediately after World War II, Churchill characterized Europe as, “a rubble
heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate." 12 U.S. intervention with
the Marshall Plan rehabilitated the economic systems of 16 European countries,
increasing agricultural and industrial output above prewar levels, alleviating inflation,
and stabilizing national currencies. Simon Serfaty in The Elusive Enemy indicates that the
character and success of this plan were shaped by a few key decisions.13 Important to the
regional drop in compellence attempts is that the Europeans had to initiate aid requests
that the U.S. then would only address in a multinational form. This inherently multilateral
approach tied the wellbeing of each state to the wellbeing of all, focusing on absolute
gains instead of relative gains. The all-European approach did not allow separate national
demands that may have prompted a return to competition between the states. Serfaty
argues, however, that the Marshall plan was only a small step in creating a level of unity
in Europe that negated the attractiveness of compellence. He characterizes the
development of the North Atlantic Treaty and its organization as the main motive force

Finnemore, "Constructing Norms o f Humanitarian Intervention," 153-4; Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment,
92.
12
Winston S. Churchill, "Churchill on European Unity," in "Europe Unite,"Speeches by Winston
S. Churchill 1947 and 1948, ed. Randolph S. Churchill (London: Cassell & Co., 1947).
13
Simon Serfaty, The Elusive Enemy: American Foreign Policy Since World War II. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1972), 64.
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that created the bonds among the European countries, to finally include West Germany in
1955.14 These bonds, enabled by the economic and agricultural improvements fostered by
the Marshall Plan, were brought into sharper focus by the evolution toward the Treaty of
Rome, and eventually the European Union. Here, the idea that the threat or use of
exemplar military force was not an appropriate tool to resolve political differences within
Western Europe was finalized. Although the strongest portion of this idea was oriented
toward fellow European states, it has made European states less likely to make such
threats outside of Europe as well. European states were responsible for 60 percent of
compellence threats world wide in 1914-1945, but only responsible for 16 percent of the
threats in 1946-2001. For Western Europe states, that equals a reduction from 2.75
attempts per year in 1914-1945 to 1 attempt per year in 1946-2001.15 From the conditions
of exhaustion and occupation in 1946, the intervention of the Marshal plan and the
building of a great military alliance created a set of conditions that made compellence
attempts much less likely .16
The Western Europeans were not prohibited from making militarized threats
against the Communist bloc of Europe, and in fact were sometimes encouraged to do so
in support of allied positions .17 The Communist bloc had a similar structure, with one
significant difference. Whereas the U.S. led the Atlantic alliance based on mutual need,
the Soviet Union led the Warsaw Pact through, in part, the use and threat of force.18 In
single state versus single state compellence attempts in 1946-2001, most were attempted
14 Serfaty, The Elusive Enemy, 64-68, 72-75.
15 Western European states used for this example are: UK, Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands, France,
Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Greece, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland
16 Geir Lundestad, Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 19451997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 36-37.
17
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know, 139.
18

Ambrose and Brinkley, Rise to Globalism.
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between the states o f the Soviet Union or its successor states, with 24 attempts, while
intra-westem Europe compellence numbered only six attempts. There were 12 attempts
from the Soviet Union or successors aimed at Western states with only five attempts in
return. This combination of reduction of threats within Western Europe and continued
attempts by the Soviets resulted in a reduction from 4.8 compellence attempts per year
from 1914 to 1945 to 3.0 attempts in the 1946-2001 timeframe.
As figure 16 denotes, in the same timeframe, states in other regions of the world
substantially increased their proportion of compellence attempts. Much of this increase in
proportion can be directly attributed to the increase in number of recognized states in
those regions. For example, in Africa, three sovereign states had been recognized before
the end of World War II, the remainder of the land and people being subject to colonial
claims, or not yet established in such a fashion that it would be involved in compelling
other states. In the period 1946 through 2001,45 African states were founded and
subsequently recognized by the international community. This more than tenfold increase
provided many potential new actors in the compellence arena. Asia tells a similar story,
starting with nine recognized sovereign states prior to 1946, and developing 37 new states
in the post-World War II era. The Middle East pattern was not as dramatic with 8 states
established before 1946 and 17 states established in the period after. In the Americas 26
states existed prior to 1946 and 13 new states came into existence after. Many of these
new states were small island nations, such as Bermuda, or other colonial remainders,
which became sovereign when colonial powers relinquished the last of their
protectorates.19

19

Small and Singer, Resort to Arms.
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Yet, despite the increase in the number of states, the global rate of attempted
compellence remained the same, while the regional proportions shifted. Largely, the
proportion of attempted compellence by region shifted because the proportion of number
of states by region has shifted, along with the suppression of compellence attempts
between Western European states. Still, the shift in proportion of compellence attempts
does not answer the question of why these now greater number of states would view
compellence as attractive, even while successful compellence became more rare.
Possible Correlations - Capability Levels and Attempts
One part of the explanation could be that the capabilities that were inherent in
colonies or protectorates were previously concentrated in a smaller number of colonial
powers and as new states became sovereign, they were able to claim the wherewithal to
conduct their own foreign policies to include the use of threats of force. To a greater or
lesser degree, France and other European powers relinquished significant capabilities
during the decolonization period after World War II. This diffusion of capability
equipped the newly sovereign states while removing some inhibitions on the threat or
•

•

•

actual use of those capabilities.

20

20

•

•

•

.

.

•

The diffusion of capability is illustrated m figure 17.

Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43, no. 2 (Jan 1991):
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Figure 17. System Concentration of Military Capability over Time

Some leading theorists of international relations have discussed the distribution of
capabilities as a causal factor in determining state behaviors.21 Since compellence is a
type of state behavior, this would imply that the distribution of capabilities could be a
causal factor in compellence attempts. Figure 17 illustrated the concentration of military
capabilities in the international system with a consolidated measure across all aspects of
military expenditures, standing forces and potentials such as population, energy, iron, and
steel production.

Although this diffusion puts more capabilities in the hands of more

different decision makers, by itself it cannot account for the level of attempts seen in
those regions that formerly did not include sending states. Once those capabilities are
available and a leader is facing the situation where the threat of use or exemplar use of

21

22

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 97-98.
Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution."
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force could possibly support achievement of his or her policy aims, recourse to attempted
compellence may be logical. Therefore, although not causal, the diffusion of capability
may be an enabling factor for the maintenance of historic levels of compellence.
As previously discussed, there is a common myth about the capability required for
compellence. In chapter three, we found that states that attempted compellence did so
with varying levels of capability and we found that capability scores are not good
predictors of successful compellence. Instead, capability distribution may play a different
role. It is possible that a certain level or range of capability is conducive to compellence
attempts. States below a certain level of capability would not attempt compellence,
whereas those above this level would, given other motivations. Although not causal, if
the level of capability for sending states remained the same from one period to the next
we would increase our insight into the necessary conditions for this phenomenon.
Although it has been demonstrated that the diffusion of capability generally
increased, the specific level of capability related to compellence attempts has not been
addressed. If the capability available for compellence attempts remained nominally the
same, across the periods we could then theorize that the level of attempts is prompted or
regulated by the level of capabilities in individual states. The question becomes: does the
level of capability for sending states remain the same from one period to the next? Or do
states in the current era attempt compellence at different levels of capabilities than states
in the previous era?
Using the same combined scale of capability discussed previously, in which the
total world capability equals 1.0, the mean capability of pre-World War II sending states
were compared with the mean capability of post-World War II sending states to see if
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their capability distribution remained the same. An independent samples t-test, equal
variance not assumed, indicated that the means differences are statistically significant,
with the pre-1946 mean higher than the post-1946 mean.

93

The difference in the means

indicates that we cannot depend on the continuation of sending states level of capabilities
as a causal factor for the maintenance of compellence attempts in the post-World War II
era.
Further, when the difference in capability between the sending and target states
was also examined in a independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed, the pre1946 differences were significantly larger that the post-1946 differences.24 The reduced
differences in capabilities combined with the earlier examination of means differences in
capability distribution, seems to indicted that the overall level of compeller’s capability is
reduced from one period to the next and that the difference in capability between the two
states become smaller also.
As noted earlier, some leading theorists of international relations have discussed
the distribution of capabilities as a causal factor in determining state behaviors .25 This
examination shows that, globally, capabilities have become more diffuse and the
difference in capabilities between the sending and target states more closely match than
previously. It does not appear that these changes in distribution of capability have
explanatory power for the observed pattern of compellence attempts. Although the
23

The independent samples t-test, on general capability difference between two time periods,
equal variance not assumed, indicated that the means o f 1914-1945 states and the means o f 1946-2001
states differences are statistically significant t (309.964) = 10.043, g_=.000. The pre-1946 era (M=.0769, SD
=.004) was substantially higher than the 1946 and after era (M =.027. SD =.04981.
24

The second independent samples t-test, on the capability difference between the sending and
target states between two time periods, equal variance not assumed, indicated that the means differences
between 1914-1945 states and the means differences between 1946-2001 states differences are statistically
significant t(302.601) = 6.4, p_=.000. The pre-1946 era (M=.0424, SD =.09021 was substantially higher
than the 1946 and after era (M_=.0046, SD =.05611.
25

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, 97-98.
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distribution of capability may have explanatory value in other aspects of international
relations, it does not appear to provide analytic leverage to this part of the compellence
puzzle.
Government Type and Attempted Compellence
Various authors have found high correlations between the government types and
their choices regarding warfare.26 This suggests that a similar relationship between
government types and choices regarding compellence may exist. If government type was
critical to maintaining the same level of attempted compellence, we would expect to see
continuity in the type of governments between the 1914-1945 era and the 1946-2001 era.
To examine this notion, we used the Polity 4 database, specifically the Polity2 variable,
which provides an aggregate score of autocracy and democracy. If the mix of autocratic
and democracy entities attempting compellence remained constant one could theorize that
a particular mix of government types results in a certain level of attempted compellence.
To serve as a baseline for comparison, figure 18 provides the distribution of government
types, 1816-2001.

26 Brace M. Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company Inc, 2001); Spencer R. Weart, Never at War: Why Democracies Will not Fight One Another
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). These works are representative examples from a large
democratic peace literature.
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Given the distribution of all states' scores for autocracy and democracy in figure
18 and the distribution of attempts in the two periods of interest in figure 19, we find that
the entire range of governments participate in attempts at compellence. It also appears
that neither autocrats nor democrats, as indicated by the Polity2 variable, are especially
responsible for any specific rate of attempts. This indicates that government type is not
generally a good indicator of the rate of attempted compellence. The question remains if
the number of attempts by type of government stayed constant from one period to the
next.
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Figure 19 does show some variation from one era to the next. The states
attempting to compel are slightly more democratic, with a small increase of states in the
middle third of the scale. Therefore, using the Polity2 scores noted above, both the
sending and target states’ government type were examined to see if their distribution
remained the same between the two time periods. An independent samples t-test, equal
variance not assumed, showed that the means differences were not statistically significant
for sending states but the t-test was statistically significant for the target states.27 The
mean for the sending states shifted very slightly from a -2.96 to a -2.1. On the target side
of compellence, the means shifted from a -1.46 to a 0.34. This indicates that the sending

27

An independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed, showed that the means differences
were not statistically significant for sending states, t_(386.849) = -1.857, p_= .064. The pre-1946 era (M = 2.96, SD = 6.523) was slightly lower than the 1946 and after era (M = -2.10, SD = 6.920) but not
significantly so. The t-test for target states indicated that L(458.997) = -4.042, g_=.000. The pre-1946 era
(M = -1.46, SD =5.783) was substantially lower than the 1946 and after era (M_= .34, SD=7.856).
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states were generally the same mix of autocracies and democracies, with a slight move
toward democracy while the target states were slightly more democratic in the second
period.
As we examined what looked to be a relatively steady pattern of attempted
compellence, we have detected substantial regional variations on the part of the sending
states, but continuity in the mixture of types of governments pursuing compellence with a
slight shift in the nature of the governments of the target states. Further, the concentration
of capabilities in the world and specific levels of capabilities on the part of the sending
states do not seem to be related to the level of compellence attempts. Since we now know
these more specific facts about the states related to the compellence attempts, we can
logically make some statements about the maintenance of the level of attempts in the post
World War II era. First, the maintenance of the level of compellence is not based on a
specific set of states, as the region percentages have shifted. Further, the increases were
in areas where there was a substantive growth in the number of Westphalian-type states,
and the reduction of attempts was in an area strongly affected by World War II. Further
still, the sending states mix indicated that compellence was being attempted by the same
type of states as previously, as it continued to be a tool for autocrats and democrats
against a slightly more democratic set of target states in the second period.
Risk Acceptance as a Factor
In addition to the location, capability, and the form of government, some
researchers have emphasized that attitude towards risk may be a factor that drives
decisions about the use of military force.28 It is possible, taking into account the shifts in

28

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason, 42-3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

175
region and capability, that states’ frequency of compellence attempts is related to the
level of risk they are willing to assume. If this is true, we would expect risk acceptance to
decrease in Europe and increase in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. If the data supports
this expectation, risk acceptance may help explain the frequency of compellence
attempts. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman in War and Reason provide a risk
calculation, which can help us test the possibility that changes in attitude toward risk
matches the changes in the distribution of compellence attempts.29 This calculation
determines a state’s safest possible set of policies, that same state’s most dangerous set of
policies, and determines its actual policies. The location along that continuum establishes
a factor, which is used within expected utility functions as an representation of a state’s
willingness to assume risk. Here we will use the risk acceptance measure as a comparison
tool to measure between one time period and the next. The expectation is, if risk
acceptance is correlated to the steady level of compellence attempts, the risk acceptance
level for sending states would remain the same.
Sending states’ risk acceptance scores were examined to see if their distribution
remained the same between the two time periods. This examination was done by region
to determine if there were similarities between risk acceptance and distribution of
compellence attempts. A set of independent samples t-test, equal variance not assumed,
showed a statistically significant shift in Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Americas
regions to accept less risk .30 Africa did not have enough cases before 1945 to create a

29 Ibid., 292-3.
30

A set o f regional independent samples t-tests, equal variance not assumed for risk scores
showed that the means differences were statistically significant for: Europe,_t_( 172.489) = 8.614, g=.000.
The pre-1946 era (M= -.1226, SD=.3236) was substantially higher than the 1946 and after era (M= -2.7565,
SD= 3.9840). Middle East,_L(322.611) = 4.719, p=,000. The pre-1946 era (M= -.0044, SD=.1955) was
substantially higher than the 1946 and after era (M= -.8572, SD=3.1039). Asia,_t(290.681) = 7.987, p=.000.
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statistically significant result. This means that we cannot depend on the idea that the
states that attempt compellence are doing so at a similar frequency because of a similar
attitude about risk. If risk attitude was an indicator or perhaps causally related to
compellence attempts, these risk values would indicate that we should have a statistically
significant decrease in the number of compellence attempts in all regions. We do not.
Therefore, risk attitude is not likely to be a determinant of the level of compellence. This
finding does not entirely discard the idea of risk acceptance as a contributing factor in the
decision to attempt compellence. Europe does have a larger decrease in risk acceptance
than the other regions, just not a change in risk attitude that is proportional to the change.
So far, we have reviewed five variables related to the sending states and the level
of compellence attempts. Two of those appear to help to better describe the phenomenon,
the apparent movement of compellence attempts from the center to the periphery and the
more even distribution of capability. Three other variables seem not to have strong
explanatory power, specific levels of capability of the sending states the form of
government and attitude toward acceptance of risk, Although we cannot explain the level
of compellence activities from this portion of our examination, our understanding of the
contributions of these five variables exclude many related potential explanations. As
suggested earlier, where direct correlations do not appear to obtain the required insights,
other techniques to work through counterintuitive situations may be helpful.

The pre-1946 era (M= -.0623, SD=. 1946) was substantially higher than the 1946 and after era (M= -1.7726,
SD=3.5207). Americas, _t_( 160.511) = 6.111, p=.000. The pre-1946 era (M= .0796, SD=,3469) was
substantially higher than the 1946 and after era (M= -1.8863, SD = 3.962).
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A Game Theoretic Approach
In War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives, Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita and David Lalman captured the idea of an international interaction game, based
on the expected utility o f various actions that could help decipher the choices between
peace and war. This interaction game focuses on decision makers assessing the
desirability of outcomes according to various costs and benefits that the outcomes are
anticipated to generate.31 Drawing on the idea of strategic interaction, this model claims
that decision makers choose their strategies with an awareness of how the countervailing
actions available to their opponents may alter their preferred course. Although the model
assumes the existence of a unitary rational actor, it is insensitive to whether the decision
is actually made by a single actor or group, or through interaction of a plurality. The
model is dependent on the rationality of the decision maker, as a key function of the
decision-maker in the model is transitive ordering of future options. Additionally, the
model provides the opportunity to include some domestic concerns in what have been
considered quintessentially foreign policy decisions.
More importantly, the model abstracts decision processes that may or may not be
conscious on the part of the decision-maker. The model depicts these as future sequential
decisions as they might be assessed by one set of decision makers or the other. The result
of these decisions range from a peaceful acceptance of the status quo to resolution of the
issue by warfare. Decision makers from both sides conduct a process that has them
consider the expected utility of various actions as they might be responded to by the
adversary. This early consideration informs the decision process, so that they maximize

31

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason, 25.
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their expected utility from that stage of the game onward. The actors in this model cannot
commit themselves to a single course of action from an early understanding of the
expected utility, but can act in anticipation of their adversary’s actions. This model
indicates that the state's decision makers are forward-looking at least into the midterm,
limiting the actors’ vision to the end of a sequence of moves that constitute a single play
in the international interaction game and allowing behavior to only affect the current
choice. Therefore, the modeling approach assumes that the state decision makers do not
knowingly act contrary to medium or longer-term interest of their state, but that their
actions have only an immediate effect. However, the model does not currently allow
decision makers to be influenced by the long-term through repeated play or iteration. The
outline of the international interaction game that provides the framework to apply these
rules is captured in figure 2 0 .
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"igure 20. International Interaction Model

If this model adequately emulates some version of the decision-makers logic, it is
possible that it can help explain why leaders continue to make compellence attempts
despite the low success rate. Applying the international interaction model for this series
of real world state-to-state interactions yields the results in table 17, compared to the
actual outcomes for compellence attempts. For example; the model predicted “Acquiesce
by B”, the nominal goal of compellence, for 278 cases. The actual outcome for those 278
cases are recorded across the categories provided by the Correlates of War database, with
only 15 real world occurrences of “Yield B”. Immediately striking is the substantially
lower performance of the model in the area o f negotiated outcomes. Whereas the
international interaction game would lead one to believe that there is about a 50 percent
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chance for negotiated settlement, actual experience indicates a much lower outcome. A
condition that is not predicted by the international interaction game is stalemate, which,
as we saw in chapter two, is the preponderance of the outcomes in the real world.

Victory A

Victory B

Yield A

Yield B

Stalemate

Negotiate

War

Totals

Table 17. Predictions of the International Interaction Game vs. Actual Outcomes
Actual

32

22

11

30

183

22

6

306

139

95

37

101

670

91

19

1152

13

1

2

6

75

7

0

104

27

19

9

15

172

35

1

278

War by A

9

21

8

13
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20

1

342

War by B

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

2

220

158

67

165

1372

175

27
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Negotiate
Acquiesce
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A
<L>
_o
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"3
byB
<D
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Totals

The area of status quo is particularly important. Since all cases had been pre
selected for the occurrence of compellence, none of the sending state decision makers
actually chose status quo. This is significant since the model predicts that the choice
would be status quo for 306 cases when the actual course of action in the real world was
to make a demand. Further, despite some minor variation in the definition of war between
the two data sources the difference between actual occurrence of war and the predicted
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was substantial.32 Where the model called for an outcome of war 344 times, the actuality
is near 30. These two errors are critical. Since the model over-predicts status quo and
recourse to war, it cannot serve as a good method to explain the maintenance of a historic
level of compellence attempts.
Before immediately rejecting expected utility and more specifically the
international interaction model for its miscalculation of the chances for various
approaches in compellence, it may be helpful to examine some key features of the model
to see if it provides insight to this apparent miscalculation. The international interaction
game captures the interaction between two theoretically equal players. It is instantiated in
the EUGene software and populated with real world data, according to the specifications
within War and Reason equation variables and rule sets.33
The model depends heavily on probabilities based on comparative military
capability and includes a domestic cost of war. The game begins with a move by nature
that enables one state or another to attempt to influence the development of events. This
state has the choice to make a demand of the other state or not. This highlights the first
difference between a description of compellence and the broader set of international
interactions.
Compellence begins when the status quo is found to be unsatisfactory by the
sending state, which then makes a demand of the target state, based on the belief that
compliance by the target will modify the status quo and result in a condition that is
acceptable to the sending state. In the case of compellence, this demand is coupled with a

32

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason, 69; Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized
Disputes," 171.
33
Bennett and Stam, "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual," 179-204; Bueno de Mesquita and
Lalman, War and Reason.
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threat, display, or demonstrative use of military force. Compellence, by definition in this
research, does not allow for a non-demand by the sending state as the initial step of
interaction. This renders the leg that allows a target state the initiative, to include the
subordinate sub-game, moot. The game is re-drawn below in figure 21 without the moot
leg, for clarity.
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figure 21. International Interaction Game, Compellence Version

At the next step of the model, where the target state can decide to acquiesce or
issue a counter-demand, examination of the empirical data has shown that few states, less
than 10 percent, acquiesce at this point. The vast majority communicate a counter
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demand that the sending state not interfere in the target state’s actions. This counter
demand may or may not include the threat of military force. The next steps open to the
sending state are, in reality, not as stark as immediately implied by the game structure.
The game allows for the sending state to attack the target state resulting in either war or
capitulation on the part o f the target state. Alternatively, it allows for a sending state to
start negotiations with the target state, which still has the possibility of ending in a
negotiated resolution, war started by the target state, or capitulation the sending state,
after use o f force by the target state. As compellence, at its core, is an economy of force
measure, we would not expect a sending state to choose to attack the target state at this
juncture as there is some probability that it will still be able to achieve its desired end
state by threatening or by a demonstrative use of military force instead of conducting
expensive "brute force" operations.34 At this point, the model structure provides for only
one other choice for the sending state, negotiation with the target state. The most
common occurrence captured in the empirical data is that the target state does not comply
and that the sending state ceases to make repeated demands. If no action is accomplished
by either side for the next 6 months, the episode is recorded as a stalemate, in the
Militarized Interstate Disputes data .35 This end state does not comport with a common
implication of the phrase "negotiated resolution" highlighted by the expected utility
model.
Despite the limited model choices after negotiation between the sending state and
the target, the sending state must, in order to make its military threats believable, retain
the ability to move from negotiation to execute its threat, up to and including war if that

34 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2-3.
35

Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 175.
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was part of the threatened outcome for non-compliance. Without that ability, the sending
state's negotiation position is untenable, as the target state will detect the empty threat.
From one perspective, during compellence the sending state is at the beginning of the
crisis sub game, attempting to negotiate with the target state, but not yet past the point
where it might use the full force of its military and start a war with the target. The target
state is not, as the model structure might imply, awaiting a decision by sending state, but
instead is actively seeking to negate the sending state’s threat using conciliation, pressure,
linkage, balancing, and sometimes non-communication to attempt to achieve its initially
desired endstate, simultaneously with the sending state's actions. For example, starting in
March of 1999, NATO forces conducted bombing raids as an exemplar use of force along
with diplomatic demands that Slobodan Milosevic cease his campaign of ethnic cleansing
in Kosovo. Milosevic did not wait passively after he issued his counter demand that
NATO not interfere with his security operations, he continued to attempt to both diffuse
the NATO threats and achieve the utilities of his initial objectives. In addition to issuing
the counter-demand, he reached out to the UN and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe and tried to use the International Court of Justice to get the
bombing to stop, while continuing to execute operations in Kosovo.36 Alternatively, the
target state may interpret a sending state’s compellence threats to be the early indicators
of an attack and not negotiation, interpreting the exemplar use of force as a signal that the
sending state has already decided to go to war.

36 Sadler et al. "Milosevic Tells Citizens to Defend Yugoslavia." In CNN. Com 24 March 1999
Focus on Kosovo. http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/24/kosovo.04/ (accessed 23 July 2004);
"World Court Opens NATO 1999 Bombing Campaign Case." Reuters Foundation 19 April 2004.
http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:Y16m4Q-lGDsJ:www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/
L19571896.htm+1999+milosevic+ICJ+bombing&hl=en (accessed 25 Aug 2004).
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This phase of compellence can be confusing. After the sending state has made a
demand and the target state has refused to acquiesce, the sending state can progress no
further than the beginning of the crisis sub game, remaining at a point of decision. The
sending state would rather not execute an attack on the target state as it is a costly venture
with uncertain payback, but it still is not sure if it can rely on negotiation with the target
state, as full commitment to that approach may disable preparations for war. While the
sending state is trapped in this schizophrenic position, the target state continues to accrue
benefits from its original policy. Further, the target state has the opportunity to engage in
the full range of negotiation with the sending state, or it can preemptively attack the
sending state to realize the benefits of having the initiative if it appears that the sending
state is about to attack. Unlike war, compellence requires the sending state to
simultaneously negotiate and make the threat of war believable. These activities generate
costs to the sending state. This limits the sending states activities to those which it is
willing to pay the price for and enables the target state that increase the cost to the
sending state by manipulating the situation. This increasing cost of attempted
compellence may cause the sending state to reconsider its demands. Further, consider the
illustrative case where targets state’s initial policy that the sending state found
objectionable was time definite. That is, the target state’s policy was to accomplish a
particular goal within a set time. If the target state accomplishes its goal before it
succumbs to the sending state’s threat, its original policy becomes moot, as does the
demand and counter-demand. A new demand to reverse the new condition may be issued
by the sending state to the target state or it may not. This partial repetitive interaction is
not directly reflected in the international interaction game.
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The international interaction game, although useful for framing the broad sweep
of possible interactions, does not inform at the point of critical interaction where the
sending state has made a demand and the target state a counter demand. The model would
make it appear that the sending state now has initiative when in fact substantial initiative
still belongs to the target state. Further, as the target state exercises that initiative it can
change the terms of the debate, as Nicaragua did on April 9, 1984 when it initiated
proceedings against the United States of America in the International Court of Justice.
That action was based on the allegation that the United States had supported, by its policy
and actions, a mercenary army, the Contras, in launching attacks on the territory of
Nicaragua, with the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista government.

-5*7

The debate

then became one of public exposure of U.S. covert methods and the unwillingness of the
U.S. to submit its actions to the judgment of an international organization. This shifts the
elements of the expected utility discussion from one underpinned by the comparison of
military capabilities to one focused on the loss of international prestige.
In actual practice, states are really playing two separate but connected games.
Unlike the interaction game, each can continue to take actions that improve their
expected outcomes, without waiting for the input of the other. Further, the players can re
define the factors of expected utility during the engagement as Nicaragua did, making the
interactions much more fluid than this particular game structure would imply. This makes
the expected utility approach, at least as expressed through the International Interaction
Game, insufficient to explain the continued historic level of compellence attempts.
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International Court o f Justice. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States o f America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14. 27 June 1986.
http://www.gwu.edu/~jaysmith/nicus3.html (accessed 25 August 2004).
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This chapter started by highlighting a part of the compellence puzzle, the
maintenance of the rates of compellence attempts controlled for the number of states that
continued at a historic rate despite the substantial reduction in successes. In attempting to
uncover a pattern to explain this continuation of the historic level of compellence, we
determined it is, in actuality, a rapid increase in the level of attempted compellence in
three regions and a reduction in the level of compellence attempts in two regions. Since
the initial measure of attempted compellence rates already controlled for the number of
states, the simple answer of post World War II decolonization and state growth was not
supportable. Further, we have examined location, the distribution of capability, the
specific level of capability of the sending states, the form of government, and the risk
propensity of the sending states. Further still, we have also more closely examined the
pattern of attempted compellence in those regions where the increase has taken place and
specifically highlighted substantial spikes in compellence attempts, where they exist. This
examination did not reveal any significant patterns of sending states, of target states, or
cross regional similarities that may provide an independent basis for explanations for the
observed behavior.

Domestic Benefits to Compellence Attempts
Emergent Behavior
Stephen Wolfram, Robert Axelrod and Lars-Eric Cederman have used complexity
theory to examine and explain a wide range of activities and behaviors.

TR
The leverage

complexity theory provides is the idea that complex outcomes and results may be

38
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explained by the interaction of a small set of actors and a few simple rules. Instead of
grounding the analysis in multi-variable correlations or a multi-path game, complexity
theory posits simple rules and actors. How the actors interact with other actors and the
environment and the adaptation within those rules creates the outcome - emergent
behavior, not dependent on a specific formula, but created through adaptive goal seeking.
In The Logic o f Political Survival, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith,
Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow develop a rich theory on a fairly simple
rule: that leaders want to remain in office as long as possible. They contend that, “The
desire to survive motivates the selection of policies and allocations of benefits; it shapes
the selection of political institutions and the objectives of foreign policy; it influences the
•

•

•

TQ

•

very evolution of political life.” The above actions taken by political leaders can be
interpreted in the context of their desire to retain power. The authors use this axiom to
construct theories of institutions, leadership incentives, governance, taxing and spending
decisions, policy choices, and war behavior. In the last category, the authors attempt to
use an elaborated theory to explain whether leaders choose to attempt to seize territory,
oust a foreign leader, or to install a puppet government. The contention in this chapter is
much simpler: leaders want to remain in office as long as possible and attempt
compellence because their attempts are compatible with increased longevity. This results
in attempted compellence rates, when adjusted for the growth of the number of states in
time, that reflect a continuation of historic rates.
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Compellers and Non-compellers
Using the data associated with the research for The Logic o f Political Survival
along with the data from the previous sources, we will first demonstrate the relationship
between attempted compellence and longevity in office, look at possible intervening
variables, and then discuss the implications. The first example will consider leaders from
1816 through 2001 who have left office prior to the end date of the data. Leaders with 90
days or less in office will not be considered in order to provide for a sufficient time for
the leader to have established themselves in office and taken control of the mechanisms
of government. This reduces the sample size from 2,743 executives to 2,456. The
examples will compare the tenure in office for compellers and non-compellers using a
survival plot. If the leader has been involved in any form of attempted compellence, from
verbal threats through declaration of war (the declaration is assumed to be a contingent
threat) they will be identified as a compeller. If there is no evidence that a leader has
attempted to use compellence as a tool of statecraft they will be placed in a group of noncompellers. The leader data remains connected to other data about form of government,
region, time period, state capabilities, and compellence success for later testing. There are
1,802 leaders that are non-compellers and 654 leaders that are compellers. The initial
diagram in figure 22 indicates a considerably better survival rate for officials that attempt
compellence over those who do not.
Using a Kaplan - Meier test, the mean survival value for the compellers is 2,772
days with a median value of 1,665 days, the mean survival value for the non-compellers
is 1,411 with a median value of 729 days. The log rank test of significance (156.68 with 1
df) shows the results to be statistically significant (.0000). This difference supports the
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contention that leaders that are compellers and leaders that are non-compellers have
significantly difference probabilities for staying in office.
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Figure 22. Compeller vs. Non-compeller Survival Data

Other factors could be influencing the time in office. Those factors could include
geographic location and form of government. These characteristics are of interest as it is
possible that the strength of a single region’s variation could affect the entire result or the
strength of a type of government could do likewise. Examining regional difference first,
we see in the table 18 that there are some regional variations.
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Table 18. Regional Differences in Compellence Effect on Longevity
Middle
Europea
Eastb
Africa6
Asiad
Mean
1197
2843
2233
1659
NonCompeller Median
1343
919
381
1600
Compeller

Americas6
1276
1142

Mean

2967

3552

4881

2685

1843

Median

1470

2083

3947

1580

1461

“Log Rank 118.44, df=l, p=.0000; Log Rank 1.00, df=l, p=.3167;0 Log Rank 21.61, df=l, p=.0000;'
Log Rank 11.50, df=l, p=.0007;e Log Rank 25.13, df=l, p=.0000

In every region, the mean time in office for compellers is greater than the mean
time in office for non-compellers. This relationship is significant in four of five regions.
In the Middle East the compeller enjoys a longer time in office but the difference in the
survival curves is not statistically significant. However, if we limit the sample to just the
post-World War II actions, the Middle East portion of the sample gains in statistical
significance, moving from p=.3167 for the entire period to p=.0123 for the post-World
War II period .40 The fact that the survival scores are significant indicates that the
relationship between compellence and longevity in office is not likely to be caused by
random chance, especially in the post-1945 era.
Another variable that could be masking the actual performance of the
compellence variable is the nature of the government. Across the entire group, 1,064 of
the states had Polity scores of 0 to -10 and 1,254 states with at least a minimal level of
democracy, 1 to 10 on the Polity score. It is possible that one type of government or
another may hold office much longer than the other.41 By re-running the Kaplan-Meier

40

Sample limited to post World War II data. Log Rank=53.14, df=l, p=.0000; Middle East: Log
Rank=6.27, df=l, p=.0123; Africa: Log Rank=23.09, df=l, p=.0000; Asia: Log Rank=20.36, df=l,
p=.0000; Americas: Log Rank=l 1.03, df=l, p=.0009
41
Henry Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, O f Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the
Modern World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 90-92.
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test with controls for autocracy and democracy, we can determine if those characteristics
are correlated to the effect observed. The survival plots for autocrats and democrats are
contained in figure 23 and figure 24.
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Figure 23. Survival Plot, 1946-2001, Autocrats

It is apparent that autocrats that use compellence survive much longer in office
than do not. At the same time, it is also evident that democrats that use compellence also
survive longer in office.
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Figure 24. Survival Plot, 1946-2001, Democrats

Table 19. Compellence Effect on Tenure in Office with Type of Government
Autocrats3
Democrats
Non-Compeller
Compeller

Mean

1699

945

Median

909

517

Mean

3760

1682

Median

2191

1461

1*

“Log Rank 103.29, df=l, p=.0000;b Log Rank 80.06, df=l, p=.0000

In table 19, the mean and median times in office for non-compeller and compeller
leaders are captured in numeric form. Both the Autocracts and Democracts groups are
statistically significant.
One clarification is needed. Some scholars refer to domestic audience costs for
failure to carry out threats or that domestic punishment for poor performance in
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diplomacy that may reduce longevity.42 In the case of compellence, there is no apparent
punishment from the domestic audience for trying and failing. Figure 25 provides a visual
depiction based on the same data used in the previous discussion of survival rates.
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Figure 25. Effect of Success or Failure of Compellence on Longevity

Although longevity for “failures” is slightly lower than successful compellers,
both survival rates are higher than those that do not attempt to compel at all. The
challenge remains that correlation is not causation. Compellence behavior, whether
successful or not, is related to greater longevity in office, even when region and form of
government are controlled for. This does not mean that our search for an explanation for
this part of the puzzle is over. It is possible that longevity causes compellence behavior.
More precisely, the office holder may have massed the right type of political wherewithal

42

Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences." 577; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and
Reason, 41, 46.
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over time to conduct compellence operations and that a lesser time in office does not
provide those opportunities. If true, the expectation would be that compellence attempts
would only start after a certain interval, or that compellence attempts would be skewed to
occur late in the incumbents’ tenure. That is, if longevity were causally related to
compellence one would need to observe a certain amount of longevity prior to
compellence attempts. If compellence attempts supported longevity one would observe
some level of compellence attempts prior to achievement of longevity. To test this
expectation, a variable was created that established the ratio of the number of days total
in office vs. the number of days from entering office to starting a compellence attempt. In
this ratio, 0.5 would indicate that the leader first attempted compellence halfway through
his or her tenure and a 1.0 ratio would indicate that the first compellence attempt on the
last day in office.43 Figure 26 contains a plot of this ratio. It clearly shows that
compellence attempts often come at the beginning of a leader’s tenure.

43

The test data previously had all cases with 90 days or less total time in office removed, to
censor those cases where a leader is almost immediately removed from power.
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Figure 26. Ratio of Tenure vs. Start Compellence Attempt

The expectation of establishment of longevity prior to compellence is not
supported for the 622 cases, M=.374 and SD=.287. Therefore, we can reject the
possibility of reverse causation. Longevity is not necessary for compellence. Further,
given approximately 70 percent of compellence users start compellence prior to the
midpoint in their tenure, this establishes appropriate directionality between compellence
attempts and tenure.
Compellence attempts are positively correlated with longevity. Controlling for
government type and region, the relationships remains statistically significant. When
testing for directionality between compellence and longevity, longevity is not a necessary
condition for compellence and further, compellence often occurs in the first half of a
compelling leader’s time in office. Given all other conditions remain equal, leaders that
attempt to compel remain in office longer. This result for attempted compellence satisfies
the motive force specified in The Logic o f Political Survival. In short, the compellence
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attempt level remains high because political leaders conduct actions that achieve a
longevity benefit for them and compellence is among those actions.
Steve R. David in Explaining Third World Alignment provides similar insight, in
an attempt to explain third world states’ policies, writ large. He coined a term
“omnibalancing” that highlighted the state leaders’ need to counter internal and external
threats against personal and political survival.44 A key observation was that this need
drove behaviors that did not comport with actions that we would expect from a realist or
neorealist approach, much as we see in compellence behavior.45 From this perspective
David’s basic unit of analysis, the state’s leader, matches the focus of analysis that Bueno
de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow use in The Logic o f Political Survival.46
Accepting the idea of an anarchic environment at some level within the state as suggested
by David, the logical extension is that the leader values and is even further motivated by
individual political or personal survival, as envision by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith,
Siverson, and Morrow. Therefore, in this context, compellence attempts could be viewed
as a tool or measure that supports political or personal requirements without the actual
need to get the other state to acquiesce for the exchange to be successful for the leader.
This is not meant to imply that all compellence attempts are only shams unintended to
shift other states behavior, but that some portion could be selected to serve purposes other
than the explicitly stated ones. An explanation of the portion of the compellence puzzle
concerning the fact of attempts continuing at historic levels may be that the rate is
partially established by survival needs of individual leaders.

44

David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," 235.

45 Ibid., 237-8.
46

David, "Explaining Third World Alignment."; Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic o f Political
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Compellence behavior is obviously not the sole determinate of longevity. Bueno
de Mesquita and Siverson found that going to war created a hazard for the leaders’
longevity. Authoritarian leaders were affected less, while costly war and defeat increased
the hazard.47 Others have indicated that the possibility that a leader will be punished at
the polls for poor performance allows some leaders to make strong commitments, but that
domestic conditions and institutional arrangements enable or constrain the punishment48
Bienen and van de Walle determined that the current length of time in office was the best
predictor of how long a leader was likely to remain in office.49 Others have examined
longevity in regard to homogenous ethnicity, regime types, participation in international
war, a notion of inevitable decline, connection to macro-features of the political
landscape, political drama, and participation in an International Monetary Fund
program .50 This list is probably not exhaustive. The larger picture that these studies draw
is that longevity is more affected by actions of the leader, than external conditions, such
as homogenous ethnicity or the idea of inevitable decline. The use of war appears risky
from the longevity standpoint if it is either costly or if it ends in defeat. Compellence, on
the other hand appears to be rewarded if attempted. It appears, all other things remaining
47

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival o f Political
Leaders: A Comparative Study o f Regime Types and Political Accountability," The American Political
Science Review 89, no. 4 (Dec 1995): 852-53.
48
Alastair Smith, "International Crises and Domestic Politics," The American Political Science
Review 92, no. 3 (Sept 1998): 623-38.
49
Bienen and van de Walle, Time and Power.
50 Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, "War and the Survival o f Political Leaders: 841-55; John
Londregan et al., "Ethnicity and Leadership Succession in Africa," International Studies Quarterly, 39, no.
1 (March 1995): 1-25; Michael D. Wallace and Peter Suedfeld, "Leadership Performance in Crisis: The
Longevity-Complexity Link," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (Dec 1988): 439-51; Robin F.
Marra, Jr., Charles W. Ostrom, and Dennis M. Simon, "Foreign Policy and Presidential Popularity:
Creating Windows o f Opportunity in the Perpetual Election," The Journal o f Conflict Resolution 34, no. 4:
588-623; Alastair Smith and James Raymond Vreeland, "The Survival o f Political Leaders and IMF
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equal, leaders who are willing to attempt compellence remain in office longer. The
contention is not that compellence is the sole determinant of longevity, but leaders who
attempt to compel are more likely to remain in office longer than the equivalent leader
who does not. Therefore, compellence attempts remain at a high level since they generate
some value in maintenance of the office.

Summary
This chapter examined three approaches to look for explanations for the
continuation of compellence attempt rates despite the dramatic decline in compellence
success. The first approach, borrowed from the Correlates of War project, looked for
correlations of factors to the maintenance of the compellence rate. This approach
examined a number of factors such as regional increases of compellence activity, the
diffusion of capabilities, and state decrease in acceptance of risk, that could have
contributed to the regional increases of compellence attempts. While there were
interesting changes in the regional distribution of compellence behavior, no clear
correlations were found with which to establish a causal relationship.
A second approach from the international relations game theoretic community
was tested. It was an attempt to apply Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s International
Interaction Game to the phenomenon of continued compellence attempts. It did not
provide specific insight into compellence behavior as it routinely predicts activities other
than compellence attempts and incorrectly indicates negotiation as the most frequent
outcome. This may be because its variables were specified for peace and war and not
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conceptualized or operationalized for compellence. It did provide a valuable framework
to characterize the sending and target states interactions and potential choices.
A third approach, borrowing from the logic of complexity, examined the
maintenance o f compellence attempts as a phenomenon that appears because of
individual state leader’s choice of actions that are compatible with continued survival in
office. Leaders who attempted compellence were found to have a statistically significant
higher longevity in office than leaders who did not use compellence. This, of course, does
not mean that attempted compellence is the only behavior that contributes to longevity,
only that actions taken by leader’s attempts to maintain their grip on office are also
reflected in the maintenance of the historic frequency of compellence attempts.
The statistical fact that compellence attempts are at historic levels may be the
result of multiple leaders applying a simple rule set that includes personal and political
survival within their own individual situations. As captured by Steve R. David in
Explaining Third World Alignment, leaders accomplish actions that they see as
compatible with maintenance in office from both an international and domestic
perspective.51 This, coupled with an increase in capabilities in the Middle East, Africa,
and Asia may have created an increase in compellence attempts in those regions. This
increase in compellence attempts compensated for the proportional decrease in
compellence attempts in the rest of the world where capabilities were not increased.
These two trends combined to give the appearance of a sustained level of compellence
attempts, adjusted for the increase in the number of states.

51 David, "Explaining Third World Alignment."
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

Although this work started with the discussion of two interesting cases of
attempted compellence, the substantive discussion has focused on trends of a large
number of states over time. This empirical approach, not previously entertained by
compellence researchers, provided insight into patterns of compellence across almost 200
years of statecraft. Additionally, it provided a global perspective that previous researchers
have neglected.

Describing the Compellence Puzzle
The early portions of this analysis indicated that compellence, when examined
from a global perspective, over time, is a fairly unsuccessful method to achieve the
announced goals. Using a strict definition of success, less than ten percent of the attempts
have been successful. Even when the definition of success was relaxed to include
compromises, the rate increased to less than 20 percent. One variation to that dismal
record was in Europe during the early 1800s where the major powers, both singularly and
acting in concert were able to compel fellow European states as well as Asian and Middle
Eastern states with modest success. Yet, more often states across the globe continued to
exert substantial effort in fruitless attempts to compel each other with about 1,800 well
documented attempts between 1816 and 2 0 0 1 .
Some of this empirical examination reflected the underlying growth in the number of
states after World War II. Even though compellence attempts statistics were corrected for
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the increasing number o f states, compellence attempts showed a shift from Europe to
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. After controlling for the effects of the growth of the
number of states, a fairly stable picture emerged as seen in figure 27.
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Figure 27. Ten Year Moving Averages of Frequency of Attempted Compellence per
Number of States and Success Rate as Percent, Superimposed

About 5 percent of the states in the international system attempted compellence in the
early 1800s. This increased between 1875 and 1945 where about 15 percent of the states
were attempted compellence. After World War II, 1946 to 2001 as the number of state
increased (68 to 191), compellence attempts fell to 13.9 percent. This was still more than
twice the rate of compellence attempts per state than during the initial period. In general,
the frequency at which compellence was attempted has been moderate in its variations,
without extremes of activity.
As we arrived at a sense of the frequency and geographic distribution of compellence
attempts, we turned to the level of compellence success, once again from a global
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perspective, across time. As we examined the success rate of compellence, it
demonstrated more variation than the frequency of attempts. Examining those successes
from a temporal perspective, a substantial variation occurs simultaneously with the end of
World War II. Although the rate for successful compellence from 1816 to 2001 is 6.7
percent, the 1816-1945 rate for successful compellence is 16.8 percent, and 1946-2001
rate only 2.1 percent. Unlike other variations in the success rate, which rebounded after a
brief dip, the post-World War II drop in success became a fixed feature for more than 55
years.
The puzzle of compellence is apparent, as seen in figure 27. Compellence success
dropped precipitously after World War II and remained substantially lower than any
period in the preceding 130 years. At the same time compellence attempts continued at a
rate that was comparable to, or slightly higher than the previous period. This apparently
illogical pattern posed three questions. What drove the success rate sharply down after
World War II? What forces maintained that low rate through the post-World War II and
into the post-Cold War period? What factor maintains the historic rate of compellence
attempts despite the lack of success?

The Contributions of Theory
Early conceptualizations of compellence focused on a calculus of pain. The
functionality of compellence was based on the idea that if a state threatened enough pain
on another state, that second state would modify its behavior to meet a demand .1 Failure
of this theory to routinely work in practice encouraged scholars to postulate various

1 Schelling, Arms and Influence.
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intervening factors. The target state’s image of war, the importance of the contended
issue, clarity o f the demand, and vagaries of perception were among the nominated
intervening variables. Nevertheless, these conceptualizations do not provide the leverage
to address the compellence puzzle.
Other scholars claimed success was predicated on the suasive powers of
2

,

diplomats more than the actual applications of exemplar force. Some took the opposite
position and claimed that success will be linked to a specific type of application of force
•j

that communicates a threat of further damage. Neither the focus on diplomacy nor the
focus on the choice of type of force has provided a repeatable explanation of actual
events.
A different approach included the idea of expected utility. Grounded in the
strategic interaction of the players as they examine their likely outcomes, its associated
utility and the likely action of the other player, compellence is one of many possible
solutions within a decision tree.4 The opportunity for success here is always tied to the
trap of war. Yet, this perspective does not provide the insight into the three elements of
the compellence puzzle.
Aside from these specific concerns, the broader vista of international relations
theory provides a different set of perspectives. Compellence seems to be very much
related to realism, with its emphasis on military capabilities and the use of force as a
means of exercising and gaining more power.5 Neo-realism, with its stress on structure
and balancing provides a good model of how some states may expend resources to assist
2
3
4

George and Simons, Limits o f Coercive Diplomacy.
Pape, Bombing to Win.
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason.

Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations.
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a target state, to counteract the influence of a sending state.6 A constructivist construct
provides some tools for the sending states, the target state, and other entities involved in a
compellence attempt.7 Since this approach identifies social interaction as the force that
constructs both the system and the actors, it reinforces the idea that social structures, that
is shared ideas, acquired logics, and tendencies that persist through time, may prove
useful.
Complex interdependence provides a perspective of structure with webs of
multiple channels, multiple issues, and some level of vulnerability or susceptibility,
which when asymmetric may produce the ability to influence others’ actions.8 Complex
interdependence also blurs the distinction between domestic and international politics and
highlights the role of international organizations.
The idea of a two level game provides a perspective of close connection between
the international and the domestic and provides an important idea and "suasive
reverberation," where communications at the international level can have substantial
positive or negative effects at the domestic level.9 This idea elaborates a mechanism that
may be occurring within the network of actors that is postulated in complex
interdependence.
Still other works highlight the issue of hegemonic power, current and past, the
establishment of converging expectations for state behavior, the value and capability of
institutions.10 This work provides an important idea that institutions and organizations

6 Waltz, Theory o f International Politics.
1
g

Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics.
Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd Ed.

9

Putnam, "Diplomacy and Dom estic Politics: The Logic o f Tw o-Level Games."

10 Keohane, After Hegemony, Keohane and Martin, "Can Institutions Deliver?"

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

206
that are operating today are at least partly a result of the U.S. actions as a hegemonic
power. This implies that it is possible that the U.S. could create a global anti-compellence
norm robust enough to last until current times.

Three Myths
To address the three questions that are central to the compellence puzzle three
erroneous impressions propagated by the literature had to be debunked. To recapitulate,
the three myths were the myth of military superiority, the myth of diplomacy, and the
myth of major powers. Each of these myths claimed that successful compellence
depended on a key attribute, massively superior military power, adroit diplomacy, or
major power status.
The empirical fact is that successful compellence does not require superior
military capability. Within the 1,558 occurrences of single state versus single state
attempted compellence, 1816 to 2001, approximately 24 percent of the 105 successful
compellence states had composite state capability scores lower than their targets. In other
words, almost one quarter of the successful compellence was achieved by a “weaker”
state. Alternatively, 58 percent of the unsuccessful cases had more military capability
than their targets. Disarming the military superiority myth helps avoid fruitless study of
capability balances as a causal factor in the compellence puzzle.
In counterbalance to the importance of possession of massive military capabilities
as the key to creating the desired compellence effect, some have stressed diplomatic
actions as the key tool. Examining the empirical record, the study focused on evidence
that would test whether negotiation was the key method of successful compellence.
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Comparing the forms of settlement with successful compellence outcomes, we find that
negotiations are not the linchpin to the success of compellence. About 42 percent of the
cases of successful compellence were recorded as having a “negotiated” settlement.
Thirty seven percent of the cases of successful compellence were recorded as
having had “none” as a settlement method. The empirical definition for “none” as a
settlement method was quite strict. It includes “none of the conditions of negotiated
settlement are present... denotes the lack o f any formal or informal effort which
successfully resolves...” the dispute.
Further, in addition to the 39 percent where no settlement process was specifically
noted, approximately 19 percent of the successful episodes of compellence were
“imposed” via military capabilities. In other words, in more than 50 percent of the cases
of successful compellence, there was no tangible evidence of a diplomatic negotiation.
Exposing the diplomatic myth enabled the remainder of the research to avoid a study of
variations of diplomatic methods as a main cause of the compellence puzzle.
Examining the myth that only major powers attempt to compel we found that the
minor powers, conducted about 1,300 compellence attempts from 1816 through 2001 as
they grew from just under twenty to approximately 180 states. The nine major powers, in
their various incarnations, conducted about 600 attempts at compellence in the same time.
Since major powers were more often involved in multiple state attempts than minor
powers these attempts were included to provide the best chance for the myth to be borne
out. Thus, minor powers, as a category, are more prolific than the major powers, but, on
an attempts per state basis, major powers are much more active than the minor powers.
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When examined across time, the major powers suffered a more substantial drop in
the rate of compellence success (23.4% to 4.4 %) than minor powers (9.9% to 1.6%)
when comparing the pre and during World War II and the Post World War II
performance. Exploring this myth points to the importance of examining major power
compellence behavior as part of the post-World War II drop in success, and also cues us
to examine the minor power record for the sustained compellence attempts.

Addressing the Three Elements of the Compellence Puzzle
The first element of the puzzle was the rapid fall in success of compellence after
World War II. Success dropped to approximately two percent of attempts. Examining the
major powers, as they had been more successful at compellence we found that these
powers had, for the most part, become occupied, exhausted, or contained. Previously
successful compellence states such as Germany or Japan were now in no position as
conquered powers to attempt compellence. Other powers such as the United Kingdom
were too exhausted to be successful at compellence. The U.S. compellence effectiveness
was also reduced as it shifted its compellence efforts toward the Soviet Union and China.
Finally, the Soviet Union’s success rate dropped from about 24 percent to about 4 percent
because o f the containment efforts taken by the United States. The same containment
efforts helped some minor powers not only to resist the Soviets but also other minor
power’s compellence efforts.
Prior to the end of World War II a norm that called for strong resistance to
compellence had been building. President Wilson’s 14 Points, President Roosevelt’s
Atlantic Charter, and the UN Charter all had expressions of this anti-compellence norm.
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As the U.S. formulated its containment strategy, and moved to the support of Iran,
Turkey, and Greece, President Truman’s enunciation of support crystallized this norm.
Wielding its hegemonic power, the U.S. cemented the understanding through a series of
treaty organizations and aid to potential targets of Soviet compellence. The norm of
resisting compellence, even superpower compellence, once adopted, became more
powerful than any single state’s influence, lasting throughout and beyond the end of the
Cold War. Yet it is too early to claim a full understanding of this part of the compellence
puzzle. Since norms cannot be directly observed, further specialized research and
analysis in the area of an anti-compellence norm needs to be accomplished to secure a
greater level of assurance prior to a declaration of causality.
Given the drop in success and acceptance of an anti-compellence norm, the final
element of the puzzle is put in focus. Despite this drop in success rates, states continued
to conduct compellence attempts at about the same rate. Viewed in a geographic fashion
we know that the continuity in the level of attempts was actually a combination of
decreased attempts in Europe and increases in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
Associated with this shift was a diffusion of military capabilities and a general increase in
states’ acceptance of risk. These factors describe a changed environment but do not
provide a motivation for attempting to use compellence.
A possible motivation was revealed when we examined compellence attempts and
leaders’ longevity. A statistically significant relationship exists between the use of
compellence and how long leaders stay in office. Compellers survive in office about
twice as long as their more pacific counterparts. This relationship remains valid for
democracies and autocracies in all regions of the world. It appears that leaders may be
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using compellence as one of their tools of foreign policy, which, in combination with
other actions, assists in maintaining their office. We must view this interpretation as an
initial observation as the mechanism by which the domestic audience values this activity
remains for further study.

Implications
Two levels of insights may be gained from the discussion of compellence. The
first is about compellence as a political activity. This perspective is pertinent to policy
considerations and also is theoretically important. The other set of insights relates to what
the study of compellence tells us about the broader study of international relations. This
perspective is also interesting to international relations theory and leads to potential areas
of future research.
Compellence and Its Future
An important policy question is: will the trends described in the puzzle continue?
This question can be addressed in two parts. The first part is about the historic level of
compellence attempts. The data on the continuing level of attempts shows variation but
no substantial sign of a downward trend over the past 50 years. Therefore, it is unlikely to
fail of its own weight. Further, if a motivation for attempting compellence is that it has a
domestic appeal that supports state leader longevity, compellence will be selected,
consciously or unconsciously, by leaders. Conversely, if leaders were punished by
removal from office by their constituencies for attempting compellence then the rate
would drop. Anecdotally, this seems to be the developing trend in the European states,
but not so in Africa, the Middle East, or Asia. This domestic influence on international
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behavior should not be surprising in democracies where the electoral mechanisms are
overt, and it seems plausible in autocracies where some level of public support for the
regime is required for continuation in power. It is likely that the historic rate will
continue, mitigated only by each leader’s domestic audience’s reaction to the
transmission of compellence threats.
The second part of question is: Will compellence success remain low? Given that
the recent low rate of success is possibly dependent on an anti-compellence norm, that
answer hinges on the stability of that norm. The answer is also affected by the condition
of the international system that allows the norm to be exercised. If a competing norm was
created and promulgated or if the international system, including organizations and
institutions, was significantly changed, then the low success rate could change. Given
that neither norm creation nor restructuring the international system is an overnight task,
it is unlikely in the short term that significant change will occur in the low rate of
compellence success. Alternatively, if other research shows that the low level of success
was caused by ineptitude or lack of analytic capability on the part of the sending states,
these things may be ameliorated with concomitant change to the success rate.
The possibility of the existence of an anti-compellence norm raises another
question: Will another norm, such as an opposing pro-compellence norm, as widespread
and having such an impact on an international phenomenon ever be created and
promulgated again? Given that the confluence of the end of World War II, the level of
hegemony exercised by the U.S., the rise of the superpower competition, the choice of a
policy of containment, and the norm development that preceding the anti-compellence
norm was an unlikely series of events, it is not probable that equivalent actions would be
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repeated. This type o f question highlights a set of insights about the study o f international
relations.
The Study o f International Relations
The second set of insights is about the structure of the field of international
relations as a discipline. In this examination no single set of theories were sufficient to
provide a complete set of guidelines to explain a fairly commonplace international
occurrence. Preponderance o f capabilities did not provide an explanation of the
outcomes, expected utility likewise did not, and the idea of constructing an
intersubjective understanding that eventually becomes a norm was intriguing but not a
definitive answer to the entire puzzle. To advance the study of compellence, advances in
the broader understanding of international relations is required.
A central difficulty in explaining this worldwide phenomenon was that the
majority of the theoretical work in international relations in this area is based on a
Western perspective and is primarily supported by case history. The Western perspective
is rich in some ways but is limited in others. Europe is rich in examples and data because
of its centrality to the modem civilized world, its many conflicts and wars, and its variety
of modes of governance. Despite these advantages, it is limited by the fact that the same
logic, as expressed in War and Reason expected utility equations, which explained
European war and peace behavior did not explain the rest of the world’s compellence
behavior.11 The fact that Europe was the home to a great concert, was comprised of
colonial powers, has progressed through two world wars, has served as contested ground
between the two superpowers, and is now in the midst of a great experiment in federation

11 Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason.
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makes European decision makers, approach international politics differently than an
American, an Asian or African leader. To make progress in compellence, peace, or war, it
is important to the study of international relations to improve the connection to real world
activities. A step toward that improved connection is to test our theories against data from
across the world and across time that describes the phenomenon under study.
The other implication of this world for the broader field of the study of
international relations is the mix of domestic and international aspects of the compellence
puzzle. Although scholars such as Putnam provide us perspective on the interplay of
international and domestic factors and Keohane and Nye provide the web of connections
that reach across and through states, our leading theory treats domestic motivations as a
black box .12 The compellence puzzle highlights an area that is important to the study of
international relations, the threat and use of force, where the domestic realm may carry
significant weight. Further work to bring the domestic perspective into the discourse
would be useful to address this and similarly connected issues.
Future Research
In order to bring about a more complete understanding of compellence further
research is required. Two concentrations of research are needed to make substantive
progress. The first concentration has been alluded to above. It relates to broader
international relations framework in which compellence operates. It requires further
development of our understanding of norms, domestic and foreign policy interactions,
ensuring that theories are based in a world view instead of a Western perspective, and
above all a focus on empirical approaches. As these actions are critical to advances in

12

Waltz, Theory o f International Politics.
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many areas of international relations, they will likely occur as part of the natural
maturation of the field.
The second concentration is internal to the subject of compellence. In parallel
with work on the larger framework, a number of technical details of compellence success
and failure need to be developed.
One method to develop those details may be country studies that examine
successful and unsuccessful users of compellence to look for specific traits or methods.
This is different from a case study that may examine a single compellence event. This
approach would examine a large number of compellence events by a state. Of particular
interest would be use or reuse of specific successful tactics, the international environment
at the time of successful and unsuccessful attempts, and any patterns of choice of target
state. O f particular interest is the UK, whose compellence reach was global, and
compellence success record was one of the best. Alternatively, a study of France from
1853 to 2001 may be especially informative due to their consistent record of single state
compellence failure. Likewise, a comparative study that includes states from each region
of the world may be helpful.
Another area of research internal to the area of compellence could be the focused
study of compellence events that had multiple states involved, such as those related to
Europe in the early 1800s. These are particularly interesting in that this was a nexus of
substantial compellence success. Initial results would need to be compared to an
appropriate set of compellence events not centered in Europe to ensure a balanced
perspective. A possible outcome may be the understanding of region system effects that
could be applied to the global perspective.
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Another key area for investigation is impact of the level of interest or pertinence a
state has to a specific topic at question on success of a compellence attempt. This is
difficult to measure, unlike physical capabilities cannot be overtly counted. Simply
measuring the level of threat is also insufficient, as the level of threat may be limited or
inflated by other factors. This research may require a combination of empirical and case
study approaches. If the researcher resolves a way to robustly operationalize “pertinence”
this factor may clarify much of compellence success and failure.
A final area for study may be an approach that places the tool of compellence in
context with other tools of statecraft. It is possible that when viewed in context of the full
use of public and private diplomacy, economic and trade policy actions, and the actions
of allies and international organizations compellence attempts during the post-World War
II period will take on a different complexion. A possible outcome may be that statesmen
have allowed compellence attempts to appear to fail as policy goals have shifted and
different venues have been chosen to pursue alternative goals.
This set of basic research tasks may appear to be daunting because of the
immature understanding of state level compellence that currently exists within the field of
international relations. This is a place that the study of international relations can help
create an understanding that makes a difference in how states interact. For that reason, as
research is conducted, frequent surveys of the area of study should be conducted and
published to synthesize current compellence knowledge and to remain connected to the
overall field of international relations.
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The Future o f Compellence
Compellence will not likely disappear as a tool of foreign policy, despite its lack
of recent success. The Western political and military milieu is populated with memories
of events where compellence did work and its failures have been forgotten. Decision
makers will continue to be guided by the lessons of compellence a la the Cuban Missile
Crisis until a different event provides a more powerful example.

1^

Leaders in other parts

of the world have adopted the tactic of compellence even as they have adopted the form
of the Westphalian state, but with even less success. Each compellence attempt,
successful or not, generates massive military and political costs. But the alternatives to
deal with aggressor states that have gone beyond the ken of normal diplomacy may be no
better. Economic measures suffer from a similar lack of success and are less precise in
application.14 War costs far more than compellence and possesses even more
uncertainties. Within the range of statecraft, the success of the other tools, the volatile
nature of the international environment and ability to precisely apply compellence
pressure may make it the best possible tool for a situation despite its low payoff
probabilities. Equipped with the understanding provided by this and future research,
decision makers should no longer be blinded by the myths of compellence as they choose
their tool. If compellence is still the choice, they should be able to plan and execute it
with a clearer understanding of the method and its shortcomings in the crises of the
future.

13
14

Khong, A nalogies at War, 35-37.

Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 371.
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APPENDIX

Compellence Statistics Sources
The data required to present an empirical perspective on the phenomena of
compellence includes the identity of the participants, chronologic data, the methods used
to attempt compellence, and other data depending on the choice of independent variables.
Currently, there is not a specific database designed to address the phenomenon of
compellence. Therefore, this work is based on existing databases with data about states,
their militarized interactions, internal political structure, and leadership. Through
manipulation o f these databases it is possible to derive data appropriate to the task.
Incumbent with the use o f that data is an explanation of the sources of that data and how
it was interpreted to arrive at conclusions.
There are five major data sources and a specialized data manipulation software
program that support this work. The first source was the Militarized Interstate Dispute
(MID) database.1 In addition to the basic identifying data for each dispute such as country
code, abbreviation, and year, the MID included start and end dates of disputes, number of
states on each side, levels of threat or force, fatalities, outcome, and type of resolution.
These facts provided the key data to identify each compellence attempt and its outcome.
A second and third sources of data were the State System Membership and National
•

•

•

2

Material Capabilities databases. This data included number of states in the international
system, system capability concentration, major power status, region, and number of
major powers. Further, it included state capability scores with sub-elements of military

1 Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes."
2

Small and Singer, Resort to Arms; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution."
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personnel and expenditures, energy and iron and steel production, urban and total
population. These database and others are hosted within the Correlates of War Project.3
To pull these sources together, this study used the Expected Utility Generation
and data management program, commonly referred to as “EUGene.” This program brings
multiple databases together in a comprehensive and manipulable data set. EUGene
combines data from the Correlates of War 2 (COW2) project noted above and the
expected utility data based on calculations of Bueno de Mesquita’s international
interaction game specified in War and Reason .4 These data elements includes a state’s
readiness to assume risk, expected utility for various courses of action and equilibrium
condition for those courses of action.
EUGene was initially designed to generate data to examine an expected utility
theory of war associated with Bueno de Mesquita works, War and Reason and War Trap,
within the broader confines of international conflict.5 More importantly to this study, it
provides an automated method to integrate and interrogate the aforementioned databases.
A key feature of this program is its ability to create dyadic data sets from source data that
is monadic in construction. However, as will be discussed later, this dyadic orientation,
although necessary, creates a second set of data challenges.
Polity 4 was the fourth major source of data, providing a well-accepted rendering
of the domestic political conditions. The Polity 4 data was downloaded from the Internet
from the Polity 4 site.6 It was then imported into the EUGene program with its organic

3

Correlates o f War 2 Project, http://cow2.la.psu.edu/ (accessed 1 March 2003).

4

D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stain, "EUGene: Expected Utility Generation and Data
Management Program Documentation,". 11 October 2003, http://www.eugenesoftware.org/ (accessed 2
April 2004).
5 Ibid., 87.
6 Marshall, Polity IV Project.
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ability to import appropriately formatted data. This allowed ready examination of the
level of democracy or autocracy that existed in any state at the time of a militarized
dispute.
The data harvested from EUGene consisted of 2,945 observations in a directed
dispute dyad format spanning 1816 to 2001 capturing one case per dyadic dispute
initiation, with 100% of available data written to a file. The directed dispute dyad format
is a directional case entry where, by selection, the state that is attempting to change
policy, territory or a regime is listed first and the state that is being acted on is listed
second. These cases list only two states. Disputes that have multiple participants are
represented by multiple dyadic cases.
The fifth source of data was leader longevity data assembled for The Logic o f
Political Survival. This data was accessed from Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s Internet site
in electronic form .7 This data identifies individual chief executives with states and dates
of incumbency. Although this data is readily available, unlike the Polity data there was no
automated method to import it into EUGene. The cases were cross-referenced by means
of common reference elements, specifically, date comparison and Correlates of War
country codes. Leaders then could then be identified as having attempted compellence or
not having attempted compellence. This also provided a method to determine where
within an incumbency compellence attempts occurred.
In formatting cases, EUGene offers the ability to select if each initiation of the
dispute should be considered a case or if each year of a dispute should be considered a
case. In order to capture the number of successful and unsuccessful attempts at
7

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic o f Political Survival Data Source.
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/data/bdm2s2/Logic.htm (accessed 23 January 2004).
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compellence, data was formatted on one case per initiation rule and not on one case per
dispute year, as the study’s proposition does not highlight length of the attempted
compellence action as an important factor.
Since EUGene expresses interstate disputes in terms of dyads, a key data selection
decision is that of inclusion or exclusion of joiners. Joiners are participants on either side
of compellence action that were not parties on the first day of initiation. Joiners are not
casual partners, mere affiliates, or even allies, but instead are actively cooperating
participants as evidenced by frequent consultations on the threatened or actual military
action or the creation of a unified chain of command.8 One approach to joiners is to select
only the very first participants in each dispute as to the subjects of the analysis. This
approach has the strength of being able to arrive at insights about decisions to start
compellence, when no other states have. Alternatively, being first chronologically may
not be a significant factor in addressing the compellence puzzle, nor does it recognize
later involvement by a state may be decisive in determining whether to resist or to
comply. In selecting data for this study joiner dyads were created. This means that for
some disputes there are multiple cases to reflect the all active participants and their
dyadic relations, not just the earliest participants.
The fourth source of data was leader longevity data assembled for The Logic o f
Political Survival. This data was accessed from Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s Internet site
in electronic form .9 This data identifies individual chief executives with states and dates
of incumbency. Although this data is readily available, unlike the Polity data there was no
automated method to import it into EUGene. The cases were cross-referenced by means
g
9

Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 175.
Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic o f Political Survival Data Source.
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o f common reference elements, specifically, date comparison and Correlates of War
country codes. Leaders then could then be identified as having attempted compellence or
not having attempted compellence. This also provided a method to determine where
within an incumbency compellence attempts occurred.
The data acquired provided a robust perspective on states participating in
compellence attempts. It still required some ordering before it could be used to help to
understand the phenomenon of compellence.

Data Manipulation
This section will explain how the set of dyadic cases produced by EUGene were
used to accurately and usefully describe compellence. First, critical aspects of the initial
data coding will be reviewed and recoding or other dispositions for this study will be
established. This procedure will show the movement from the initial available 2,945
cases to 1,893 cases.
To understand this process, the original operational definition that were used
within the MID must first be reviewed. In Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992:
Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns, Jones, Bremer, and Singer indicates
that the term "militarized interstate dispute" refers to a unified historical case in which the
threat, display, or use of military force short of a war by one member state is explicitly
directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or
territory of another state.10 This initial portion of the definition is particularly important to

10 Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 6.
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compellence, as compellence focuses on decisions undertaken by the target based on
threat, display, or exemplar use of force.
This does not indicate that compellence does not occur simultaneous to full-scale
warfare, as might be the case with Hiroshima and Nagasaki within World War II, only
that it is analytically difficult to separate the effects created by physically capturing or
destroying military capabilities with the intent to obliterate and effects created by threats,
displays, and exemplar uses of military force with the intent to convince. The militarized
interstate disputes, as operationally defined by Jones, Bremer, and Singer provide a
sample of activities that are not mixed with the intricacies of a broader war. This will
focus conclusions specifically on compellence separate from general warfare and its uses
as a tool short of warfare.
The database captures the interstate dimension of the cases, limiting them to
diplomatically recognized member states of the global system and excluding interactions
involving non-state actors. This portion of the operational definition will limit the
conclusions of this study specifically to state actors. Dispute also excludes militarized
actions when they are provided for by treaty or occur at the invitation of the target state,
unless they clearly exceed the bounds spelled out within the treaty or invitation. The
initial operationalization that guided the population of this database limits cases to stateto-state actions that reflect the position of the duly constituted government and disallow
allegations of dispute or even routine military training exercises, nation building, foreign
internal defense support, and intervention on behalf of the recognized government from
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consideration.11 These strong limitations ensure that the data extracted from the MID
reflect compellence vice some other type of activity.

Type o f Actions
This database also characterizes militarized incidents in three general and 20
specific categories. The three general categories include threat of force, display of force,
and use of force. The researchers characterize threats as verbal indicators of hostile
intent. As the data was coded, threats were identified by contingent speech and usually
took the form of an ultimatum; the intention is to take a certain action against another
state if the other state acts, fails to act, or does not stop acting in a specified manner.
Some may interpret these threats as deterrence instead of compellence. To guard
against this confusion, the cases were selected based on the “initiator” also being a
“revisionist.” This means that first state in each case was coded to have issued a threat for
the purpose of requiring a change in the second state’s policy, territory, or regime status
quo. Since the goal of deterrence is to ensure that an entity does not conduct a particular
behavior and the cases here are about attempting to force a change to policy, territory, or
regime the data supports examination of compellence, and not deterrence.
The second broad category is a display of force. The authors coded this selection
when there was a military demonstration but no combat interaction. These nonviolent
military acts serve as ways to signal capability and intent to the target state. It is possible
that these signals could be more persuasive than verbal threats because the state that is
attempting to compel has invested materiel and political resources to communicate this

11 Ibid., 169-70.
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signal. As military forces deploy in an emerging crisis, domestic politics can increase the
pressure for an executive to succeed. Target states can be aware of this pressure and their
behavior may be more readily modified based on greater knowledge of their opponent’s
investment.12
Unlike the previous category, the category of the use of military force almost
entirely represents activities that have a direct effect on a target state such as blockades,
clashes, or occupations of territory. The exception in this category is official declarations
of war. The actions within this category are still only state-to-state communications of
capability and intent, although because they are an application of military force, they can
be deadly for those individuals directly engaged in them. The physical acts within this
category can escalate to an intensity that is no longer distinguishable from war.
Previously, researchers set the threshold of 1,000 total battle deaths as the
dividing line between militarized interstate disputes and interstate wars .13 Most
militarized interstate disputes never reach this threshold, however there are two codings
within this database that indicates this outcome. One of the codings is "interstate war" to
indicate the start point of a war growing from a dispute and the other coding is “join
interstate war” to indicate that a state engaged in the dispute joined an ongoing interstate
war that the other state is already involved in.

Nature of Actions
Having described the different types of militarized incidents and offered a
classification that categorizes them, Jones, Bremer and Singer grouped these incidents
12
13

Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, 17-18.
Small and Singer, Resort to Arms.
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into coherent historical episodes that constitute militarized interstate disputes. It is
important to note that this record of disputes is actually an incomplete and skeletal record
of the interactions between the states. For example, only the highest level of hostility will
be reported for each state involved. Repeat exchanges at a given level will not be
apparent from the data; therefore, in this data set, escalation is more obvious than
persistence. Further, de-escalatory steps are not directly reflected either, although the
method by which a dispute is settled is recorded.
The authors indicate that coders and compilers of the database paid particular
attention to the continuity of location and issues by first isolating and coding specifics
incidences using the rules noted above and then aggregating related incidences into larger
militarized interstate disputes. The project used six rules for aggregation that help ensure
the coherency of the incidents and subsequent lessons for compellence.
1) same or an overlapping set of interstate members.
2 ) same issue or set of issues and occur within the same geographic area.

3) start date of a dispute is defined by the initiation of the first militarized
incident, but the end date is determined in several w ays,...
4) When two states go to war, all other ongoing disputes between these
two states cease.
5) In cases of militarized interstate disputes within the context of a civil
war, the side that controls the pre-war capital controls the government.
When effective control of the capital shifts so does the government.
6 ) Wars and sub-war disputes of independence are included in the data
only if there are interstate system members on both sides of the dispute.14
Another key area of demarcation is determining the end a compellence attempt.
This set of rules uses expiration of 6 months after the last codeable incident, restarts of
the attempt within a short period of the end, if activity increases, and recognizes formal
endings, 3 months after treaties or other negotiated instruments. These indicators of

14

Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Disputes," 174-77.
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incident endpoints provide a technique to divide what otherwise might appear to be a
continuous stream of state actions and make it susceptible to empirical analysis.
Particularly important to this study are the outcomes of attempts at compellence.
In order to discern these it is necessary to examine how the original outcome data was
coded within the Militarized Interstate Dispute database and reinterpret these outcomes
based on an understanding of compellence. The initial coding of disputes is seen in table
20 .

Table 20. Outcomes within Militarized Interstate Dispute Database
Alteration of the status quo by one state through the use of
Victory
militarized action which imposes defeat upon the opponent
One state capitulates by offering concessions which appease the
demands of another state before the militarized forces of either
Yield
state has secured any substantial tactical gains on the battlefield
Lack of any decisive changes in the pre-dispute status quo and
is identified when the outcome does not favor either side in the
Stalemate
dispute
Each side in the dispute agrees to give up some demands or
Compromise
make concessions with regard to the status quo
Only for situations in which a seizure of material or personnel
defines the context of the dispute. Seizure of material or
Released
personnel culminates with their release from captivity
Unclear

Historical sources provided either conflicting interpretations or
ambiguous information about post-dispute status quo

In order to use this data to illuminate the complexities of compellence it will be
necessary to exclude some of it, and in some cases, recode it so as to be useful.
Specifically, victory for either side (code 1, 2) is, by definition, imposition of military
defeat upon the opposing state, whereas “yield”, by comparison, is a condition achieved
without gaining tactical advantage on the battlefield. The "victory" definition continues
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by indicating that it is attainment of the goal of revision, territory, policy, or regime by
force.
The data provides the ability to determine the actual highest level of threat,
display, and use o f force within the dyad, and the same data by each state. Upon
examination it appears that some of the cases that are coded as victory a, but that they
have reached the revisionist’s goal without using force. In other words, the highest level
of activity is recorded as a threat or display followed by the desired change in behavior
on the part of the target state without recourse. The apparent inconsistent coding of
“victory a” and the condition where the highest level of activity that state a conducted did
not include application of force will be considered successful compellence for this study.
Alternatively, those cases coded with war as the highest level of activity could be
considered to be failures of compellence if the sending state attempted to use threats,
displays, and exemplar uses of force to convince the target state prior to moving to war.
Although the database does not contain direct information on precursor activities, a “bolt
out of the blue” war is very unlikely.15 Notwithstanding Japan's attack on Hawaii, the
wars that are recorded in this database were preceded by some attempt on the part of the
revisionist state to gain its goals at cost less than war. For this reason, cases that are
scored as "victory" and have an activity code that indicates war will be considered failed
compellence attempts.
This leaves the actions within the "victory a" that could have created a physical
difference that led to be assignment of victory as the outcome, e.g. blockade, clash,
attack, etc. As these cannot be reasonably proven to be dependent solely on threat or

15 Nancy Kanwisher, "Cognitive Heuristics and American Security Policy," The Journal o f
Conflict Resolution 33, no. 4 (December 1989): 656.
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demonstration, but involve some level of physical application of force, they will be coded
as unsuccessful compellence attempts.
A more straightforward site of cases it is yield by side a (code 3). As the database
is arranged so that side a is the initiator of a revision to the then status quo, this outcome
represents successful resistance to compellence by side b and scored as failed attempt at
compellence. However, yield by side b (code 4) is a successful compellence attempt for
side a and a failure for side b.
The bulk of the cases are coded stalemate (code 5), which is the outcome when
side b decides not to comply with side a demands, but does not either get side a to
capitulate, nor is overcome by direct military force. Since side a has not achieved its goal
to get side b to act in a particular fashion this outcome constitutes unsuccessful
compellence.
To this point, the differentiations between successful resistance and successful
compellence have been fairly clear. The next outcome, compromise (code 6 ), could be
viewed from either perspective. Side a achieves some of its desired objective and side b
does likewise. One could forward a number of scenarios that led to the compromise;
however, the information in the database does not provide that level of detail. Therefore,
in order to provide an initial stringent examination of compellence, compromise will be
coded as an unsuccessful effort at compellence. Later in the analysis, this assumption will
be relaxed to gauge its effects on our understanding of the data.
Another special case, “released” (code 7), indicates, according to the MID code
book, the release of seized territory, items or people. This is only applicable to special
cases where the substance of the dispute was the seizure, for at least twenty-four hours, of
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material or personnel of official forces from another state, or the detention of private
citizens operating within contested territory. Since the cases that constitute this outcome
area are, by definition, resolved by reversing the seizure that defines the dispute these
cases are not coded in a way it is clear if this is a “victory,” “yield,” or “compromise”
outcome. Further, examination of the activity codes in the database indicate that almost
90 percent of the cases of "seizure" are resolved via a "seizure" by the aggrieved party.
This therefore does not illuminate the success of compellence or effective resistance, as
the objects that constitute the subject of the actions in this category, materiel or
personnel, are seized and re-seized. Therefore, these cases will not be considered in this
study. These cases constitute approximately eight percent of all the available cases.
More obvious, unclear (code 8), indicates that the coders did not have sufficient
data to make a differentiation - therefore these cases will also be excluded as they does
not provide indicative information for the proposition. Also fairly obvious, "joins
ongoing war" (code 9), is a failure of compellence and an indicator of successful
resistance as the dispute has moved past the stage of threats and exemplar use of violence
to join with an ongoing military operation that substantially depends on the ability to
physically control the adversary. As previously noted, some level of compellence can
occur during major combat, however, the data in this category describes disputes where
compellence efforts have substantially failed and the target of compellence resists to such
a level that 1,000 or more battle deaths occur. The final category, missing data (negative
9) about outcomes does not provide insight into successful compellence or resistance so
will be excluded from the analysis. Table 21 recapitulates these treatments.
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Table 21. Recoded Outcomes from Militarized Interstate Dispute Database
Original Coding

Modified Coding

Number
of Cases

Victory A

Either successful and unsuccessful compellence,
based on revisionist’s highest level activity

280

Victory B

Unsuccessful compellence

158

Yield by A

Unsuccessful compellence

92

Yield by B

Successful compellence

Stalemate

Unsuccessful compellence

Compromise
Released
Unclear

Initially included unsuccessful compellence for a strict
examination of compellence
Discarded as not indicative of response to
compellence
Discarded as not indicative of response to
compellence

228
1751
200
151
44

Joins Ongoing
War

Unsuccessful compellence

27

Missing Data

Discarded as not indicative of response to
compellence

14

Total

2945

Data Processing
The initial data extracted from EUGene provided 2,945 dyadic cases for
militarized interstate disputes for the years 1816 to 2001, inclusive. The program settings
that yielded these cases are attached as the last page of this appendix. The first data
manipulation was to remove the cases where a state was identified as “revisionist,” but
did not issue a threat, displaying military forces, or using force. This left 2,814 dyadic
cases. The second manipulation was to remove the cases whose outcome did not inform
compellence. As discussed above, cases with seizure, unclear, and missing data results
were deleted, leaving 2,613 cases. O f these, 1,558 were cases where a single state
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attempted to compel a single state. In the circumstance where the data indicated that each
state was attempting to compel the other, compellence and counter-compellence, 2 cases
were recorded. The data set describing the one state vs. one state cases can be directly
manipulated and create meaningful results.
Some dyadic cases that are subcomponents of larger compellence events with
multiple states involved on either side requires additional processing before we can use
them effectively. Participation in these cases is not as straight forward as the single state
vs. single state cases. Of the 1,055 dyadic cases that involve multiple participants some
had multiple states involved at differing levels of activity. Simplifying them for the
purpose of examining compellence, cases that were assigned to categories based on
activities that involved actual communication of threat, demonstration of forces, or
exemplar use of force were retained. This resulted in a new set of 79 single state versus
single state cases where the database indicated the involvement of a multitude of states,
but compellence related actions were only indicated for single states.
Likewise, 478 line items of a single state attempting to compel multiple states,
308 line items where multiple states attempted to compel a single state, and 190 line
items where multiple states attempted to compel multiple states were created. These were
resolved to 335 cases of attempted compellence by associating the sender and target data
across the identification numbers of the line items. After the data from the multiple
participants has been appropriately aggregated and combined with the single state cases,
1,893 episodes of attempted compellence will be available to inform our common
understanding.
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These additional manipulations open these cases to methodological concerns that
the initial one state vs. one state do not face. Therefore, these derived cases were not used
to establish the initial conditions of compellence and its puzzle, but were used to
illuminate aspects that are specific to multiple state compellence.

Extract from EUGene 3.04 Command File
Below is an extract from the EUGene command file that was created when data
for this study was processed in EUGene. It provides the key variables used to create the
initial data set for this work. It is provided to aid researchers that may want to replicate
this work. In its full form the command file enables movement of data to a preferred
statistics software package. This study used SPSS 11.0.

Start of Extract
Number of observations in this data set: 2945
*
*
*
*
*
*

Data set specifications:
Base Format: Directed Dispute Dyad
Time Span: 1816 to 2001
Selected Subset: One case per dyadic dispute initiation
Sampling: None (100% of available data written to file)
Variables included:
ccodel

ccode2

year

abbrevl

abbrev2

cap 1

cap 2

milper 1

milex 1

energy 1

irst 1

upop 1

tpop 1

milper 2

milex 2

energy 2

irst 2

upop 2

tpop 2

majpowl

majpow2

rlregion

region 1

region2

alliance

numstate

numGPs

syscon

riskTl

riskT2

w rTulvl

wrTulv2

wrTulvsq

wrTplwin

wrTstkl

wrTulsq

wrTulacl

wrTulac2

wrTulneg

wrTulcpl

wrTulcp2

wrTulwrl

wrTulwr2

wrTu2v2

wrTu2vl

wrTu2vsq

wrTp2win

wrTstk2

wrTu2sq

wrTu2ac2

wrTu2acl

wrTu2neg

wrTu2cp2

wrTu2cpl

wrTu2wr2

wrTu2wrl

cwongo

cwongonm

cwinit

cwinitnm

cwhostl

cwhost2

cwhostd

cwkeynum

cworigl

cworig2

cwjoanyi

cwjoanyt

cwjomidi

cwjomidt
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cwmidnme

cwstmol

cwstdayl

cwstyrl

cwstmo2

cwstday2

cwstyr2

cwendmol

cwenddyl

cwendyrl

cwendmo2

cwenddy2

cwendyr2

cwsideAl

cwsideA2

cwrevisl

cwrevis2

cwrevtl 1

cwrevt21

cwrevtl 2

cwrevt22

cwfatall

cwfatexl

cwfatal2

cwfatex2

cwhiactl

cwhiact2

cwhiactd

cwoutcm

cwsettle

cwfatald

cwrecip

cwnumstl

cwnumst2

cwnmmdnw

cwnmmdal

cwpceyrs

cowrolea

cowroleb

polity21

polity22

durable 1

durable2

exrecl

exrec2

exconst 1

exconst2

polcompl

polcomp2

woversl

wovers2

Selected settings for variables with multiple output options:
* Alliances taken from COW dyadic alliance file
* Peace years calculated using Werner peace year adjustment
* Conflict exclusions based on COW ME) data
* Dispute characteristics:
* When two or more disputes occur in a year, data is from the highest intensity dispute
* Originators and all states on initiating side coded as initiators
* Initiator defined as "Revisionist State(s)"
* Ongoing dispute years not considered new initiations
* Target vs. Initiator directed dyads dropped if no new MID
* Joiner Dyads included
End of extract
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